Personal identity: between subjectivity and objectivity

Babich Vladimir Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0001-8537-9782 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of History and Philosophy of Science; Tomsk State Pedagogical University 634061, Russia, Tomsk region, Tomsk, Kievskaya str., 60 v.v.babich@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Personality research is an extremely complex field. In which, since the time of the Socratic turn, both methods and ideas about the object under study have constantly changed. This research area is represented by a whole range of paradigms, which makes it difficult to achieve an empirical generalization of the facts about personality and their interpretations. The difficulty also arises in the formulation of generalized theoretical propositions, which are constantly multiplying and changing, which leads to terminological confusion in this section of philosophy.

To express the existence of a special human subjectivity, the following concepts are used in modern philosophy: personality (person), subject (subject), self (self), actor (actor), individuality (Individuality). These definitions are used in the philosophy of language as a reference for personal pronouns, in the ontology and metaphysics of personality - to clarify who or what the "I" is, and how it is possible to preserve its identity. The use of this terminology is chaotic, some philosophers interpret them as equivalents, others as meaningfully different terms. Moreover, none of the terms presented is unique. Peter Strawson discovered in the literature the use of the term "self" in thirty-one meanings ^{[1, p.18]}. Some philosophers equate the concepts of "personality" and "self", others use "self" and "subject" as synonyms, but avoid using the terms "agent" and "personality" ^[2]. Still others use the concept of "personality", but avoid using the concept of "self", as they consider it not defined and not ontologically grounded ^[3]. Semantic uncertainty is generated, among other things, by the complexity and dynamism of the subject being studied. Philosophers, sociologists, cultural scientists, and psychologists study the human self in various aspects. It is possible that they are talking about numerically different aspects of human subjectivity.

The variety of approaches to the study of human subjectivity and its various aspects, new emerging definitions and concepts do not necessarily contradict each other. This is proved by a multitude of interdisciplinary studies ^{[4, 5, 6]}. Nevertheless, we continue to fix the problem of semantic uncertainty of the concept of human subjectivity, overloaded with contradictions and various meanings. The difficulty in generalizing the facts and theoretical positions of theories representing subjectivity, the chaotic use of terminology - all this prevents the establishment of clarity and requires continued analytical work to clarify the concept of "I".

The uncertainty of Self and the problem of identity

Personality, self, subject, actor, agency, etc. [*] are not things that we could point fingers at in the objective world. We face difficulties in applying these concepts, which represent human subjectivity. We need a special theory of the "I" in order to talk about something that lies on the border between internal and external, value and fact, subjective and objective. Like Augustine, we discover ourselves in our own existence.: "Do you know that you exist? - I know. "Do you know what you're thinking?" - I know. So, you know that you exist, you know that you live, you know that you learn." ^{[7, p. 330]}. Of course, I understand that I am the person who is writing this text, trying to take a certain side in the debate about the "I". Somewhere inside me, I know that I have certain obligations and that I am responsible for them, as well as the ability to choose and make ethical judgments. But who is this "I", when does it arise and when does it cease to exist, what is its structure, where and how exactly does it exist, and what is necessary for its existence? Maybe the idea of "I" is just an appearance, but then how revisionist should another view of my "I" be and what is its basis?

As Paul Ricoeur noted, the question of human identity is a special space for various aporias ^[8]. The clash of Parmenides and Heraclitus can be imagined as a programming model for all future discussions about change and identity. What is really changing and what remains the same? Is it really all about eternal and unchanging "being" or, conversely, about the changing flow of "becoming"? Despite the experience of historical and philosophical knowledge, we still do not have a complete and clear answer to these fundamental questions.

The problem of the relationship between identity and change has traditionally been a source of endless metaphysical interpretations and perplexities. Today, the search for a model of personal identity is seen as a problem associated with profound transformations of social, religious, and economic relations and ethical norms. The modern emphasis on the individual, his rights, responsibilities, powers, and freedoms depends on a new perspective on subjectivity. The destruction of boundaries and the parallel disclosure of new possibilities, which are a distinctive feature of modern culture, on the subjective side of experience have caused a living connection between different, and previously unforeseen, parts of inner life. As a result, the modern Self emerges from the changing balance of the worldview more as a space of conflict than as a single substance.

Today, the problem of identity is important in many ways because of the vague and uncertain status of the "I". It is no coincidence that the heroes of modern novels or feature films are usually busy "searching for themselves" ^{[9, 10, 11]}. The feeling of isolation from the traditional foundations of identity exacerbates the need to be unified and understandable to oneself and others. That's why Parfitt's famous dictum, "Personal identity doesn't matter," still sounds like a provocative and thought-provoking thesis ^{[12, p. 245]}. How can personal identity be irrelevant in our lives? How is this possible when almost all the social practices in which we participate are based on the simple fact that we are separate, autonomous, and responsible beings – centers of action and consciousness ^[13].

Going beyond classical ontology, personal identity is something that cannot be fixed or precisely defined. It is a kind of "sameness" without substance. Or, if we turn to Riker again, "ipseite" is a type of identity that a person builds by himself due to "loyalty to himself in restraining this word", loyalty to norms, ideals and deeds related to obligations to the "Other" and to his "I" ^{[8, p.148]}. According to the philosopher, a restrained word indicates the preservation of the "I", which makes it possible to characterize the subject as the author of motives and actions. "Ipseite" is the type of identity that we use when we talk about the existence of human subjectivity. Defining this subjectivity as the identity of oneself, one's self, which is subject to change. Thereby fixing the dynamic nature of identity. To form such an identity, it is essential that it dialectically includes the ability to recognize and construct oneself through another.

Although personal identity is not limited solely to the characteristics inherent in physical objects, its dynamic and dialectical nature presupposes the existence of a certain "center" - the locus of personal "appropriation". The consequence of this "appropriation" is the ability to speak about "mine." This is exactly what allows us to say "my body", "my desire", "my look", etc. This "appropriation" can be described as a reflexive attitude towards an object or idea, as a result of which the object or ideas can become "mine". Accordingly, personality is represented by a set of reflexive practical relationships that do not arise out of nowhere and are not suspended in the void. These relations are connected with the space of both personal and impersonal causalities and the horizon of meanings and meanings that pre-exists in relation to the personality. The ability to form such relationships presupposes a multiplicity of combinations of "reflexive connections" with objects of "appropriation."

Me: embodiment, connectedness, culture, and appropriation

As a preliminary definition, we can characterize human subjectivity as a mental phenomenon consisting of reflexive relationships with people and cultural objects. This definition of "oneself" through a relationship with the "other" should not be perceived as an apophatic method of explicating the hidden essence of the "I", but should be considered as a prerequisite for the formation of self-identity. In this interpretation, the implicit otherness of the "I" is a source of "appropriation", articulation and the desire to form a "narrative unity"[**]. In turn, "narrative unity" is constructed through the acceptance of a sequence of commitments, the "appropriation" of assessments, values, goals, and attachments that form a reflexive bond.

If we agree that a convincing theory of human subjectivity should reflect both our immediate understanding of ourselves and the relevant scientific information about our "inner" life, which is becoming more and more numerous thanks to various sciences, then we think it would be wise to start with the general assumption that the "I" is multidimensional, and It is not a one-dimensional reality, which has a dynamic rather than a static structure ^{[14, 15, 16]}. In other words, we fix the problem of connection or relationship, not substance. This allows us to consider our subjectivity as a "field" of relationships in which the "center" of the space of subjectivity is the perspective of convergence of events and "reflexive connections." What we could designate as the reason for personal "appropriation," the consequence of which is the ability to talk about "mine."

In an attempt to define the core of our subjectivity, Daniel Dennett writes: "I believe that it is akin to the center of gravity, an abstraction that, despite its abstraction, is closely related to the physical world" ^{[17, p. 122]}. The convergence of the abstract and the physical takes place in the space of a first-person perspective. D.B. Volkov, developing Dennett's definitions, writes: "The movement of a perspective point in a developing story is mostly consistent and continuous both in space and time. The specific location of the perspective determines a selective attitude to circumstances and is expressed in descriptions from some specific angle of view. Perspective acts as a spotlight, picking out the main thing from the infinity of available descriptions.… Thus, the laws of perspective make it possible to select and structure narrative elements" ^{[18, p. 169]}.

If that's the case, then we could describe ourselves as a field of relationships with a predominant "center of narrative gravity," capable of "personal appropriation," allowing us to reasonably (though not always correctly) speak about "mine." The claim to such "appropriation" comes from three basic foundations of our existence.

The first foundation, "embodied existence", is that our body is not an inert object, but the basis of perceptual experience, the center of actions, deeds and their meanings ^{[19, p. 169]}. The corporeal nature of consciousness, based on the numerical identity of the body, determines the preservation of the unity of the first-person perspective. Without reference to "my body," the perspective that "I" expresses could not be identified by itself, since it would not be anchored in anything perceptual. A person always co-perceives the world with the perception of his own body. If our "I" were not formed by bodily continuity, there could not be the pain of loss or the joy of achievement, the feeling of our body as "mine", as well as the ability to rebuild our lives as our own. For example, how it happens to those who have experienced trauma ^[20]. The continuity of my body as one and the same body can never be just an objective fact of biology, chemistry or physics. It involves conscious continuity, which Ricoeur and others call self-identity or personality (ipseity). The "I" is always an embodied subject. At least for now we remain in the empirical space, excluding futurological predictions and speculative experiments.

The second foundation is the "psychological connectedness" or "psychological continuity" of our existence. It is based on the need to feel the psychological unity of our experience, emotions, motives, actions and acceptance of consequences. Our memories of past actions and plans for the future presuppose "sanity," that is, the ability to appropriate, remember, understand, and control our desires and actions. In fact, psychological continuity, like "embodied existence", presupposes the presence of a "center" of the space of subjectivity, but in a different dimension of the "I". Psychological continuity implies two abilities. The ability to perceive, connect and preserve memories of past experiences and the ability to maintain the connection of mental states over time (beliefs, values, attitudes, character, etc.). All known types of representation of subjectivity (even Strawson's diachronic personality) include as parts of the "I": beliefs, values, perceptions, emotionality and memory. These parts can be attributed to different, often conflicting, mental dimensions of human existence, but located in a single topos of human subjectivity, expressed in the psychological continuum of the "I". We introduce this continuity when we talk about a person's character or personality.

The third foundation is "cultural continuity." Our "I" is actualized in a reflexive relationship with the "other" (both with other "I" and with physical and ideal objects), that is, in an act of transcending our own definitions and experiences. This transgressive act, or act of self-distancing, does not occur in a void and is not caused by purely cognitive needs. It is aimed at forming a number of obligations that only a person can assume, assuming the formation of attachments and the axiological horizon of the existence of the "I". By saying that the self-distancing of the "I" does not take place in a void, I mean first of all the cultural continuum containing that range of possible axiological alternatives, which is given for one or another empirical subject. A continuum in which we discover objects for "appropriation" that form the identity of the "I". Thus, the axiological framework of culture acts as a prerequisite for the fundamental ability to make meaningful choices, defining one's identity based on existing narratives. Without a discourse that organizes the variety of alternatives (defining qualitative axiological differences), a conscious choice would be tantamount to random and would have no consequences for both the formation of our identity and the definition of our actions ^[21]. The identity of a person arises when the "I" forms reflexive connections with objects and causes represented in culture, which he thereby manages to make "his own" by accepting their normative force.

Reflection, identity, and ethical subjectivism

Such reflections should not lead us to conceptions of solipsistic or voluntarist self-creation ex nihilo. We become full-fledged individuals by accepting the normative consequences of our values, beliefs, and desires. We do not create our identity in a void; in practical terms, we experience it through a series of personal "certificates" [temoignage] or "attestation" ^{[22, p.90]}. This does not mean that we necessarily have complete knowledge of ourselves and our "testimonies" are always infallible. But it does mean that we can be responsible in a broad context for the regulatory obligations that shape our personality. According to Riker, this is referred to as "the ability to keep your word." We become who we are when we act reflexively, creating and conceptualizing the cultural space. Thus, the ability to self-reflect is a source not only of normativity, but also of practical identity. In this context, a practical identity is a description through which the "I" evaluates itself and according to which the "I" believes that actions have sufficient grounds to take them.

Reflection is a way of conflict resolution, a response to problems that disrupt the normal course of our lives ^{[23, 24]}. In other words, the reflecting Self resolves conflicts and dissonances (including internal ones) by activating our ability to distance ourselves from our mental content, observing and "appropriating" external objects and meanings, making them "our own", thereby changing and constructing ourselves. Reflection is a necessary element of interiorization.

Despite the fact that the "I" is a field of contradictions and conflicts, it is not a place of "war of all against all." Beliefs, emotions, and the experience of direct perception are different and sometimes conflicting aspects of the life of the Self, but they belong to a single mental space, which we call character or personality. In a sense, the reflexive position consists in actualizing the potency that is implicitly present in every empirical Self, and finds its expression in the teleological and axiological aspects of human existence. This is what we can call the desire for independence or self-determination. Living "your" life means embodying your goals and values. In this context, human existence does not act as passivity, submission to norms or adaptation of the subject, but as an active, conscious and creative duty, focused on taking its unique place in existence.

It is a truism to say that no one else can live my own life instead of me. However, this statement has a number of philosophical implications, since for the "I" it means the need to make commitments, and, consequently, to have experience of reflection, awareness of the causes and motives of their own actions. This brings us back to the question of the correlation of the reflexive Self with the normative requirements of culture. Kristina Korsgaard explores this problem by correlating the problem of personal identity and normativity.

Korsgaard emphasizes the importance of personal identity for understanding the nature of ethics. She turns to reflection as the basis for the normative status of our moral judgments. The philosopher understands reflection as the ability to question our beliefs, desires, and motives, the ability to ask ourselves if they constitute sufficient grounds for our actions. Here, the grounds are preferences, values, and desires that have passed the reflective endorsement test. Thus, the ability to reflect is a source of normativity. It gives us the opportunity to choose what to believe and how to act ^{[25, pp. 25-26]}. Arguing that the "I", through reflection, is able to form its own beliefs and values that explain its actions and determine the intentionality of actions, Korsgaard introduces the term "reflective endorsement". This "ability to consciously reflect on our own actions gives us a kind of power over ourselves, and this power gives normativity to our moral requirements" ^{[25, p. 26.]}.

For Korsgaard, the will generated by the subjectivity of the Self is the source of the "moral law" to the extent that it expresses a set of basic attributes that a person has critically comprehended and approved. When expressed, these signs explicate personality. When a person's actions contradict them, or her speech disavows previously reflexively approved reasons, she re-raises the question "who is this person?" through the questions "what is he declaring?" and "why is he doing this?".

It follows that ethical issues are related to practical identity issues. The reasons on the basis of which we act or adopt certain values and points of view are at least partially determined by our personal identity. If the reasons that guide our actions are not based on our basic qualities, if our values are not embodied in who we are, our actions and beliefs will be arbitrary and meaningless. Thus, our identity is formed by socially determined experience, the physicality and structure of our psyche, on the one hand, and the ability to self-determination based on reflexive approval, "appropriation" and free will, on the other.

If human subjectivity is understood as a dynamic structure connected by a series of acts of "appropriation" (interiorization) and positioning in relation to the space of motives and causes, which are considered not as part of the Platonic world of ideas, but as a topos of normative relations connected with physical and cultural reality, for which only relative independence is recognized, then "I" it is impossible to describe as a self-contained entity or substance subject to a purely external description. A personality is not an entity, but a dialectical process unfolding in the space between what it could have become and what it has become from the point of view of the "I" and the "Other". This raises the question of how we can combine human "subjectivity", based on free will and personal experience of existence, with human "objectness", fixed through a naturalistic description of the physical aspect of the existence of the "I", which is based on an impersonal determination of causes and effects, in which a person is only "a thing among things."

The following dialectical spiral can be considered as a "sketch" on the way to the formation of a holistic personality model representing the dynamic, narrative, reflexive and heterogeneous nature of the "I", including the experience of the first and third person perspective (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

Personality as a first- and third-person problem

In order to form a minimal idea of the "I", we must explain and describe the qualitative characteristics of a person experiencing their own human existence from the perspective of the first person ^[26]. This means answering the question most fully: "What does it mean to be me?" The first-person perspective and the associated qualitative characteristics of experience express the subjectivity of human existence. Human "objectness" is described from the point of view of a third person, which implies the use of naturalistic methods of describing existence ^[27].

The distance between these two perspectives of human existence is well illustrated by Thomas Nagel's classic work "What does it Feel like to be a Bat?", where he argues that it is impossible to get an answer to this question from a third person. It can be obtained only by having a first-person perspective, that is, you need to be the mouse itself ^[28]. Negel believed that it is impossible to completely overcome the distance between the naturalistic language of description and the language of describing the experience of existence in the first person.

A modern example of the search for a philosophical solution to the problem of describing the experience of the existence of a first-person perspective, using naturalistic ontological representations, is the research of Thomas Metzinger. The philosopher believes that consciousness can function without a certain perspective. This is confirmed by the experience of studying pathological disorders of the human psyche and animal consciousness. Accordingly, we cannot make a clear distinction between a Homo sapiens biological organism and a person with free will and the ability to intend without constructing an additional theoretical entity, which can be described as a "phenomenal first-person perspective." This perspective is a fundamental and fundamentally ineffable form of self-knowledge, preceding any other form of cognitive self-awareness and presentation ^{[29, 30]}.

In other words, in order to get a minimal understanding of the nature of the "I", we must describe the experience in the first person, in which "my body", "my mental content" and "my reflexive activity" related to the definition of "myself" find a common basis. In an attempt to find such a common basis, modern philosophy assumes the existence of two poles in the spectrum of explanations of the phenomenon of consciousness - a substantial understanding of the "I" based on classical ontology and physicalist reductionism, which assumes that consciousness does not have an independent ontological status, since it is derived from the physical processes of the body ^[31].

Developing the theory of personal identity, Charles Taylor argued for the need for "peaceful coexistence" of various scientific approaches to describing human reality. In his opinion, any physicalist explanation of human existence should satisfy not only the basic empirical conditions and correspond to the modern scientific method, but also have the epistemological potential necessary for the theory to include the possibility of various interpretations of the existence of the intentional horizon of the human personality ^{[32, 33]}. In other words, a revisionist revision of human nature, based on natural scientific research methods (primarily reductive physicalism), should not exclude the phenomenon of the "I" itself as the existence of a first-person perspective capable of intentional actions. This does not imply the imposition of a priori restrictions on scientific research, but only indicates the existence of a boundary beyond which any scientific research method risks losing contact with the object under study.

Taylor did not rule out the possibility that in the future a theory might arise linking mechanistic and naturalistic explanations with a phenomenological understanding of the study of objects, states and events. The philosopher called this long-term scenario the "convergence hypothesis." According to which, he proposed to replace the scientific explanation, which is recognized as successful only when it succeeds in systematically reducing complex phenomena to their basic elements and simple cause-and-effect relationships, with a multiplicity of approaches to describing reality. Complementing each other and forming connections between different levels of explanations, different methods of describing reality, according to Taylor, contribute to a more complete clarification of the issues under study ^[34]. In fact, this is a criticism of philosophy – science, which claims that preference in choosing a research method should be determined by the historical success of this method. On the basis of which, in turn, the "right" is formed to deny the very existence of the explanandum, as soon as the method encounters obstacles that it is unable to overcome using its own explanatory power.

Obviously, the "convergence hypothesis" outlined above is not a universal practical solution in the methodology of science. It only draws our attention to the fact that no revisionist explanation of the "I" can go so far as to completely deny the meaning of our experience in the first person, as well as the very vocabulary that we use to comprehend it and label the experience of its existence. If this is true, then it is necessary to conclude that even the most radical revisions of our experience of existence must remain in the space of continuous mutual influence of multiple methods of describing reality. In a space in which the objectifying position of a third-person perspective can never completely get rid of the subjective point of view. In this sense, human existence can be scientifically explained without eliminating or systematically denying the experience (and the vocabulary generated by it) from a first-person perspective.

Therefore, when constructing a theory of personality, we must take into account the subjective experience of the existence of the "I", which acts as a basic prerequisite for describing the mental life of the embodied subject. This means that theories of personality should contain the goal of achieving a reflexive balance between the knowledge acquired in the course of our awareness of the experience of our own existence and what we manage to learn through a detached attitude towards ourselves. Thus forming an intersection of first- and third-person perspectives. Thus, the principle of economy of thought is complemented by the principle of preserving an irreducible level of phenomenological complexity. Thomas Metzinger, speaking of consciousness, referred to it as the presence of a "phenomenal first-person perspective." This principle is introduced not for the purpose of "multiplying entities", but to designate and articulate the experience of the existence of the "I" in the first person, forming the conditions for its comprehension and recognition. Compliance with these two principles acts as an "insurance policy" against the loss of the object under study and at the same time a condition for improving and correcting our ideas about the "I".

This determines the need for constant refinement of our understanding of sensus communis. Which, as we have known since the time of Descartes, is the methodological basis of any theory. "Common sense" should not require sacrificing one or another part of experience in order to preserve the abstract consistency of a one-dimensional research method. This attitude is based on the simple fact that we experience reality through sensory perception, which forms a sensory experience that is understandable and interpretable. What Kant designated as the horizon of cognition is "the proportionality of the magnitude of the totality of knowledge with the abilities and goals of the subject" ^{[35, p. 347]}. It is important that this knowledge is not depleted or eliminated altogether during scientific research.

I, Phallibilism and phenomenological realism

According to the idea of convergence of different ways of human research, any scientific methods should abandon the total claims of a complete and exhaustive explanation. Radical physicalist reductionism, applied in anthropological theories, is an important part of the horizon of cognition, provided that the limits of its explanatory power and heuristic potential are understood. Against the background of such fallibilistic pragmatics, a version of phenomenological realism is being built. One of its foundations is Aristotle, who understood reality as "that which manifests itself for all" ^{[36, p. 269]}. According to Aristotle, reality is something that is visible to everyone. What is devoid of this appearance comes and goes like a dream, as exclusively our subjective experience, not rooted in reality. Such arguments refer us to Heraclitus, who argued that "for those who are awake, there is one common world [κόσμος], and from those who sleep, everyone turns away to his own" ^{[37, p. 198]}. Understood in this way, phenomenological realism attempts to reconcile the subjective and objective dimensions of experience. As Thomas Nagel accurately noted, an overzealous claim to objectivity risks turning into an extreme form of idealism ^{[38, p. 229]}. In the end, returning to Taylor's thoughts again, "when it comes to human affairs, do we know more adequate criteria of reality than those concepts that, as a result of critical reflection and correction of identified errors, best explain our lives?" ^{[39, p.57]}. In this sense, even our most daring attempts to understand our own nature cannot go beyond the built relational structures that "act as a set of relationships ... and form the basis of reality" ^{[40, p. 49]}.

But does this mean that future scientific discoveries, for example, in the field of neuroscience, will not be able to change or question our experience of a phenomenological sense of self, the way we think of ourselves as individuals, moral agents, and spiritual beings capable of value choices? Trying to answer these questions in the context of today, it should first be noted that conditions of instability, variability and uncertainty are the natural state of modern culture ^[41]. This requires a person's ability to make judgments, freed from the burden of traditions that act as a priori prerequisites for understanding and evaluating. Therefore, the identity of a modern person, in the language of existentialists, is largely built in conditions of anxiety and abandonment. However, self-understanding cannot be based solely on worry. Modern culture contains ideas that originated in the modern era, such as progress, the ability to self-determination and autonomy. These ideas continue to serve as guiding, explanatory and motivating grounds for many people, acting as an "antidote" to modern anxieties, mitigating their effects.

Control and manipulation (the ability to change and influence) are additional encouraging ideas. It is difficult to imagine anything more encouraging and inspiring than the idea that we are able to analyze the perspective of the development of the reality around us, take an objectifying position in relation to it, and improve the ways of controlling and manipulating it. But what if the manipulated thing is the main concern? What if we are told that we can radically manipulate ourselves by becoming part of the changing world of Heraclitus ^[42]? This is one of the basic reasons for our concern. An example is the range of bioethical problems, such as setting the boundaries of genetic intervention, artificial insemination, cloning and transplantation, gender identity change, etc.. This causes anxiety and misunderstanding primarily because exposure and control are not the same as knowing about the object of manipulation.

We can control certain factors by creating desired phenomena without understanding their essence and value, just as 17th-century chemists explained the combustion of gunpowder using the concept of phlogiston.Gorenje. Thus, when someone like Martha Farah asks rhetorically, "Is there anything about people that is not a capacity of their bodies?"^[43] he is raising two different questions. (1) “Is there anything in our mental and physical life that does not find its expression in the form of embodiment? and (2) “Do we know everything about a phenomenon when we have learned to manipulate or control it?” The most likely answer to both questions is no.

Today, as before, we can manipulate a person's personality, preventing him from freely using the abilities of the body, hiding or providing important information about his personal history, thereby influencing his identity. We don't need to change the genotype or manipulate the brain for this. Since personality is determined by a wide range of conditions of its existence (physical, cognitive, social, cultural, etc., but is never reduced to one of them), it is something fragile, something that can be damaged in many ways at different levels. That's why we need a holistic view of personality. And such a view, in all likelihood, requires the synthesis of several methods of explication of the "I" with the construction of a complex ontology.

Conclusion and conclusions

Scientific knowledge is unlikely to directly change our sense of self based on the phenomenological experience of the Self, but it can indirectly affect our self-understanding by presenting us with information that can radically change our reflexive balance. In this case, the alternative to a disturbed balance will be to find a more stable equilibrium. This means that theories of personality should contain the goal of achieving a reflexive balance between the knowledge acquired through the experience of our own existence and what we manage to learn through a detached attitude towards ourselves. Thus forming an intersection of first- and third-person perspectives.

We cannot go beyond the "visible" or "embodied" by studying personality. Since the first-person perspective, which we designate by the pronoun "I", could not in itself be identified without the presence of something perceptual. The only way to achieve this is to overcome the conditions of preserving the three continuities (physical, mental, and cultural) necessary for the existence of the "I" identity. That is, to eliminate the physical, mental and cultural conditions of our existence. However, it is difficult to imagine such a prospect even within the framework of radical transhumanism projects. Thus, personality is a necessary and prerequisite for the existence of any experience (not just "my" experience), which makes it impossible for scientists of all fields (including physicalist reductionism) to exclude the concept of personality when constructing human models.

The fact that we are increasingly able to manipulate the physical and mental conditions of the Self's existence cannot mean that personality is a substance that we can completely objectify and manipulate like other material objects. Personal identity is primarily a matter of bodily, social, mental, and normative relationships. It should rather be understood as an ordered whole, rather than as a rigid hierarchical system. Reductionism does not allow us to properly understand the dynamic, narrative, active, heterogeneous and dialectical (essentially conflicting) nature of personality, which requires the construction of a holistic theory of the Self.

[*] In the context of the presented research, these terms are a reference to the author of the speech as someone who is identical to the individualized participant of the event, who has the experience of living this event, and who is capable of autonomous, internally conditioned action, who can be designated by the pronoun "I".

[**] Narrative unity is understood as the subject's experience of the unity of his life project in time through the construction of an autobiographical narrative, which allows him to realize the identity of his own existence as something, causally and axiologically grounded, connected, lasting and continuous.