Manifestations of ethnopolitical identity in the narratives of the 2024 presidential election campaign in the Republic of North Macedonia

Tyurin Evgenii Anatol'evich ORCID: 0009-0003-7963-5876 PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Central Russian Institute of Management, branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 12 Oktyabrskaya str., Orel, Russia, 302028 Turin.of.Foveran@yandex.ru

Golishevskiy Maksim Borisovich Senior Lecturer; Kaluga Branch; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Postgraduate student; Central Russian Institute of Management-branch; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 248021, Russia, Kaluga region, Okruzhnaya str., 4 golishevsky@klg.ranepa.ru Other publications by this author

The most important event in the political life of the Republic of North Macedonia (hereinafter referred to as the Republic of North Macedonia) in 2024 was the combined parliamentary and presidential elections, which not only influenced the balance of power within the Republic, but also caused a certain shift in emphasis in foreign policy. Both election campaigns were held simultaneously. As a result of the fact that a second round was required in the presidential election, the final vote in both directions took place on the same day – May 8. It should also be noted that all the presidential candidates admitted to the elections were nominees from political parties that participated in the struggle for parliamentary seats. Therefore, the election programs of the parties and the respective candidates for the presidency were similar. In these unavoidable circumstances, the presidential candidates did not turn out to be the locomotives of the election campaign, but rather the mouthpieces of their parties' narratives within the framework of a common party strategy.

In this article, analyzing the presidential campaign of 2024 in the Republic of Moldova, the authors focus on the ethnopolitical component of the very narratives that turned out to be similar between presidential candidates and their party members who applied for a seat in parliament.

All experts who have dealt with this issue note the emotionality of the rhetoric and the extreme degree of aggravation of the ethnopolitical aspects of the narratives used during the 2024 elections.

The subject of research in this article is ethnopolitical and identity narratives, as well as manifestations of symbolic politics, which appeared during the presidential elections of 2024 in the Republic of Moldova. The methodological base of the research includes a range of general scientific and special methods and approaches used in ethnopolitology. Firstly, the authors resorted to systemic and institutional approaches, as well as to the sociological method (in order to study the impact of social factors on the sphere of political activity of ethnic groups and the influence of these factors on political mechanisms for solving ethnonational problems).

Secondly, the method of comparative ethnopolitical analysis was used, which was necessary due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the Macedonian population. This method made it possible to correlate different practices and instruments of political protection of the interests of ethnic and religious minorities within the framework of a single civil nation. Based on this method, the authors tried to trace the approaches of the candidates for President of the Republic of Macedonia to building a model of state policy towards minority communities that would focus on finding a balance between the interests of the national majority and ethnic and religious minorities in Macedonia and would not violate national stability.

Thirdly, when analyzing the programs and public statements of presidential candidates, methods of discourse analysis and analysis of symbolic visualization techniques of political concepts (including graphic design of materials of political advertising of candidates) were used.

Finally, the article used an analysis of secondary statistical data.

Political narratives and symbols as elements of political discourse

The issues stated in this article expectedly led the authors to the question of the use of narratives and symbols in the political process (in general) and political discourse (in particular) ^[9]. This research perspective is also conditioned by an understanding of the relevance of studying the practical potential of various narratives used in the Russian ^[1],[4] and foreign ^[8] political space.

The theory of narrative offers a rather deeply developed analysis of the narrative. Various approaches to understanding narrative are considered on the basis of identifying unique elements of narrative discourse as a text, taking into account the areas of application of the narrative and the nature of its impact on the addressee ^[10]. There are different types of narratives ^{[7, pp. 4-7]}. The influence of historical narratives on national states is also studied ^[6].

Within the framework of the analysis presented in the article, the authors consider the political narrative as a specific emotionally colored information containing an idea aimed at shaping public opinion and influencing the political actions of certain actors. The purpose of such a narrative is to simplify complex events and appeal primarily to emotions and values. However, the actual facts may be of secondary importance.

In addition, the narrative is part of the political symbolization ^[2]. Being a story by its nature, a narrative is based on a verbal component, but when it is perceived during interaction with the addressee, non-verbal components may also arise. For example, a political narrative is often accompanied by symbols aimed at emotionally exacerbating its perception. In other words, symbols become part of the narrative, and the narrative itself is used by political actors as a tool for mobilization.

Thus, analyzing the narratives used by the presidential candidates, it is necessary to take into account non-verbal symbols designed to influence the emotions of voters and strengthen their identity connection with the narratives.

Ethnopolitical features of the Presidency in the Republic of Moldova (the context of the 2024 election campaign)

The nature of the narratives used by the presidential candidates of the Republic of Moldova in 2024 was influenced by two defining circumstances.

The first is related to the actual situation prevailing at the time of the 2024 elections in the Republic of Macedonia (primarily with the intensification of the political confrontation between the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia – Macedonians and Albanians). The policy pursued by the SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) party aimed at the country's accession to the European Union has enjoyed popular support for many years and served as a unifying motive for Macedonian society, but by 2024 it had not brought results. Macedonia has not become a member of the European Union. At the same time, the RSM government, consisting mainly of SDSM members and allies from the pro–Albanian coalition, was able to make a number of decisions to please the Albanian minority (which greatly impressed the European supervisors of the RSM's accession process to the European Union, as well as its closest neighbors, Greece and Bulgaria, who blackmailed the RSM by refusing to support the republic's accession to the European Union). As a result, by the time of the elections, a part of ethnic Macedonians loyal to the SDSM felt disappointed in the unsuccessful efforts of the SDSM to integrate with the EU. The other part of the Ethnomakedonian majority, which supported the party "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization — Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity" (hereinafter - VMRO-DPMNE), which was in opposition at the time of the elections, was increasingly annoyed by the policy of advantages towards the Albanian minority. As a result, the presidential and parliamentary elections were held against a backdrop of ethnopolitical tensions. Therefore, the participants in the presidential race could not ignore the issues of ethnopolitics and national identity.

The second circumstance that determined the nature of the narratives used by the candidates for the post of President of the Republic of Moldova is the specifics of the very institution of the presidency in this country. The role of the president in the Macedonian government is noticeably limited and significantly inferior in political influence to the parliament and the government^[1]. Moreover, there were situations when the majority of seats in parliament (and, consequently, the opportunity to form a government) were given to some political forces, and a representative of others (the opposition) became president^[2].

So, may 12, 2009 February 12, 2019 by the President of the country was the representative of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE Gjorge Ivanov. For many years, he patriotically defended the national identity of Macedonians^[3], but his ethnopolitical efforts were ignored by parliament and the government (with the pro-Albanian-Brussels coalition of the SDSM and the Democratic Union for Integration parties dominating there). The latter influenced the country's domestic and foreign policy in their own way, interpreting the Macedonian identity in line with the Albanian-Brussels approaches. It is not surprising that the anti-patriotic forces were able to activate the processes of integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union, prepare and conclude in 2018. The Prespa Agreement with Greece (as a result of which the adjective "Northern" appeared in the state name of Macedonia), as well as to provide a legal basis for the country's accession to NATO.

In other words, it is clear that the president in the RSM rather symbolizes a single state and its people, is a representative of the entire population, regardless of his own original party affiliation. Political parties, even after the elections are over, remain competitive, defending the interests of their own voters (contrary to the interests of their opponents' voters). Accordingly, a presidential candidate who escalates the controversy during the election campaign risks further questioning his own symbolic role, which embodies the unity of the nation.

The President of the Republic of Moldova is elected by a majority vote of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova, including the Diaspora living abroad. The turnout threshold is set at 40% of the number of voters. If the threshold is not reached, the election is repeated. A presidential candidate must get more than 50% of the vote. If this does not happen, a second round of voting is announced, during which the two candidates who received the most votes in the first round compete. Voting in the second round is scheduled to take place within two weeks. The presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova held in 2024 were scheduled for April 24, respectively, the date of May 8 (simultaneously with the parliamentary elections) was immediately set as the second day of voting for a possible second round ^[11].

Surveys conducted in January 2024 The Institute for Political Studies (Skopje) showed the following distribution of votes: 20.2% were ready to vote for any candidate from the VMRO-DPMNE party; 11% supported the candidate from the ruling SDSM party; 6.7% supported the candidate from the DSI; 5.7% – the candidate from the ZNAM; 5.2% – the candidate from Levica; 3.7% – the candidate from the Alliance of Albanians; 17.3% opposed all of them; 9.8% did not want to answer, and 8.9% found it difficult to answer^[4]. In addition to a general understanding of the distribution of forces, such statistics clearly indicated a second round, since none of the candidates had a decisive advantage.

In 2024, the political parties of Macedonia put forward 7 candidates for the post of president. The newcomers of the "big politics" were the famous political scientist Professor Bilyana Vankovskaya (the Levitsa party), the mayor of Kumanova Maxim Dimitrievsky (the new ZNAM party) and the mayor of the metropolitan municipality of Karposh Stevcho Yakimovsky (the THUNDER party). Both mayors were already quite experienced politicians, previously they were members of the SDSM party, but at different times they left it and created their own movements. Two more candidates represented Albanian parties and already had experience working in the government of the country. From the Alliance of Albanians party – Arben Taravari (in 2017 he was the Minister of Health of the Republic of Moldova, and since November 1, 2017 he has headed the municipality of Gostivar) and from the DSI party – Buyar Osmani (since 2008 He was Minister of Health, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration; at the time of the 2024 elections, he held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs).

The most experienced participants in the 2024 presidential race were Professor Gordana Silyanovskaya-Davkova (VMRO-DPMNE party) and Stevo Pendarovsky (SDSM party), the current President of the RSM at the time of the election. These two candidates have already met in the 2019 presidential election, when Silyanovskaya-Davkova lost 7% of the vote to Pendarovsky. The elections were also held in two rounds. Moreover, according to the results of the first round, 0.6% of the votes were divided between the rivals, and in the second round, Pendarovsky received support from representatives of the Albanian minority (the Albanian candidate for president in 2019 did not pass the results of the first round)^[5]. During the presidential elections of the Republic of Moldova in 2024, Gordana Silyanovskaya-Davkova and Stevo Pendarovsky also reached the second round. Moreover, in both rounds Silyanovskaya-Davkova had a two-fold superiority in the number of votes over Pendarovsky. The results of the presidential elections are presented in the table.

Table 1. Candidates for the post of President of the Republic of Moldova in the 2024 elections and voting results^[6]

Thus, all the participants in the presidential race were more or less experienced politicians and quite competently presented their political platforms during the election race.

Ethnopolitical and identity narratives in the programs and speeches of the candidates of the Macedonian presidential campaign in 2024 (political and symbolic aspects).

The candidates' programs were publicly available on the websites of the parties that nominated the candidates. All programs, with the exception of Maxim Dimitrievsky's program, are presented on the websites in the form of colorful booklets corresponding to the party's color and composition solutions, as well as the main ideas of the candidates' program.

Visual political communication, expressed both in colors and in the political symbols used by candidates, has already become the subject of reflection in Macedonia itself^[7]. We will pay attention, among other things, to those visual elements of the programs that will help to understand the ethnopolitical and identity narratives formulated by the candidates.

Perhaps the most obvious identity narrative, noted to one degree or another in the political programs of all the candidates for president of the Republic of Moldova, can be defined as "Macedonians are a European people, and Macedonia is a European state." During the 2024 elections All political actors, as before ^[3], maintained the conceptual vector of Macedonia's future as part of the European Union, although they viewed the problem of European integration in different ways.

Bouyar Osmani's program was entirely based on the use of the symbols of the European Union^[8]. Of the 36 pages of Osmani's election booklet, 18 pages contain symbols referring to the European Union, 3 symbolically refer to Macedonia (interestingly, two of them have Macedonian symbols next to the US state symbols), 2 pages have UN symbols; the remaining 13 pages do not contain explicit symbols and could be considered neutral if not for the color their design preserves the dark blue and yellow colors of the symbols of the European Union.

In the program itself, Osmani explicitly states that he is counting on the "influence of international friends" and sees the need to orient the administrative and state apparatus towards fundamental reforms and full adaptation of the state and society to the rules, standards and values of the European Union. As a basic guideline, it is proclaimed that North Macedonia should become an EU member state by 2030. At the same time, the Osmani program does not use the names of any ethnic groups living in Macedonia. However, considering the possible future transformation of the system of elections/appointments to the post of president of the Republic of Moldova, he suggests using the ideas of a consociational democracy based on the consolidation of proportional representation in all spheres of public administration ^[5], which indicates Osmani's ethnopolitical ideas related not to the creation of a civil nation, but to the preservation of the existing ethnopolitical stratification.

Thus, in the Osmani program, Macedonia appears not as an independent nation-state, but only as a part of the European Union, nothing more. The term "Europe" itself, with one connotation or another, is mentioned almost as many times as the term "Macedonia" (17 and 18).

Arben Taravari's 16-page program no longer contains an obvious symbolic reference to the European Union. Nevertheless, the basic shade of the color scheme is the European Union dark blue color ^[9], although there is no yellow in the design and red is present, characteristic of the Macedonian state symbols. The mention of Macedonia with different connotations prevails over the mention of Europe (54 and 37). Moreover, Taravari calls Northern Macedonia "our common home." However, according to Taravari, the pillars of this "house" are integration into the European Union, the rule of law, security and consociational democracy. If elected president, Taravari promised to base his foreign policy on European and pro–Western values, and to promote consociational democracy in a "multinational and multicultural society" in his domestic policy. Taravari promises to pay special attention to the protection of the Albanian language, and chauvinistically accuses ethnic Macedonians (calling them allegorically "a significant part of the citizens") of not being loyal enough and not trustworthy enough to work in public service or manage certain sectors of the state. Taravari also promises to do his best to implement the Prespa Agreement and the Friendship Agreement with Bulgaria, which are painfully perceived by the majority of ethnic Macedonians. Thus, in the narratives of the Taravari program, Macedonia nevertheless appears as an independent state that is part of the European Union, in which the ethnic issue is considered exclusively within the framework of a consociational approach involving the implementation of various mechanisms to protect the interests of the Albanian minority.

In the text of his extremely concise program, consisting of 17 points, Stevcho Yakimovsky does not disclose in detail his vision of the identity of the Macedonian nation^[10]. In paragraph 11 of his program, Yakimovsky proposes to direct foreign policy towards strengthening the RSM's position in NATO structures and meeting the conditions for joining the European Union. Yakimovsky (with a clear emphasis on respect for Macedonia) promised not to negotiate with anyone about identity and language. The visual and symbolic image of the program is designed in colors characteristic of the Macedonian statehood. Of the 19 pages of the program, five have neutral images, one page contains the symbols of the European Union, and the remaining 16 contain references to the Macedonian state symbols. Thus, in Yakimovsky's program, Macedonia appears as a pro-European state built on Macedonian identity.

The position of Maxim Dimitrievsky from the new ZNAM party, the movement For Our Macedonia, looks almost as moderate in relation to foreign policy^[11]. Dimitrievsky, linking the country's future with European integration, promised to encourage the promotion of EU fundamental values in Macedonian society. In general, Dimitrievsky and his young BANNER party can be attributed to supporters of European integration in an attempt to "sit" on two populist positions at once.: "Yes to European integration, no to Bulgarian demands," despite the fact that in real foreign policy conditions these positions seem to be mutually exclusive. The party itself uses the symbolic blue color of the European Union (to a greater extent) and the red-yellow Macedonian national color scheme (to a lesser extent). However, the ZNAM party did not offer any narrative picture of Macedonian identity and ethnic politics different from the SDSM, except for public criticism of Bulgaria's position.

Professor Bilyana Vankovskaya's narratives on Macedonian identity and European integration were the most strident^[12]. Vankovskaya accused her opponents of considering identity an "ugly thing" and forcing Macedonians to abandon national interests, collective memory and history. In her election speeches, Vankovskaya presented European integration neither as an inevitable nor as a necessary process, especially taking into account the requirements for this, which the candidate called "unscrupulous conditions." She did not offer any balanced plan for the continuation of European integration, promising generally a multidirectional foreign policy without set conventions and prejudices towards individual states (with the predominance of national Macedonian interests). Vankovskaya pointed out the need to abandon policies leading to a bi-ethnic state and federalization (which the Albanian candidates categorically insisted on). Moreover, she directly proclaimed her rejection of "ethnic segregation and the quota society," calling her opponents representatives of "ethnic cartels."

SDSM candidate Stevo Pendarovski, traditionally for the position of his party, promoted in his program^[13] the narrative of strengthening civil (rather than Macedonian ethnic) identity in the country, which is part of the European identity. In his opinion, securing Macedonia's status as a member of the European Union is a condition for the country's security and prosperity. For the sake of practical realization of such a picture of the world, Pendarovsky convinced Macedonian society of the need to sacrifice its traditions, culture and historical concepts. At the same time, in ethno-political issues, this candidate demonstrated the most neutral views, arguing that a policy that implements the rights of communities should not be understood as a policy that gives preference to one community over another. He also insisted that the ideas of ethnic exclusivity and nationalism would not strengthen society as a whole. As a result, while proclaiming the importance of civil identity, Pendarovsky did not identify any recipes for overcoming the consociational proportional ethnopolitical division in society, enshrined in the Ohrid Agreement.

Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova (due to her personal beliefs and membership in the VMRO-DPMNE party) has traditionally taken a more conservative position on issues of Macedonian identity. Considering Macedonia as a European state^[14], she made it clear that European integration should not come at the cost of losing the Macedonian ethno-political identity, and called the Prespa agreement a mistake, categorically rejecting the term "northern" when naming the state. Siljanovska-Davkova, seeing European integration as the only possible path, nevertheless insists that for the sake of the interests of Greece, Bulgaria or someone else, Macedonians should not be required to give up their Macedonian identity, which is primarily related to the language and ethnonational understanding of the history of Macedonia.

Thus, the public communication of the candidates for president of the Republic of Moldova fully reflected the understanding of the real prospects during the election campaign. As a result, the main struggle took place between two competitors from the leading parties, Gordana Silyanovskaya-Davkova and Stevo Pendarovsky. These candidates showed maximum restraint during their speeches, avoiding statements that could be interpreted as a reason to escalate the ethnopolitical confrontation.

Gordana Silyanovskaya-Davkova actively emphasized the need to achieve the ethno-political neutrality of the president (provided that he respects the interests of the whole country)^[15] and called on society to reach consensus "regardless of party, religious, ethnic or other affiliation"^[16]. At the same time, she demonstrated her commitment to the European Union by offering to involve the European academic resource in solving the problems of the RSM^[17]. At the same time, both in the program and during public appearances, Silyanovskaya-Davkova paid special attention to issues related to the national identity of Macedonians and the Macedonian language (in those connotations that are close to ethnic Macedonians).^[18].

One of the main narratives of the Siljanovskaya-Davkova election campaign was the thesis that during the reign of the coalition of the SDSM and DSI parties, Macedonia lost its national pride, and the Macedonian nation lost its dignity^[19].

Stevo Pendarovsky (who conducted his campaign as neutrally as possible) contrasted the Siljanovska-Davkova narrative about Macedonia's loss of national pride with the thesis about the need for such a sacrifice for the successful implementation of European integration.

The Albanian candidates, realizing that they had no chance of defeating the leaders of the presidential race, competed with each other, emphasizing their own status as representatives of the interests of the Albanian minority^[20]. Both Albanians accused each other of corruption^[21], as well as complicity between Serbia and Russia^[22]. At the same time, representatives of the DSI constantly used narratives of oppression of Albanians by ethnic Macedonians^[23] and Albanophobia^[24].

The chances of the other presidential candidates to win were initially seen as completely illusory. Therefore, all public statements by Vankovskaya, Yakimovsky and Dimitrievsky very quickly came down to duplicating the positions of their parties and sounded in a partisan way^[25], as well as reflecting the opposition of their parties to each other^[26]. These candidates did not offer any narrative constructions reflecting the specifics of the presidential race.

Conclusion.

In the presented article, the authors tried to show that at the level of the two main candidates for the post of President of the Republic of Moldova, the most neutral and balanced ethno-political position was manifested, while Siljanovska-Davkova consistently demonstrated upholding the ideas of Macedonian national identity while maintaining ethno-political neutrality. Regarding the presentation of the foreign policy course and European integration, we can arrange the program statements of the candidates for President of the Republic of Moldova on a conditional scale – from unconditional European integration to the rejection of such. On this scale, the Albanian candidates (and the Albanian parties supporting them) will be positioned in a position of full European integration, and the identity of Macedonian citizens is not a narrative, symbolic or real value, dissolving into a conditional European identity (dear to the heart of the pro-Albanian candidates). Next on the scale will be Stevo Pendarovski and the SDSM, who recognize a separate Macedonian identity, but perceive it as a sacrifice worth making for the sake of European integration. The authors would assign the next position on the conditional narrative-symbolic scale of the 2024 presidential campaign to Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova and other candidates who do not deny the path of European integration, but insist that Macedonians should not dissolve and lose their identity during European integration. Finally, the final point on the scale of ethnopolitical and identity narratives in the programs of the candidates of the Macedonian presidential campaign in 2024, according to the authors, is set by Bilyana Vankovskaya, who does not consider the path of European integration to be absolutely obligatory if it means sacrificing the identity of Macedonians as the ethnopolitical and ethnocultural majority of the Macedonian people.

^[1] The Charter (Constitution) of the RSM - https://www.sobranie.mk/ustav-na-rm.nspx . Amendments to the Charter - https://www.sobranie.mk/odluki-za-proglasuvanje.nspx .

^[2] The priest was elected President of the Republic of Macedonia in 2014. Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the Republic of Macedonia, the Institute for Democracy, Societas Civilis– Skopje. 2014. https://izbornaarhiva.mk/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/priracnikpretsedatelski2014mkupd.pdf

^[3] Early adopters. Cabinet at the President of the Republic of Northern Macedonia https://pretsedatel.mk/poranesni-pretsedateli/

^[4] Questionnaire: The last person in Macedonia is not a bidet but a VMRO-DPMNE. 07.02.2024. https://arhiva3.republika.mk/vesti/makedonija/anketa-sledniot-pretsedatel-na-makedonija-ke-bide-od-vmro-dpmne/

^[5] Presidential election 21 April and 5 May 2019. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/7/428369_1.pdf

^[6] Compiled based on the materials of the website of the RSM State Election Commission (https://www.sec.mk /?bypass=true) and POLITICKI CATALOG: Site pretsedatelskikandidat(k)andhttps://civilmedia.mk/politicki-katalog-site-pretsedatelski-kandidat-k-i/

^[7] SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL PROJECT: "ANALYSIS ON PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2024". https://isppi.ukim.edu.mk/proekt-nauchnoistrazhuvachki-proekt-analiza-na-parlamentarnite-i-pretsedatelski-izbori-2024

^[8] Bujar Osmani https://bujarosmani.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Programa_MK_Priprema_Final-1.pdf;

^[9] Arben Taravari https://www.arbentaravari.mk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/TaravariPresident_Programi_MK-2.pdf

^[10] Stevcho Jakimowski https://grom.mk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/jakimovski_programa_compressed-1.pdf;

^[11] Maxim Dimitrijewski https://plusinfo.mk/manifest-za-makedoni-a-maksim-dimitrievski-a-promovirashe-pretsedatelskata-programa/

^[12] Biljana Vankovska-Tsvetkovska https://levica.mk/izborna-programa-2024/;

^[13] Stevo Pendarovski https://plusinfo.mk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Stevo-Pendarovski-programa-Nashiot-Pretsedatel.pdf;

^[14] Gordana Sijanovska-Davkova https://drive.google.com/file/d/1D6cfO_TyHrLtSr7PEss4a-gHgEpm9Cnj/view?pli=1;

^[15] Siljanovska-Davkova: The head of the Imam is slick, who demands that he rule, but does not agree with the final decision for the candidacy. 1.02.2024 https://360stepeni.mk/siljanovska-davkova-vo-glavata-imam-slika-shto-treba-da-pravi-eden-pretsedatel-no-ne-sum-donela-konechna-odluka-za-kandidatura/

^[16] Time for the women's dimension in politics – poraca Siljanovska-Davkova, potvarduvaja and ja podnesenata pretedatelska candidacy to VMRO-DPMNE. February 22, 2024. https://360stepeni.mk/vreme-e-za-zhenska-dimenzija-vo-politikata-poracha-siljanovska-davkova-potvrduvajki-ja-podnesenata-pretsedatelskata-kandidatura-do-vmro-dpmne/

^[17] VMRO-DPMNE is the only possible European alternative, led by Siljanovska-Davkova, SDSM estimates of deca and Mickoski ne ima vraќe con isolacija. March 2, 2024 https://360stepeni.mk/vmro-dpmne-e-edinstvena-mozhna-evropska-alternativa-veli-siljanovska-davkova-sdsm-smeta-deka-so-nea-i-mitskoski-ke-ima-vrakane-kon-izolatsija/

^[18] Siljanovska-Davkova: Screw up Europe's AI in the European banner, abusing the law by the nose. April 9, 2024. https://360stepeni.mk/siljanovska-davkova-lazhnite-evropjani-go-iskinaa-evropskoto-znamentse-zloupotrebuvajki-go-za-nosene-zakoni/

^[19] Look at Gordan and Biljan. The Salvation Army. 11.04.2024 https://nezavisen.mk/ideite-na-gordana-i-biljana/

^[20] HARM”: Bujar Osmani, the only Albanian with a subject in a special prosecution. Slavica. March 14, 2024. https://mia.mk/story/%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%E2%80%9D-%D0%B1%D1%83%D1%98%D0%B0%D1%80-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BE%D1%82-%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86-%D1%81%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE

^[21] „Harm" nema da mu go forgive bet on Bujar Osmani for "Monstrum" 27/03/2024. https://nezavisen.mk/vredi-nema-da-mu-go-prosti-stavot-na-bujar-osmani-za-monstrum/

^[22] Taravari mu se potsmeva na Bujar Osmani deka stanal pishman aџija the Balkans are open. 15.04.2024 https://nezavisen.mk/taravari-mu-se-potsmeva-na-bujar-osmani-deka-stanal-pishman-adzhija-za-otvoren-balkan/

^[23] "The slogan of 'Macedonia is your chauvinistic self': Bujar Osmani is attacking the world. 22.04.2024. https://nezavisen.mk/sloganot-makedonija-povtorno-tvoja-e-shovinistichki-bujar-osmani-go-napadna-vmro-dpmne/

^[24] Za Bujar Osmani najgolema peril e da ima graanski Charter 09.04.2024 https://nezavisen.mk/za-bujar-osmani-najgolema-opasnost-e-da-ima-gragjanski-ustav/

^[25] Vankovska: The framework of this agreement was signed on 08/04/2024. https://nezavisen.mk/vankovska-ramkovniot-dogovor-si-ja-zavrshi-svojata-funkcija/

^[26] Stevcio Jakimowski on Wednesday at Gostivar 05.04.2024 https://nezavisen.mk/stevcho-jakimovski-na-sredba-so-gragjanite-na-gostivar/