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Novikov, M.A. (2025). Crisis in state policy regarding patriotic education in the 1990s-2000s. Politics and Society, 2, 114–123. . https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0684.2025.2.74499
Crisis in state policy regarding patriotic education in the 1990s-2000s.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0684.2025.2.74499EDN: PUNVFLReceived: 18-05-2025Published: 25-06-2025Abstract: The author thoroughly examines aspects of the topic such as the problem of patriotic education in Russia from the 1990s to the 2000s, when there was no unified state policy in the field of patriotic education for children and youth, and the consequences of its absence. The issue of a possible correlation between this gap in state policy and the protest sentiments and activities in Russian society, which were prominently expressed during a series of rallies on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow in 2011 and in the following years, is also carefully investigated. The author pays special attention to the current state of patriotic policy and its connection with the internal strengthening of Russian society at present. The research is based on statistical data obtained from sociological studies regarding the demographic indicators of individuals involved in protest movements, as well as those who consider themselves patriots, along with a comparative analysis of the data. The novelty of the conducted research lies in establishing a correlation between the absence of a unified state policy in the area of patriotism during the period between the 1990s and 2000s and a series of events in the form of protests, starting from Bolotnaya Square to protests against the ongoing special military operation. In conclusion, the author noted that for the sustainable development of the state, the implementation of patriotic policy is necessary, which consolidates society and makes it more resilient to external and internal destructive ideas and movements. The current patriotic education policy is clearly yielding positive results, as it is determined by the patterns of societal development. These results are notably reflected in the increasing number of individuals who identify as patriots of the country, as well as in the rise of volunteers willing to provide real support and help without any reward. Nevertheless, there is a pressing need to systematize this work at all levels of government. Keywords: state policy, patriotism, education, President of the Russian Federation, cosmopolitanism, rally, volunteer, protest, special military operation, USSRThis article is automatically translated. The author expresses his gratitude to the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg for their help in publishing this article. Patriotic education is the foundation of any society that strives to survive and build a strong state, because without love for the Motherland, it is impossible to instill in a person respect for his country and its historical memory. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809 of November 9, 2022 "On Approval of the Foundations of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values" enshrines the main traditional Russian values, including love for the Fatherland and the preservation of historical memory. This is an extremely important decree, because it reinforces Russian values at the state level, which are protected by the state itself. Based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, there can be no ideology in Russia, but no state can survive without a specific goal. Educating a person in accordance with the traditional Russian values enshrined in the decree is the goal that our state strives for. The decree of the President of the Russian Federation is important, but it came out quite late, because Russian society existed without any goal fixed in the very policy of the state for 30 years, without a clear idea of what the new generation should look like, what values should be instilled, unlike the Soviet Union, where the goal was clearly traced. the purpose of the educational process was to educate a new person. Shortly before the start of the special military operation, the President of the Russian Federation said that "Russia cannot be defeated, it can only be destroyed from within" [1]. As mentioned earlier, for 30 years in Russia, the range of values that should be instilled in the younger generation has not been defined at the level of state policy, which was particularly evident in the 1990s, when the state separated itself from issues of education, including patriotic education. Ultimately, the very word "patriotism" began to carry a negative connotation, especially in conditions when Russian President Boris Yeltsin said: "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" [2], being a Russian patriot was equated, at least, to extremism. In this regard, Boris Yeltsin's choice of A.I. Kozyrev as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is indicative, who at a meeting with the US President R. Nixon allowed himself the following statement: "But if you have any ideas and you can tell us how to identify our interests, then I will be very grateful to you."[3] Boris Nikolaevich's own phrase is no less eloquent in this regard.: "God bless America!"[4]. Such statements, made at the highest level, indicate a decline in the authority of one's own country in the eyes of top officials of the state. Such a careless attitude towards the Motherland was also transmitted to Russian society as a whole. Fundamental concepts such as good and evil, Homeland, and Fatherland should be instilled from childhood, when a person is most receptive. This process begins with parenting, which is provided by parents within the family. However, in the 1990s, due to the difficult economic situation in the country, parents were doomed to survive in the circumstances, which led not only to a drop in living standards, but also to a decrease in the amount of time that parents could devote to their children. That's why they couldn't keep track of what their children were doing. Further, education continues within the framework of kindergarten and school, where a certain state order for the inculcation of certain values is carried out through educators and teachers; but after the collapse of the USSR, the function of education was taken away from the school, leaving only education, i.e. no one even had the right to instill any views and values in the child, much less to give patriotic education. In addition, the range of values that teachers could hypothetically instill in the democratic and liberal society of the new Russia was not defined. A vacuum was formed in the minds of children, because the concepts of October, pioneer, and Komsomolets, which gave children and adolescents moral guidance, were gone. Thus, parents could not properly educate their children due to lack of time, and the state refused to do so. Western goods, services, and most importantly, ideas that brought only moral degradation to their bearers flooded into Russia – a model for building a consumer society, the predominance of interests of one individual over society and the state as a whole, and the decomposition of traditional values. Separately, it is worth noting a trend that was subject to persecution even in Stalin's time [5, p. 340], namely cosmopolitanism, which is a vivid antagonist of patriotism, even an enemy capable of captivating with its attractive, romantic, but in practice dangerous ideas. Since a person who considers himself a "citizen of the world" cannot have a specific homeland, which means that he cannot have obligations to the specific state in which he lives. Similar ideas have flooded the heads of the younger generation. In addition to Western ideas, Russian thought was also being distorted, including in favor of Western "partners." The very concept of "patriotism" was obstructed, military service was seen as the lot of losers, and the phrase "patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels" became popular in liberal circles [6, p. 28]. There were numerous attempts to rethink history, which is the fundamental core of any society. The clearest example of this is the publication of numerous literature that distorted ideas about the Soviet Union, exposing exclusively negative aspects of the disappeared state. Thus, such an approach led to the fragmentation of society, its polarization due to the division into different camps, for example, those supporting the restoration of the USSR, regretting its collapse, and supporters of the new Russia with its liberal conquests. It is worth noting that this conflict was also a generational conflict, since the older generation for the most part advocated the preservation of the USSR, as exemplified by Nina Andreeva's famous 1988 letter "I cannot compromise my principles." Interestingly, Nina Alexandrovna also noted the harmful role of cosmopolitanism[7]. Of course, the letter dates back to the times of the USSR, but in general it outlines a certain outline of supporters of the preservation of the Soviet Union. It is worth noting that patriotic sentiments did not disappear from society at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. There were still people who loved their homeland and were devoted to it. A striking example of this is the famous U-turn or "Primakov loop" over the Atlantic in 1999, when Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was flying to the United States to obtain much-needed loans to restore Russia's economy after default, refused to visit the United States because of the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO. Thus, Yevgeny Primakov made a choice in favor of the authority and honor of his country. Another example is the numerous interviews of veterans of the Chechen wars. For example, Alexey Terentyev, a veteran of both Chechen wars, describes in an interview the reason for his military service in the early 1990s as follows: "At that time I had no purpose in life. Or rather, there was, but not understood by most, patriotism. I have always loved and continue to love my Homeland." "Patriotism pushed me to the Second Chechen war: the terrorist acts that took place in Moscow at that time were the reason for my return to the army," A. Terentyev described the reasons for returning to the army [8]. As mentioned earlier, there are a large number of interviews in which veterans of the Chechen wars emphasize the role played by patriotism, both in voluntarily joining the army and in direct combat, when thoughts of the Motherland helped the fighters overcome various difficulties [9-11]. These interviews are an invaluable example of the fact that a sense of patriotism remained in the hearts of people even at a time when such feelings were subjected to various attacks and were not popular in society. February 29 – March 1, 2000 At hill 776, a battle took place between soldiers of the 6th company of the 76th Airborne (Pskov) division and Chechen militants, during which the soldiers of the Russian army held back the enemy's vastly superior forces. This case is an example of the courage of soldiers and, of course, patriotism, because without sincere love for the Fatherland, it is impossible to find the strength to take on such an unequal battle. The above examples, starting with Primakov's reversal and ending with the feat of the soldiers of the 6th company, are an example of patriotism not because of the state, but in spite of it. Yevgeny Primakov was raised in the Soviet Union, and therefore his love for his Homeland was instilled in him by a vanished state, not by liberal Russia. Speaking about the soldiers of our army, it is worth noting that in interviews the soldiers mentioned the contribution of parents, grandparents, many of whom themselves went through the war, and therefore they had a living example. Someone else managed to live in Soviet times, study at a Soviet school and receive a Soviet upbringing [9]. Since 1996, the country's leadership has begun to think about the need to introduce patriotic education, as evidenced by the publication of Presidential Decree No. 727 dated May 16, 1996 "On measures of state support for public associations working on military-patriotic education of youth." However, this decree contained neither the principles of patriotic work nor its systematic organization. It was only by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 122 of February 16, 2001, that the state program "Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation for 2001-2005" was adopted, where one of its goals was: "to create a mechanism that ensures the establishment and effective functioning of the state system of patriotic education." Thus, the very fact of the absence of a state policy in the field of patriotism was recognized. At the same time, it is difficult to talk about any significant results at first due to the fact that patriotic programs and organizations have just begun to be created on a large scale and tried to spread everywhere, because, like any other reform, these transformations needed time. New programs were introduced to spread patriotic education. At the same time, the function of education was returned to the school only in 2020 by introducing amendments to Federal Law No. 273-FZ of December 29, 2012 "On Education in the Russian Federation". Thus, the 2000s became a time of rethinking the role of patriotism in society on the part of the state. Work has begun to spread the ideas of patriotism. But the result could not be achieved in a short time. It was a job for the future, for the new generation of the new millennium. At the moment, patriotic education in Russia is at a fairly high level. Patriotic organizations for children and adults are widespread. At the same time, it is worth noting that the initiator of such an idea back in the late 1990s was Vladimir Putin, at that time the Chairman of the Government, and at the time of the issuance of the Government decree - the President of the Russian Federation. That is, the President of our country from the beginning of his career as head of government, and to the present as head of state, systematically pursues state policy in the spiritual and moral sphere. The President has repeatedly stressed the importance of patriotic education. One of the indicators of this work is the following fact: according to the Russian information agency Pobeda RF, at the moment "28% of Russians are ready to provide support and take part in volunteer projects" [12]. At the same time, according to Presidential Decree No. 309 dated May 7, 2024 "On the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 and for the future up to 2036," one of the goals is to "increase by 2030 the proportion of young people involved in voluntary and public activities to at least 45 percent." Indicative in this regard are the results of a study by V.S. Kalinich, who, during a survey of students aged 17 to 24 in 2022, revealed that: "80.8% of respondents consider themselves to be patriots" [13, p. 23]. These data are also confirmed by the results of a sociological study by the analytical center of the Synergy University, which states that: "75% of Russian youth stated that they consider themselves patriots of their country and are ready to participate in patriotic projects," while over 5,000 students from all over Russia participated in the survey [14]. At the same time, work is underway at the regional level. For example, the Governor of St. Petersburg, Alexander Beglov, has repeatedly noted that "Patriotic education is one of the priorities in our work with young people" [15]. However, the generation of the 1990s and early 2000s was already "lost." Confirmation of this can be observed to this day. For example, a series of mass rallies that took place on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow in late 2011, rallies against the "Crimean Spring" in Moscow in 2014, in which Russian citizens did not support the return of ancestral Russian lands to Russia, protests organized by Alexei Navalny* in the late 2010s, when a number of citizens followed a man who was sponsored from the outside; to this can be added rallies in support of A. Navalny * after his return to the country, when citizens clashed with the police for the sake of a man who at that time was obviously a person who was sponsored by foreign states. Completing the list, it should be noted the protests against the SVR in 2022. Separately, it is worth noting the flight of Russian citizens across the state border, where the Upper Lars border checkpoint stands out, from where they can get a road to Georgia, which is the clearest act of their civic irresponsibility and antipatriotism. At the same time, for the most part, the protesters and those who fled Russia are young people whom the country urgently needs. The above theses are confirmed by the data in Table 1, based on which it can be seen that the largest proportion among the interviewed protesters at rallies in support of A. Navalny* (* A person included in the register of extremists and terrorists of Rosfinmonitoring) in 2021 in various cities were people from 25 to 39 years old, followed by young people aged 18 up to 24 years old. It should be noted separately that the lowest proportion among the protesters are people whose age is less than 18 years.
Table 1. Age characteristics of the participants of the 2021 rallies (in % of the number of respondents at each rally) [16, p. 307].
It should be noted that the data shown in table 1, published during the study by A.S. Arkhipova, A.V. Zakharova and I.V. Kozlova, are confirmed by data provided by a number of media outlets during public coverage of rallies. For example, the Businessonline newspaper reported that in St. Petersburg "There were 1.5% of underage participants in the action, 33% aged 18 to 24, 42.5% aged 25 to 35, and 12% aged 36-46. The median age of those who came to the rally, according to experts, was 28 years old" [17]. In Moscow, the picture of detainees almost completely coincided with that in St. Petersburg, which was also reflected in table 1, albeit with a slight difference. Similar indicators are mentioned by other media outlets, which provide data from various opinion polls [18-19]. The data in Figure 1 allow us to conclude that, on the one hand, in the period from 2011 to 2021, there was a "rejuvenation" of rally participants, the older generation, i.e. people aged 55 and older, were no longer so actively interested in the rally movement. On the other hand, the opposite trend is also noticeable: in 2021, the number of people aged 25 to 39 increased compared to 2011, which leads to the conclusion that those who actively participated in the 2011 rallies continued to do so in the future. People aged 25 to 39 are the generation of the 1990s-2000s, in which the state abandoned the function of education, which affected this generation and their attitude towards their own country.
Fig. 1. The shares of age groups of participants in the Moscow rallies in 2011, 2019 and 2021. (participants of rallies over the age of 18 were accepted as 100%) [16, p. 309].
Thus, as a result of the failed state policy in the 1990s, there was a huge failure in educational, in particular, patriotic work with society. A gap that was filled with destructive, both Western and domestic thoughts and ideas. The results of this failed policy can be observed to this day. A very eloquent confirmation of this is the burning of passports by citizens of the Russian Federation in protest of state policy [20]. Within the framework of this study, a pattern was established between the separation of the state from education, and patriotic education in particular in the 1990s, and protest movements that took place in the 2010s and early 2020s. The experience of the 1990s should be an example of how government policy cannot be pursued, and what flirting with the collective West, with its values and ideas, including those of cosmopolitanism, leads to. However, the results of the positive patriotic work that was resumed in the early 2000s can be seen now. There are numerous examples of heroism on the part of the younger generation on the battlefields of the SVR, who went to the front, including voluntarily, and not as a result of mobilization. The number of volunteers in Russia who are willing to help others for free is steadily growing, as well as the number of people who consider themselves patriots of their country. Thus, a competent state policy in the field of patriotism leads to the strengthening of society, its stabilization, as well as consolidation through patriotic ideas and motives. References
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