External dimension as a panacea? Italy's cooperation with third countries (Libya, Tunisia, Albania) in managing migration flows (2022–2024)

Glubokaya Ol'ga Anatolevna ORCID: 0000-0002-7202-8630 Assistant to the Vice-rector; Federal State Educational Public Institution of Higher Education “Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation” 53/2 Ostozhenka St., building 1, Moscow, 119021, Russia oaglubokaya@gmail.com

Introduction

The Central Mediterranean migration route continues to be a critically important and intense destination for the European Union. Italy, as the main country of first entry along this path, has faced unprecedented pressure in recent years: if about 34,000 illegal arrivals were recorded in 2020, then by 2023 this figure had more than quadrupled, reaching a record 157,000 people since 2016 ^{[1, 2]}. This sharp increase The growth has created significant challenges for the asylum system, reception infrastructure, and the country's socio-political climate. The coming to power in October 2022 of the center-right coalition led by Giorgio Meloni marked a strategic turn in Italy's migration policy, making the so-called "external dimension" a key priority. The essence of this strategy is to actively shift responsibility for controlling and curbing migration flows beyond national and pan-European borders, mainly through cooperation with third countries.

However, despite the break with the approaches of its predecessors declared by the Meloni government, its strategy is largely based on externalization tools inherited or intensified from an earlier period (for example, the extension of the Memorandum with Libya in 2017) ^{[1, 8]}. The dynamics of migration flows in 2022-2024, characterized at first by a sharp increase (105,000 per year 2022, 157,000 in 2023), followed by an equally significant decline (66,000 in 2024), and their constant reformatting (shifting a key transit hub from Libya in 2022 to Tunisia in 2023 and back to Libya in 2024), along with an attempt to implement a radically new model through an agreement with Albania, highlighted a number of There are fundamental contradictions ^{[1, 2, 3]}. First, there is a clear gap between the rhetoric of "rigidity" and the harsh pragmatic dependence on cooperation with unstable governments in Libya and Tunisia. Secondly, the policy of curbing migration is faced with systematic accusations of complicity in human rights violations occurring on the territory of these partner countries. Thirdly, symbolic political "victories" such as the treaty with Albania often turn out to be legally vulnerable and operationally problematic when trying to implement them in practice.

The purpose of this article is to conduct a comparative analysis of the effectiveness, risks and consequences of the three main directions of the migration control externalization strategy implemented by Italy in the period from 2022 to 2024.:

1) traditional and extended cooperation with Libya based on maritime border control and interceptions;

2) a new alliance with Tunisia, formed with the key role of the EU and involving large-scale financial support in exchange for curbing migration;

3) a radical experiment to create asylum request processing centers in Albania under Italian jurisdiction.

The article poses the following research questions: what is the real effectiveness of each of these agreements in reducing the number of migrant arrivals by sea on the Italian coast? What are the legal, ethical, and political risks posed by each of the three cooperation models? Can the externalization strategy be considered as a sustainable long-term solution to the migration pressure on Italy, or is it primarily a tactical compromise with a limited duration? Finally, how does the dynamics of migration flows (a sharp increase in 2023 and an equally significant drop in 2024) correlate with the implementation and evolution of these agreements?

Methodologically, the article is based on a qualitative analysis of three consecutive annual reports of the Italian Institute of International Policy Studies (ISPI) for 2022, 2023 and 2024 on Italian migration policy. Comparative historical analysis methods are used to study the evolution of agreements; analyze effectiveness by comparing data on arrivals, interceptions, and progress in the implementation of agreements; identify cause-and-effect relationships between policy measures and changes in migration flows; and comprehensively assess risks based on data on legal conflicts, human rights violations, and political instability in partner countries.

The scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that it offers the first comprehensive comparison of three different types of externalization models (traditional, pan-European, and bilateral innovation) implemented by one government in a short time. She gives a critical assessment of the "success" of 2024 – a 58% decrease in arrivals - linking it not only to measures of pressure on transit countries (especially Tunisia), but also to the phenomenon of "hybrid migration" through Libya, when migrants arrive there legally or semi–legally from Asia, and then illegally cross the Mediterranean Sea.. The article also predicts the sustainability of the strategy in the light of upcoming challenges in 2025, such as the decision of the EU Court of Justice in the case of the Albanian centers and the need to implement the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

The key thesis of the article is that although the Meloni government's bet on externalization as a "panacea" has led to a tactical decrease in the number of arrivals in 2024, the long-term effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of this strategy remain in serious question. This is due to its inherent systemic legal risks, dependence on problematic partners, and inability to address the underlying structural causes of migration, which casts doubt on its status as a true solution.

Theoretical framework and methodology

The analysis of the Italian Government's strategy for managing migration flows through cooperation with third countries requires reliance on a clear theoretical concept of the externalization of migration control. In this article, externalization is understood as a strategic approach in which States or supranational associations (in this case, Italy and the European Union) seek to transfer the functions of preventing illegal migration, intercepting, detaining, and initially processing protection requests beyond their own borders, delegating these tasks to third countries. This phenomenon, which has been studied in detail in the academic literature ^{[4, 7]}, is not just technical cooperation, but a form of risk management. Its essence is to create a buffer zone where migration flows are contained or redirected until they reach the territory of the target State or union, thereby minimizing the immediate political, social and administrative burden. The key instruments of this strategy are readmission agreements, financing and equipping the law enforcement agencies of partner countries, the creation of request processing centers on their territory, and exerting diplomatic pressure to tighten border controls.

A critical look at externalization ^{[5, 6]} focuses on its fundamental dilemmas and risks. The first and most acute risk is associated with systematic human rights violations. Shifting responsibilities to countries with unstable institutions or weak legal safeguards, such as Libya or Tunisia, often makes EU states complicit in practices including arbitrary detention, torture, exploitation and forced expulsions (pushbacks), which directly contradicts international law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement.

The second significant risk concerns issues of sustainability and dependence. The effectiveness of externalization critically depends on the political will, stability, and goodwill of the Governments in the partner countries. Financial and technical support can create dependency relationships without addressing the underlying socio-economic or political reasons that force people to migrate.

The third risk is legal uncertainty and conflicts. Innovative models such as the agreement between Italy and Albania on the establishment of extraterritorial processing centers raise difficult questions about the delimitation of jurisdictions, ensuring the right to effective remedies, and compliance with EU legislation (especially regarding asylum procedures) and international conventions.

Finally, the fourth risk is that externalization often leads to displacement rather than a solution to the problem. It provokes a change in migration routes (as happened with the shift from Libya to Tunisia in 2023 and back in 2024) and the emergence of new methods of movement, such as the "hybrid migration" observed in Libya, when people arrive there legally or semi-legally from Asia, and then illegally cross the Mediterranean Sea.

The methodology of this study is deliberately focused on an in-depth qualitative analysis of specific cases of Italy's cooperation with Libya, Tunisia and Albania in the period from 2022 to 2024. This choice is determined by the nature of research issues that require not so much quantitative measurement of correlations as a deep understanding of the context, policy implementation mechanisms, identification of cause-and-effect relationships and a comprehensive assessment of emerging risks. The main source of empirical data for the analysis was three consecutive annual analytical reports published by the Italian Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI) ^{[1, 2, 3]}.

The work uses several complementary methods of qualitative analysis. A comparative historical analysis allows us to trace the evolution of each of the three areas of cooperation (Libya, Tunisia, Albania) over a three-year period, identify elements of continuity and fundamental gaps with previous policies, as well as determine the specifics of each model (traditional extension of agreements vs. new pan-European deal vs. radical bilateral innovation). The reconstruction of causal relationships (Process Tracing) is used to analyze how specific policy decisions (for example, the signing of the EU-Tunis Protocol, the ban on migrants disembarking from NGO ships, the launch of centers in Albania) influenced or could have influenced the observed changes in migration flows (a sharp increase in 2023, an equally significant fall in 2024, change of main routes). This helps to assess the expected effectiveness of measures against the background of many other factors. In-depth Case Study (Case Study Research) is applied to each of the agreements, considering it as a separate but interrelated object of research. This allows us to study in detail the unique implementation mechanisms, identify specific risks (legal conflicts, humanitarian consequences, political instability of partners) and the factors that led to success or failure.

Certain limitations of the methodology should be recognized. There is an open shortage of some primary data, such as detailed and independent reports on human rights violations in detention centers controlled by Tunisian or Libyan authorities with EU/Italian support. However, the focus of the study on a qualitative analysis of political processes, the context of decision–making and the identification of systemic risks allows us to overcome these limitations in order to achieve the main goal - a critical assessment of the externalization strategy as a migration management tool in the specific historical and political conditions of Italy in the period 2022-2024. A consistent analysis of three years based on data from a single reputable source provides a unique opportunity to track the dynamics and long-term consequences of this strategy.

Evolution of cooperation with third countries (2022-2024)

The strategy of externalizing migration control, which became the cornerstone of the Meloni government's policy, was implemented through three main areas of cooperation: with Libya (as a legacy and extended model), with Tunisia (as a new pan-European initiative) and with Albania (as a radical bilateral innovation). The dynamics of this cooperation over the years 2022-2024 reflect both attempts to adapt to changing migration flows and internal contradictions between pragmatism and ideology.

Cooperation with Libya: Continuity in conditions of instability (2022-2024)

Cooperation with Libya remained the foundation of Italy's deterrence policy throughout the period under review, despite the deep political instability in the country and systematic accusations of human rights violations in detention centers controlled by the Libyan authorities. One of the first significant steps of the Meloni government was the tacit extension at the end of 2022 of the Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, concluded back in 2017 ^{[1, 8]}. This extension, implemented without public debate, demonstrated the broad political consensus in Rome regarding delegating the tasks of intercepting and returning migrants to Libyan forces, despite the known risks. Italy continued to finance and support the Libyan Coast Guard, including training and equipment supplies. The result was a significant increase in the interception of migrants in Libyan waters and their return to shore, where they often found themselves in conditions classified by international organizations as inhumane. Interestingly, the role of Libya as the main transit hub temporarily decreased in 2023 (amid a surge in activity from Tunisia), but by 2024 Libya had regained its dominant position, becoming the departure point for more than 60% of migrants who reached Italy ^{[2, 3]}. This return was partly due to the development of the phenomenon of "hybrid migration" ^[3], when citizens of Asian countries (Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan) began to arrive in Libya legally or semi-legally (for example, on work or study visas), and then illegally go by sea to Italy, which complicated the control tasks for the Libyan authorities, even with Italian support.

Tunisia: A pragmatic alliance with an unpredictable partner (2023-2024)

The sharp increase in the number of migrants leaving Tunisia in 2023 (almost 60% of all arrivals in Italy) ^[2] forced the Meloni government to look for new instruments of influence. The response was active lobbying and co-financing of a large-scale agreement between the EU and Tunisia, signed in July 2023 ^{[2, 9]}. This Protocol, which formally covered a wide range of issues (economic support, energy, migration), was primarily aimed at curbing migration flows. The EU pledged to provide Tunisia with an assistance package of about 1 billion euros, part of which was intended directly to strengthen border control and coast guard capabilities. Italy played a key role in advancing this deal, seeing President Qais Sayed as a necessary, albeit highly unpredictable, partner. The implementation of the agreement faced serious difficulties already at the start: the EU refused to directly finance the Tunisian security forces due to numerous documented cases of brutality and violations of the rights of migrants (especially those from sub-Saharan Africa), which coincided with the harsh rhetoric of Sayed himself ^[3]. Despite this, pressure from the Italian government and the threat of an even greater crisis in Lampedusa after the mass arrivals in the summer of 2023 led to a marked increase in the activity of the Tunisian Coast Guard to intercept boats in 2024 ^[3]. Although this has contributed to an overall decrease in the number of departures and arrivals, the effectiveness of the agreement remains questionable due to the ongoing political instability in Tunisia, problems with full payment of promised EU funds, and the fundamental ethical issue of government support.

Albania: Radical Experiment and Legal Risks (2023-2024)

In an effort to find a more controlled and "European acceptable" solution than cooperation with unstable North African governments, the Meloni government concluded a revolutionary bilateral agreement with Albania in November 2023 ^{[2, 3]}. This protocol provided for the establishment of two centers on Albanian territory (reception and pre-trial detention) under the control of the Italian authorities and in accordance with the Italian jurisdiction. Migrants rescued by Italian ships in international waters were to be sent to these centers to undergo accelerated procedures for processing applications for international protection. The stated goal was to reduce the burden on the Italian admissions system and speed up the processing of applications, as well as create a powerful symbol of deterrence. However, from the very beginning, the project faced serious legal and practical obstacles. The Constitutional Court of Albania temporarily suspended the ratification process of the agreement in early 2024, requiring improvements to comply with the national constitution ^[3]. Despite this, the centers were opened in September 2024, and the first contingent of rescued migrants was delivered to Shengin (Albania) ^[3]. However, very soon the courts in Rome ruled that it was illegal to detain some migrants as part of these accelerated border procedures, which led to a de facto shutdown of the mechanism. In response, in December 2024, the government passed legislative amendments through parliament aimed at strengthening the legal basis of the agreement (for example, giving the list of "safe countries" the status of law and transferring jurisdiction over detention centers to the Courts of Appeal). However, the future of the entire project remains in doubt, pending a key decision by the EU Court of Justice scheduled for 2025, which should assess its compliance with European asylum and human rights legislation. The Albanian experiment vividly illustrates an attempt at radical externalization, which encountered strict legal restrictions and raised fundamental questions about the limits of transferring protection procedures outside the EU.

Analysis of the effectiveness and risks of the externalization strategy

The Meloni Government's strategy of shifting migration control to external borders through cooperation with Libya, Tunisia and Albania shows contradictory results. On the one hand, the significant decrease in the number of arrivals in 2024 to 66,000 (58% less than in the record year of 2023) represents a tactical success that the authorities are actively appealing to. On the other hand, this success is due to a complex of factors, among which externalization plays an ambiguous role, associated with serious systemic risks that cast doubt on the long-term sustainability of the entire model.

Deterrence effectiveness: evidence and doubts

The Meloni government attributes the sharp drop in arrivals primarily to the effectiveness of its externalization policy, especially pressure on Tunisia and an innovative agreement with Albania. Indeed, the intensification of Tunisian Coast Guard interceptions after the conclusion of the Protocol with the EU in 2023 (the result of active lobbying by Italy) contributed to a reduction in sailings from its shores in 2024. However, a deeper analysis of the dynamics and structure of migration flows casts significant doubt on this direct cause-and-effect relationship.

The key factor was not the disappearance of the migration flow, but its redistribution and transformation. A sharp increase in arrivals from Tunisia in 2023 (up to 60% of the total) In itself, it was the result of a shift in the route from Libya, caused by tighter control in the Libyan sector with Italian support. Accordingly, the drop in shipments from Tunisia in 2024 was accompanied by the return of Libya to the status of the main transit hub (60% of shipments), where the phenomenon of "hybrid migration" developed. This term describes a new practice in which citizens of Asian countries (Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan) arrive in Libya legally or semi-legally (for example, on work, study, or tourist visas), and then illegally travel by sea to Italy. This transformation of the flow has made traditional maritime interception measures less effective and only partially explains the overall 58% decrease. As for Albania, its contribution to the decrease in arrivals in 2024 was minimal or zero. The centers in Shengin started operating only in September and were almost immediately blocked by court decisions from Rome, which declared illegal the practice of detention under accelerated border procedures. Thus, their main stated goal – not only to reduce the burden on the Italian system, but also to become a powerful symbol of deterrence – was not achieved.

Legal and ethical risks: the price of deterrence

Success in containing the number of arrivals has been achieved at the cost of profound moral and legal costs, undermining the legitimacy of Italy and the EU as defenders of human rights and the rule of law. The most acute problem is the systematic complicity in human rights violations in Libya and Tunisia. The ongoing financial, technical, and operational support for the Libyan Coast Guard forces and their Tunisian counterparts comes amid numerous independent reports by the United Nations, international NGOs (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch), and reputable media documenting violence, arbitrary and indefinite detentions, and forced expulsions (pushbacks) against migrants in these territories. countries ^{[1, 2, 3]}. Such support, in the absence of effective mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring respect for basic human rights, directly contradicts international law, including the fundamental principle of non-refoulement (prohibition of expulsion to a country where life or freedom is at risk) and the absolute prohibition of torture. Italy and the EU are de facto becoming complicit in these practices.

Italy's domestic policy also shows a tendency towards the erosion of the asylum system. Measures to tighten procedures (restriction of access to protection, reduction of social guarantees), complementing externalization, as well as the very attempt to create "accelerated border procedures" in Albania under Italian jurisdiction, were initially aimed at maximizing the number of successful asylum applications through accelerated consideration and limitation of procedural guarantees. This undermines the very essence of international protection, shifting the focus from individual risk assessment and protection needs to mechanical filtration and failure. The legal vulnerability of the model was clearly demonstrated in the Albanian experiment. The decisions of the Rome courts on the illegality of the detention of migrants in Schengen and the expected decision of the EU Court of Justice in 2025 cast doubt on the very possibility of creating centers outside the EU that are formally subordinate to the jurisdiction of a member state, but at the same time circumvent strict European guarantees of asylum procedures and the right to effective judicial protection. This sets a dangerous precedent for any future attempts to extraterritorialize protection procedures.

Political and operational sustainability: dependence and uncertainty

The effectiveness and long-term sustainability of the externalization strategy critically depend on factors beyond Italy's direct control, which makes it internally unstable. The main risk factor is the extreme unpredictability of key partners. Tunisian President Qais Sayed's policies, statements and actions regarding migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the general instability of the Government, make Tunisia an unreliable partner. Delays and harsh conditions in EU financial aid payments to Tunisia, driven by concerns about human rights and the rule of law, further undermine the sustainability of the agreement.

In Libya, permanent political fragmentation and armed power struggles between clans and rival Governments make any cooperation fragile and prone to sudden disruptions.

The agreement with Albania, initially presented as a "breakthrough" and "groundbreaking," in practice quickly degenerated into a symbolic gesture designed to demonstrate the determination and rigidity of the Meloni government. Its operational viability (insurmountable legal barriers, logistical complexity, immediate judicial blockages) and the lack of a measurable impact on real migration flows cast serious doubt on the expediency of significant political investments and financial costs for such projects.

The economic costs of the strategy are also significant. Significant funds allocated to support the coastguards of Libya and Tunisia (both through pan-European instruments and directly from Italy) and to the construction and operation of centers in Albania divert limited resources from the development of much-needed legal labor migration channels and deep reforms of the refugee reception and integration system in Italy itself. This exacerbates the structural problems of the Italian economy, such as the chronic shortage of labor in agriculture, tourism, healthcare and elderly care, despite a modest increase in quotas in 2023-2024 ^{[2, 3]}.

Comparative assessment of cooperation models

A comparison of the three main directions of externalization reveals their fundamental differences in key parameters (see Table 1). Cooperation with Libya, based on the extension of the 2017 Memorandum, is a traditional model focusing on the interception of migrants at sea and their return. His contribution to the overall decline in arrivals in 2024 was significant, but in many ways paradoxical: he is associated with the return of Libya as a major transit hub and the development of "hybrid migration", which this cooperation itself cannot effectively control. The main risk of this model is deep and systemic complicity in gross violations of human rights.

The agreement with Tunisia, formalized as an EU Protocol in 2023, is an example of a new pan–European initiative aimed at curbing sailings off the coast. Italy played a key role in its promotion. Its contribution to the decrease in arrivals in 2024 can be estimated as moderate, mainly due to the increased activity of the Tunisian Coast Guard to intercept boats. However, this model carries a double burden of risks: the extreme unpredictability of the Tunisian partner and the continuing serious violations of migrants' rights with the support of the EU/Italy.

The experiment with Albania, secured by the 2023 bilateral agreement, is a radical attempt at a bilateral innovation aimed at transferring the procedures for processing protection requests outside the EU to Italian jurisdiction. His real contribution to the decline in arrivals in 2024 was negligible due to legal blockages and operational unavailability. His main vulnerability is fundamental questions about legal compatibility with EU law and international standards in the field of asylum, which will be answered only by the upcoming decision of the EU Court of Justice. From a political and economic point of view, this model proved to be the least stable and effective.

Table 1. Comparative assessment of cooperation models

Thus, the externalization strategy brought the Meloni government a tactical victory in 2024 in the form of a sharp decrease in maritime arrivals. However, this success is largely due to changing migration patterns (a return to Libya and the development of "hybrid migration") and the limited effect of pressure on Tunisia, rather than the implementation of breakthrough or sustainable solutions, especially in the case of Albania. The price of this victory turned out to be high: systematic complicity in human rights violations in Libya and Tunisia, the erosion of the asylum system both inside Italy and through the legally dubious Albanian experiment, as well as growing dependence on unstable partners. The legal fragility of the model, which was particularly evident in the Albanian case, and its inability to address the structural causes of migration or adequately respond to the labor needs of the Italian economy, cast serious doubt on its status as a "panacea." The decrease in arrivals in 2024 looks more like a temporary pause or the result of a shift in the problem than as a sign of finding a long-term and sustainable solution to the migration pressure on Italy.

Conclusion: Externalization as a tactical tool, but not a panacea

The analysis of Italy's three-year cooperation with Libya, Tunisia and Albania (2022-2024) allows us to draw a fundamental conclusion: the strategy of externalizing migration control, despite its tactical effectiveness in achieving a short-term decrease in arrivals, cannot be considered either a sustainable solution or an ethically acceptable "panacea" for complex migration challenges.

The sharp drop in the number of sea arrivals to Italy by 58% in 2024 (to 66,000 people) was indeed a notable result. However, this success should be interpreted with caution as the result of a complex interweaving of factors only partially related to the targeted externalization policy of the Meloni Government. The key role was played by the redistribution of migration flows: the shift of the main route back to Libya (60% of shipments in 2024) after its temporary shift to Tunisia (60% in 2023), reflecting the high adaptability of migration networks to changing pressure conditions ^{[1, 2, 3]}. Equally important was the development of the phenomenon of "hybrid migration" through Libya, where citizens of Asian countries (Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan) began to use legal or semi-legal entry channels (work, study, tourist visas) followed by illegal crossing to Italy, which reduced the effectiveness of traditional maritime interception measures. The contribution of the externalization agreements directly to the reduction was heterogeneous: the EU-Tunisia agreement provided a moderate effect due to increased interceptions, the Albanian experiment did not make a significant contribution due to legal blockages, and cooperation with Libya, while maintaining high risks, contributed to a change in the flow structure rather than its overall reduction.

The key findings of the study clearly indicate the fundamental limitations and risks of the externalization strategy.

First, the price of short-term "success" turned out to be unacceptably high. The decrease in arrivals was accompanied by the systematic complicity of Italy and the EU in gross violations of human rights in Libya and Tunisia. Financial and operational support for forces that practice violence, arbitrary detention and forced expulsions (pushbacks) is not only contrary to international law (including the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of torture), but also causes irreparable damage to the moral authority and value foundations of the EU. Partnering with unstable Governments undermines the very legitimacy of cooperation.

Secondly, the legal vulnerability of radical forms of externalization has become their Achilles heel. The Albanian experiment clearly demonstrated the fundamental incompatibility of the model of extraterritorial asylum processing centers under national jurisdiction, but outside the EU, with the legal system of the Union and international standards for the protection of refugees. The decisions of the Italian courts that recognized the practice of detention in Schengen as illegal, and the upcoming decision of the EU Court of Justice in 2025 are highly likely to confirm this illegitimacy, calling into question the very possibility of such projects.

Third, strategic dependence on unstable partners poses an insurmountable risk. The effectiveness of the model is critically tied to the will and capabilities of governments like the one established in Tunisia, whose unpredictability and internal instability, or permanent chaos in Libya, can negate the results achieved at any moment. This deprives the externalization strategy of the necessary stability and reliability.

Fourth, the hypertrophied focus on containment diverts resources and attention away from solving structural problems. Significant financial and political investments in support of third-country coastguards and dubious projects like the Albanian center divert funds and energy from the development of much-needed legal labor migration channels that meet the needs of the aging Italian economy (agriculture, tourism, care), and from deep reforms of the asylum system and integration within Italy itself. Externalization, in fact, struggles with the consequences, ignoring the underlying causes of migration and the internal needs of the country.

Finally, fifthly, the policy of the Meloni government is characterized by the dominance of symbolic gestures over substantive decisions. Measures such as the agreement with Albania served primarily to demonstrate "decisiveness" and "rigidity" to an internal audience, but proved operationally untenable, economically inefficient, and legally vulnerable, calling into question the rationality of such investments of political capital.

The answer to the central question of the study – whether cooperation with third countries is a "panacea" for Italy – turns out to be unequivocally negative. Externalization appears to be a tactical tool of limited and short-lived effectiveness, fraught with unacceptable ethical compromises, fundamental legal risks, and strategic dependence. It cannot be considered as the basis of a long-term and responsible migration policy.

The prospects for 2025 put the emphasized tact of Meloni's course under serious test. The EU Court's decision in the case of the Albanian centers will not just be a verdict on a single project, but will define the legal boundaries of the very possibility of extraterritorialization of asylum procedures within the EU, potentially burying this model. The implementation of the New EU Migration and Asylum Pact, which is scheduled to enter into force in 2026, will require significant resources, legislative changes and administrative efforts from Italy in 2025 to adapt internal procedures. This will inevitably exacerbate the contradiction between pan-European legal obligations and the government's continuing "identitarian" agenda focused on rigidity and restrictions. The dynamics of the development of "hybrid migration" through Libya will become a key indicator of the ability of the externalization strategy to adapt to the transformation of migration practices or its fundamental inadequacy to new challenges.

In the light of these findings and perspectives, policy steps should be aimed at finding a more balanced and responsible approach.:

1. Priority of a balanced strategy: Avoiding excessive dependence on externalization in favor of a comprehensive policy that combines:

· Strict human rights conditions in any agreements with third countries (independent monitoring, suspension of assistance in cases of violations).

· Substantial investments in the reform and humanization of asylum and integration systems within Italy and the EU to increase their efficiency, speed and public trust.

· A drastic expansion of legal channels of labor migration, clearly linked to demographic and economic needs, including simplification of procedures and the creation of circular migration schemes.

2. Rethinking the partnership with Africa: Shifting the focus from narrow "containment" to long-term cooperation in development, migration management, combating the causes of forced displacement and creating legal mobility opportunities. We are looking for partners whose legitimacy and stability are beyond doubt.

3. Rejection of legally questionable experiments: Recognition of the non-viability of models like the Albanian one and concentration of efforts on the qualitative implementation of the procedures of the New EU Pact within the legal framework and jurisdiction of the Union.

4. Honesty in public communication: avoiding speculation on the "successes" of 2024, recognizing the role of factors unrelated to government policy (shifting routes), and an open dialogue about the real costs and risks of the chosen strategy.

Thus, the period of Meloni's rule clearly showed that betting on externalization as a "panacea" can bring short-term tactical gains in terms of arrivals, but it is achieved at the cost of systemic vulnerability, a deep ethical crisis and strategic dependence on unreliable partners. The decline in 2024 is not a triumph, but rather a pause caused by the shifting of the problem and generating new risks. Sustainable and effective migration management in the future will require Italy and the EU to courageously abandon the illusions of "quick fixes" and move towards a truly integrated, balanced and human rights-based strategy that recognizes both responsibilities to protect the vulnerable and the needs for development, legal mobility and mutually beneficial partnerships.