Diagnosis of behavioral characteristics of employees prone to opportunistic behavior

Yuzhakova Ninel Aleksandrovna ORCID: 0009-0005-0711-8962 Postgraduate student; Faculty of Public Administration; Lomonosov Moscow State University 140016, Russia, Moscow region, Lyubertsy, md. Zenino Residential complex Airplane, 46 Helicopter street uzhakova.n@mail.ru Other publications by this author

1. Introduction

The opportunistic behavior of employees is one of the most difficult to identify and destructive factors of intra-organizational risks. Such behavior can take both latent forms (for example, concealment of information, manipulation of reports) and more obvious ones (fraud, abuse of trust, unauthorized use of company resources). The difficulty of timely detection of opportunism is due to the fact that its manifestations are often in the "gray zone" between violation of norms and legitimate behavior. Empirical evidence and models of corporate fraud (fraud triangle, MICE model, S.C.O.R.E., etc.) show that behavioral predictors and rationalization opportunities are of key importance in assessing the risk of staff deviations.

The relevance of the study is due to the growing number of internal corporate offenses that cause not only direct economic damage to organizations, but also undermine their reputation, worsen the internal climate, increase staff turnover and reduce investment attractiveness. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Investigation Experts (ACFE), opportunistic behavior is manifested in 85% of internal fraud cases, and is most often initiated by employees who had not previously been noticed in violations. Modern organizations need a systematic approach to predictive diagnostics of the risk of opportunism both at the recruitment stage and after the employee is included in the production processes.

The purpose of the study is to identify the behavioral characteristics of employees who are prone to opportunistic behavior, as well as to develop practical recommendations for its diagnosis and prevention both at the stage of personnel selection and during their work.

Research objectives:

1) Describe the main typological features of employees most often involved in corporate fraud.

2) To analyze the existing theoretical models and concepts used to explain the motivation and possibilities of opportunism.

3) Identify key indicators of opportunistic behavior in the pre-contract and post-contract periods.

4) To form a set of recommendations for the identification and prevention of opportunistic behavior of employees in HR practices and the internal control system.

Subject of the study: behavioral manifestations of opportunistic behavior of employees in a corporate environment.

The object of the research is the mechanisms of influence of individual and organizational factors on the emergence and development of opportunistic behavior of employees.

Research hypothesis: the opportunistic behavior of employees is caused by the interaction of personality traits (for example, narcissism, desire for control, low empathy) and organizational conditions (for example, weak control, lack of an ethical climate), and can be predicted at the stages of personnel selection and adaptation.

The methodological base includes an analysis of domestic and foreign literature on organizational behavior, the psychology of deviant behavior and anti-corruption mechanisms, a comparative analysis of fraud models (Fraud Triangle, Fraud Diamond, MICE, etc.), a synthesis of empirical data, including cases of leaks, abuses and falsifications committed by company employees, elements of behavioral psychodiagnostics and socio-psychological risk analysis., summarizing the recommendations of professional associations (ACFE, AICPA, CIPD, etc.).

Source materials: theoretical works of foreign and domestic researchers, analytical reports of professional organizations (ACFE, AICPA), publications in specialized scientific and applied publications on personnel management, organizational psychology and economic security.

2. Analysis of opportunistic behavior of employees based on theoretical models of fraud

The personal qualities of employees who are prone to opportunism are a less studied area of studying the motivation for the manifestation of opportunism. Some studies have found that certain behavioral traits are quite common among those who commit fraud. R. Allan, editor of the Fraud Column, grouped these characteristics into the following four personality types: egoist, bully, control freak, and mouse ^[1]. He defines an egoist as a person who is single-minded, narcissistic, trusting, and eager for the approval of others. Someone who falls into the category of bullies is a person who cultivates fear, does not follow the rules, and does not like criticism. A control freak is always attached to a certain territory, accustomed to controlling everything and refuses to change his style of behavior. Finally, a mouse is a quiet, antisocial, and reserved person. He is usually an exemplary employee. In addition to the four personality traits described by R. Allan, there are other traits of fraudsters. For example, enterprising people usually try to surround themselves with people who are easy to dominate ^[2]. Other studies have shown a link between cheating and the desire for control, rivalry, lack of discipline, insensitivity to others, unpleasantness, aggression, and neuroticism ^[3]. However, these behavioral traits are not absolute indicators of fraud. In fact, there is no convincing evidence that certain personality traits make a person more likely or unable to commit fraud. Research in this area simply indicates that there are some commonalities among those who commit fraud. Currently, behavioral scientists have not been able to identify any characteristics that could reliably indicate a person's propensity to commit fraud. Therefore, more research is needed in this area to gather more convincing evidence.

The "diagnosis of behavioral characteristics of employees prone to opportunistic behavior" implies a comprehensive assessment of both individual psychological and organizational and environmental parameters that characterize the likelihood of deviant actions. The term "labor opportunism" (or "shirking") is defined through indicators of reduced engagement, non—compliance with formal obligations, and manipulation of resources, which is revealed through special questionnaires and scales, as shown in an empirical study ^[4]. To measure organizational cynicism, an adapted Russian-language scale by Pavlova and co-authors is used, which includes cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components ^[5]. Diagnostic tools are complemented by situational tasks (cases), which test the response to situations of information asymmetry and moral choice in the work environment. The combination of these methods improves the reliability and validity of measurements, making it possible to identify both explicit and hidden forms of opportunism in the structure of corporate interaction.

Based on the analysis of literature and practical observations, several typical behavioral types of employees who are prone to opportunistic actions can be identified. Each of them has its own characteristics, motives, and reactions to the organizational environment. Understanding such behaviors helps management to more accurately build management measures. The table below shows five common types, their features, possible actions in an organization, and recommended responses from management.

Table 1. Behavioral types of employees with signs of opportunistic behavior and management response strategies

The above typology of opportunistic behavior of employees allows not only to identify destructive attitudes in the team, but also to direct managerial influence on their transformation into productive forms. The proposed approach is based on the idea that opportunism is not a static characteristic of a personality, but a dynamic state that depends on the organizational context and motivation systems ^[6]. Thus, a formal performer with a well-structured system of non-financial motivation and engaging leadership is able to move into the category of proactive employees ^[7]. Similarly, justifying deviations — when explaining ethical standards, personal consultations, and demonstrating consequences — is able to correct behavior and strengthen personal responsibility ^[8].

Thus, management measures applied not in a punitive, but in a developmental logic, make it possible to turn risky behavioral types into sources of growth, both individual and organizational. This approach forms a strategy for guided adaptation: the identified behavioral profiles are used as benchmarks for building individual development tracks, rather than as markers for exclusion. This, in fact, is the managerial realization of the potential of the staff, including previously hidden competencies, emotional and role resources.

Based on these instrumental approaches, a methodological framework is being formed for predictive assessment of opportunistic potential within the organizational environment. At the same time, the interpretation of behavioral indicators requires taking into account not only the current state, but also latent predictors of deviant behavior. From a theoretical point of view, such a diagnosis is based on earlier work in the field of organizational deviant behavior, primarily on the classical concepts of "white—collar crime." Among them, the model of D. Cressy is of particular importance, considering corporate fraud as the result of an internal conflict between moral constraints and subjectively justified rationalization of behavior. Embedding this approach in the modern context of personnel management makes it possible to more accurately position employees by their behavior: from situational conformity to conscious opportunism. This provides a theoretical and empirical link between behavioral diagnostics and the motivational-value nature of trust violations in organizations.

Why people commit corporate fraud was first studied by criminologist and researcher of "white collar" crime D. Cressy in 1950. His research focused on what causes people to break their trust. He interviewed 250 criminals over the course of 5 months, whose behavior met two criteria: the person had to accept the trust, and he had to break the trust. Cressy's fraud theory explained why trust violators commit fraud, and has been widely used by regulators, professionals, and scientists. This work has been conceptualized as a "fraud triangle." However, critics of the fraud triangle have argued that it alone cannot help explain fraud, as it is impossible to observe two factors (rationalization and pressure), and other important factors such as fraudsters' capabilities are ignored ^[9].

D. Cressy discovered that in order for a person to break trust, three factors must be present: opportunity, pressure/motivation, and rationalization ^[10]. He concluded that employees can violate trust when they believe that they have a financial problem that cannot be shared, and realize that this problem can be secretly solved by violating their trust ^[11].

D. Cressy found that in interviews, many trust violators expressed the idea that they had always known that such behavior was illegal and wrong, and that they were simply deceiving themselves into thinking that it was not illegal ^[12]. Over the years, D. Cressy's hypothesis has become well known as the "fraud triangle", as shown in the figure below.

The first side of the fraud triangle represents pressure or motivation to commit a fraudulent act, the second side represents a perceived opportunity, and the third side advocates rationalization. For fraud to take place, all three elements must be present ^[13].

Figure 1. The Fraud Triangle

Source: D. Cressy

Among the possibilities, some researchers identified high staff turnover in key positions, lack of separation of responsibilities, and complex transactions or organizational structures ^[14].

The motive for committing fraud is often related to personal or corporate pressure on a person. Among the motives for committing fraud, pressure exerted on a person, rationalization, or simply the opportunity to commit fraudulent acts (favorable conditions) were mentioned ^[15]. It was believed that a person's position in an organization contributes to the possibility of fraud, and there is also a direct correlation between the possibility of fraud and the ability to conceal fraud ^[16]. Some researchers have suggested that the pressure may be financial or non-financial. Financial pressures included personal financial losses, falling employee sales, greed, living beyond their means, personal debt, unpaid loans, unexpected financial needs, and examples of non–financial pressures included the need to report results higher than actual productivity to management, frustration at work, and a challenge to defeat the system ^[17].

It can be assumed that pressure is related to employee motivation to commit fraud for personal gain, and opportunity refers to weakness in a system where an employee has the power or other opportunity to commit fraudulent acts, while rationalization can be defined as justification for fraudulent behavior due to an employee's lack of integrity or other moral considerations^[18].

Researchers have classified pressure (motives) both internal, from working in the company, or external pressures, while others have classified them as financial and non-financial pressures. However, it can be seen that both classifications are somehow related. For example, personal pressure can come from both financial and non-financial pressure. Personal financial pressure in this case may be gambling addiction or sudden financial need, while personal non-financial pressure may be lack of personal discipline or greed. Similarly, employment pressures and external pressures can come from both financial and non-financial pressures. These examples are illustrated in the following Figure 2.

Figure 2 Types of pressure exerted on an employee

Source: compiled by the author

In 1984, critics of the D. Cressy triangle presented a "Massive Scale of Fraud" as an alternative to the model. The scale of fraud includes personal integrity instead of rationalization. They defined personal integrity as "a personal code of ethical conduct that every person accepts ^[19].

Ten Common Personal Characteristics of Scammers:

1) Living beyond your means;

2) An irresistible desire for personal gain;

3) The presence of a large number of personal debts;

4) Close communication with clients;

5) The feeling that wages do not correspond to official duties;

6) Involvement in fraudulent schemes;

7) Strong challenge/desire to defeat the system;

8) Excessive gambling addiction;

9) Feeling pressure from family or peers;

10) A feeling of lack of recognition for work.

In 2004, a "diamond" of fraud was developed, as shown in the figure below, where the fraudster's abilities were highlighted ^[20].

Figure 3. The "Diamond" of fraud

Source: R.Kassem

The authors proposed four observable signs for committing fraud:

1) an authoritative position or function in the organization;

2) the ability to understand and exploit weaknesses in accounting and internal control systems;

3) the assurance that the employee will not be detected or, if caught, will not be harmed;

4) the ability to cope with the stress that an otherwise good person experiences when they do bad things.

Another model called MICE was proposed by Mary-Jo Cranacher, a certified expert in fraud and financial expertise. In this model, the author suggested that the motivation of fraud perpetrators could be more appropriately expanded using an abbreviation: MICE: money, ideology, coercion, and ego. Ideological motives justify the means by which they can steal money or engage in fraud in order to achieve some perceived greater good that is consistent with their beliefs (ideology). Coercion occurs when people can be unwittingly drawn into a fraudulent scheme, but these people can turn into informants ^[21]. Ego can also be a motive for cheating, when sometimes people don't like losing their reputation or position of power in front of society or families. This social pressure may be a motive for committing fraudulent acts just to preserve one's ego ^[22].

In 2019, the S.C.C.O.R.E. model (incentive, ability, collusion, opportunity, rationalization, and ego) was developed. It should be emphasized that the S.C.C.O.R.E. model should be used as an extension of the S.C.O.R.E. model (in this model, as well as in the MICE model, the concept of ego is introduced), previously introduced by the author ^[23]. This model is better used in employee crimes, where collusion plays a crucial role in determining the factors leading to financial fraud ^[24].

In order to understand which of the models is suitable for the organization, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis. The results of the comparative analysis are presented in table 2.

Table 2. Comparative analysis of fraud patterns

Source: compiled by the author

The following comparative analysis helps to identify exactly where domestic and foreign approaches to the diagnosis and prevention of opportunistic personnel behavior converge and diverge. This provides a basis for selecting effective practices that can be adapted to Russian conditions, as well as points out aspects that need to be adjusted to reflect local culture and organizational realities.

Table 3. Comparison of domestic and foreign approaches to the diagnosis and prevention of opportunistic personnel behavior

Source: compiled by the author

A comparative analysis shows that foreign approaches to combating opportunism rely on high technology, standardized diagnostics, integration of ethical culture and digital tools, as well as on the active involvement of employees in development. Russian models, despite the availability of adapted psychometric techniques, need increased digitalization, structural motivation, and formalization of the ethical community, taking into account domestic cultural and administrative peculiarities. As a result, hybrid strategies will be the most effective: combining standardized tools and ESG approaches with Russian teamwork practices and motivational systems. This will pave the way for optimizing both diagnostics and unlocking the potential of staff, as well as creating a sustainable corporate environment.

3. Behavioral indicators of opportunistic risks

When a person exhibits opportunistic behavior, they often exhibit certain behavioral traits that are usually associated with this type of behavior. In the ACFE study, survey respondents were given a list of 20 common behavioral signs of fraud. It was necessary to note how often and in what situations, in their opinion, employees show behavioral warning signs.

The most common signs were:

1) Living beyond your means (39%);

2) financial difficulties (25%);

3) excessive control or unwillingness to share responsibilities (13%);

4) unusual irritability, suspicion, or defensive reaction (12%);

5) intimidation or pressure from outside (12%);

6) problems in family or personal life (11%);

7) problems with addiction (7%).

The study also drew attention to the personnel management system, which can also influence the manifestation of opportunistic behavior by employees. Each of these factors can potentially cause stress related to personal finances or resentment towards the employer, which can influence a person's decision to commit fraud ^[38].

The Association of International Certified Professional Accountants (AICPA) identifies the following warning signs that management should pay attention to ^[39]:

1) Working overtime at the workplace.

An employee who arrives early, stays late, works weekends, and doesn't take sick leave or annual paid leave may seem ideal. However, it can also be a sign by which an employee who exhibits opportunistic behavior can be identified. Fraudsters can often avoid holidays and weekends because there is a possibility that other people will see the work they have done and may detect fraud ^[40]. Similarly, people who arrive early and work late or on weekends can use the time when they are less likely to be caught in misconduct to commit or conceal fraudulent activities ^[41].

2) Life is beyond your means.

If someone with a modest salary suddenly starts driving a new car to work, or carrying an expensive bag and luxury watch, or buying expensive real estate, this can be a cause for concern. While this behavior may seem like an obvious clue, companies often overlook it. It can be quite difficult for organizations to assess legitimate windfalls in an employee's life, such as inheritance, compared to funds obtained fraudulently ^[42].

3) Negative manifestation of stress at work.

There are many reasons why people may experience stress at work. However, showing anger or concern in response to routine questions that arise in the employee's area of responsibility, especially when the questions come from the examiner (auditor), can be a warning sign of fraud ^[43].

4) Access to a large amount of information.

Employees who have worked in a company for a long time tend to be more trustworthy, know the weaknesses of the company, and have the ability to circumvent what is called control. They are also more likely to have access to multiple sources of information related to each other. Therefore, in a well-controlled system, the tasks of creating an account profile for a new employee and approving payments should always be performed by different people. Employees who are able to do both may be tempted to commit fraud ^[44].

In order to prevent opportunistic behavior, it is necessary to use special tools and mechanisms that will help save large amounts of money that can be invested in the development of the company, rather than eliminating the negative consequences of opportunism.

4. Recommendations for identifying opportunistic behavior of employees in order to prevent pre-contract and post-contract opportunism

1. Psychometric and behavioral assessment at the personnel selection stage

Traditional methods of personnel selection, focused primarily on professional competencies and interview results, do not allow reliable diagnosis of deviant behavior of applicants. For example, a candidate with pronounced narcissistic and antisocial traits was selected for a financial position according to the DSM-5 typology, demonstrating a high level of social desirability. A year later, he was exposed for misrepresenting accounting data for personal gain. In this case, the use of psychodiagnostic tools (Hogan Development Survey, HEXACO, IPIP-NEO) in the recruitment process and conducting structured interviews on ethical dilemmas using case studies and questions on ethical ambivalence will help to form a system of preventive diagnosis of individual tendencies to opportunistic behavior. As a result, the likelihood of hiring applicants with a high level of deviant potential will decrease, especially for positions related to access to resources and financial information.

2. Comprehensive verification of the applicant's reliability (background screening)

Unreliable or partially distorted information about the applicant's biography and professional reputation creates a high risk of employment for people with a history of ethics violations, conflicts of interest, or involvement in fraud. Thus, an employee who had a judicial history of abuse of office concealed this information. The employment check for a new company was limited to a standard call with formal recommendations from former colleagues.

The use of comprehensive verification of the applicant's reliability with the study of professional biography, business reputation, legal status (courts, arbitrations, INN for affiliation) and digital footprint (content analysis of social networks, media field) will increase the level of information openness when hiring.

3. Behavioral adaptation monitoring system for onboarding

The initial period of employee adaptation is a zone of high uncertainty. In the absence of control, destructive socialization and the appearance of behavioral distortions can occur. The development of an adaptive behavioral monitoring system, including serial interviews with HR and a direct supervisor for 30/60/90 days, monitoring of the emotional climate and feedback responses, assessment of inclusion and social positioning (sociometric profiling methodology) will form an adaptive barrier against deviant behavioral strategies and timely identify destructive integration into the organizational environment, as well as increase the accuracy of predicting behavioral employee reliability.

4. Using sociometric and climate analysis to identify behavioral anomalies

Intra-organizational deviations are often formed in conditions of a local imbalance of power, pressure, fear, or norms of "tacit approval." Formal feedback channels do not reveal latent foci of deviant activity. Conducting anonymous assessment surveys with a focus on the perception of ethical culture, the presence of pressure and role conflicts, trust in internal reporting mechanisms, as well as the use of sociometric analysis and network analytics to identify informal structures, points of influence and control centers will form a behavioral map of the team and identify hidden deviations, toxic centers of influence.

5. Case audit of the ethics of decisions made at key points

Opportunistic behavior often begins with small, "justified" violations — manipulations with contractors, internal bonuses, and the reporting configuration. Such actions may be technically legal, but they are contrary to corporate ethics. For example, a manager took advantage of a gap in the regulations and entered into a series of "undisputed" contracts with firms affiliated with his entourage. Violations were revealed only after a change of leadership. Implementation of a case audit of behavioral decisions at key points (for example, procurement, personnel appointments, bonuses, bonus payments), the use of a retrospective analysis with a focus on compliance with corporate values, principles of transparency and declared mission, and the application of ethical expertise and the principle of "conditional publicity" (as an independent observer would perceive the choice: the press, the client The auditor will increase the responsibility of decision makers and create a culture of preventive ethical reporting.

The table below summarizes the key types of risks described in the article and correlates them with specific recommendations proposed based on the analysis of empirical cases, behavioral models and research results in the field of organizational psychology and personnel management. This format allows you to systematize the research materials and ensure the practical applicability of the results for HR and internal control specialists.

Table 4. The main types of risks of opportunistic behavior and their solution

Source: compiled by the author

Thus, the presented format of the correlation of problems and managerial decisions allows not only to systematize the results obtained, but also to demonstrate their direct applicability in the practice of personnel management and the construction of internal control systems. This is especially important in the context of the growing complexity of the organizational environment, when behavioral risks are increasingly becoming a source of not only reputational, but also financial losses. The implementation of the proposed solutions contributes to the formation of a culture of responsibility, increased transparency of internal processes and the formation of sustainable ethical standards in the corporate environment.

As an additional measure to the existing HR and anti—corruption tools, it is proposed to introduce at the company level a mechanism of ethical control points - predefined situations and roles in which the risk of opportunistic behavior is highest. Unlike universal regulations and codes, these points rely on specific vulnerable processes and decision-making areas identified during internal analysis (for example, procurement, bonuses, reporting, remote access to resources, etc.).

At these points, you must enter:

• brief checklists of ethical risks filled out by a supervisor or employee when making a decision (for example, "Could this be perceived as a conflict of interest?"),
• The principle of conditional publicity is an internal criterion by which a decision is evaluated from the perspective of an external observer (for example, a client, auditor, colleague).
• Built—in discussion procedures provide an opportunity to discuss ethically ambiguous situations anonymously or face-to-face with a designated ethical coordinator or trusted person.

This approach allows you to:

• reduce the moral burden of an employee facing a gray area,
• to integrate ethical reflection into routine processes without overloading them with formalities,
• strengthen trust between the employee and the organization, creating a sense of fairness and transparency.

How does this differ from current practices?:

In most companies, ethical standards are fixed in the form of a code, which is read when applying for a job and then rarely used. Ethical control points, on the contrary, are a working tool in specific management situations where temptation or uncertainty is particularly high. This is a simple, built-in measure that makes ethics not an abstract norm, but a part of everyday decisions.

To implement the mechanism of ethical control points, structured interviews with heads of functional departments working in high-risk areas of opportunistic behavior can be included in the internal monitoring system. Such interviews allow not only to identify specific vulnerable processes, but also to capture ways of making decisions in ambiguous situations.

Frequency: 1 time per quarter or at the end of a key cycle (for example, a project, tender, budget allocation).

Key interview blocks:

1. Gray area detection

– In what situations have you had to act recently in the absence of clear regulations?

– Were there any cases when the decision was made "at discretion"?

– What is the level of transparency of such decisions for other participants in the process?

2. Reactions to ethical dilemmas

– Were there any doubts about the permissibility of decisions from the point of view of corporate values?

– Have these issues been discussed with colleagues, senior management, or HR?

3. Assessment of the atmosphere in the team

– Are there signals of hidden pressure, resistance, or distrust?

– How are sanctions for violations and the rules of the game perceived in general?

4. Preventive measures

– What steps are being taken by the manager personally to reduce risks (separation of functions, transparency of decisions, etc.)?

– What could be improved in regulation to reduce the moral burden of decision-making?

Practical effect:

• It allows us to formalize the experience of managers in the form of identified risks and typical situations.,
• records real practices of behavior in conditions of uncertainty, complementing formal instructions,
• strengthens horizontal links between HR, internal control and managers, developing a culture of open discussion of complex decisions.

Interviews do not require significant costs, but they can be an effective tool for early detection of opportunistic attitudes and managerial distortions. It is embedded in a culture of trust and transparency and can be complemented by a survey of subordinates, which will give a more comprehensive behavioral picture.

Conclusion

Thus, the opportunistic behavior of employees is an important and increasingly urgent problem in the context of organizational management, since it not only violates ethical and legal norms, but also reduces the effectiveness of internal processes, undermines trust and increases reputational risks. This paper examines key theoretical approaches to explaining this phenomenon, from classical fraud models to modern multifactorial concepts involving behavioral and personality predictors.

As a result of the analysis, behavioral characteristics, typological profiles, and structural conditions conducive to the formation of opportunistic strategies in the corporate environment were identified. The necessity of early diagnosis of such risks using psychometric tools, monitoring of behavioral adaptation, sociometric methods and case audit of ethically significant decisions is substantiated. The developed recommendations cover both the pre-contract and post-contract stages, which allows a systematic approach to the problem at different levels of personnel management.