Translate this page:
Please select your language to translate the article


You can just close the window to don't translate
Library
Your profile

Back to contents

International Law
Reference:

EU Restrictive Measures with Respect to third States and their Residents (the Case of the Russian Federation)

Panov Filipp Yur'evich

Postgraduate student, Department of International and European Law, Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation

117218, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, B. Cheremushkinskaya str., 34

filipp3096@gmail.com

DOI:

10.25136/2644-5514.2022.3.38850

EDN:

RIKRRX

Received:

26-09-2022


Published:

03-10-2022


Abstract: The historical development of the practice of applying restrictive measures (sanctions) has led to a transition from the idea of their application against States to the concept of their application against individual private law entities. The article examines the historical practice of applying sanctions against Russia and the prerequisites for their application against private law entities. The author gives a general description of the restrictive measures of the European Union used against third States and individuals. In addition, the article examines the specifics of the restrictive measures of the European Union that have been in force against Russia since 2014, taking into account their significant expansion that occurred after February 24, 2022. The legal regulation of the European Union, which establishes restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, was significantly expanded and revised after the announcement by the President of Russia about the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine. As a result of the analysis of this regulation, the author comes to the conclusion that at the moment there is a hybrid sanctions regime in the European Union, when targeted sanctions against individuals are combined with comprehensive restrictive measures against a number of sectors of the Russian economy. The article also assesses the compliance of restrictive measures of the European Union with modern concepts of "smart" and "targeted" sanctions, which, according to the supporters, should reduce the negative humanitarian consequences of the use of restrictive measures. Despite the official statements of the European Union, the article presents arguments that allow us to conclude that in practice such "smart" and "targeted" sanctions are accompanied by indiscriminate comprehensive restrictions that apply not only to sanctioned persons, but also, in principle, to any Russian persons.


Keywords:

sanctions, restrictive measures, European Union, smart sanctions, targeted sanctions, asset-freeze, sectoral sanctions, European Communities, Treaty on the EU, EU sanctions regulations

This article is automatically translated.

The modern practice of applying unilateral restrictive measures by subjects of international law (for the purposes of this article, the concepts of "sanctions" and restrictive measures are proposed to be considered equivalent) confirms that their targets traditionally become sovereign states (for example, the Russian Federation) or private legal entities – individuals or organizations that meet certain criteria (for example, persons operating in oil and gas sector of the Russian Federation). At the same time, a special place among the subjects of international law applying restrictive measures is occupied by the European Union (hereinafter also referred to as the "EU" or "Union"), which is the only regional international organization applying unilateral restrictive measures against third States and their residents. Currently, there are over 40 sanctions regimes in the Union, 25 of which were put into effect autonomously, that is, in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution (hereinafter referred to as the "UN Security Council")[4, c. 142-143].

After the announcement on February 24, 2022 by the President of the Russian Federation of the beginning of a special military operation against Russia, its individuals and legal entities, restrictive measures (sanctions) from the European Union followed. The new sanctions simultaneously provided for both the expansion of prohibitions in force since 2014 and fundamentally new, previously unused, restrictions.

It seems necessary to note that the problems of restrictive measures (sanctions) of the EU have received a relative scientific study in the domestic legal literature. The most complete description of the restrictive measures of the EU is contained in M. G. Doraev's monograph[5]. However, it cannot be said that this work is a comprehensive scientific study of this phenomenon – due to the general nature of the monograph, relatively little attention has been paid to the restrictive measures of the EU, which does not provide an exhaustive scientific study. Moreover, the monograph in question was published in 2016 and has not been updated subsequently, so it does not take into account the significant changes in the legal regulation of EU restrictive measures that occurred after February 24, 2022.

It should also be noted the works of S. V. Glandin, in which certain issues of restrictive measures of the EU are investigated, however, the scope of research of these works seems limited mainly to the introduction of sanctions against certain private legal entities and the challenge by these entities of the sanctions imposed in the Court of the European Union (hereinafter - the "EU Court"). In this regard, S. V. Glandin pays considerable attention to the study of the judicial practice of the EU Court in cases of challenging restrictive measures by sanctioned persons[21], and also analyzes the application by the EU Court of Justice for these purposes of the provisions of the Charter of the European Union on Fundamental Rights[25]. At the same time, the author's attention is focused on studying the case law of the EU Court and its application when considering claims of Russian applicants such as Arkady Rotenberg[22], Almaz-Antey Concern and Rosneft oil company[23][24]. At the same time, the specifics and features of the practical application of certain types of EU restrictive measures are not given in these works.

In addition, the work of A. A. Klishas should be highlighted, in which a political and legal analysis of the restrictive measures of the EU was carried out[6]. The subject of the analysis of this work was the restrictive measures imposed on the Russian Federation at the time of publication – that is, the specifics of the new restrictive measures introduced after February 24, 2022 are not taken into account. In addition, as part of his work, the author did not set out to conduct a doctrinal study of the restrictive measures of the EU, his work reflects the specifics of sanctions of a wide range of subjects of international law, which, in addition to the EU, includes the United States, Switzerland and Australia.

Some issues of restrictive EU measures in force against Russia were considered in the work of V. V. Voynikov[7], however, this work can be considered as a general regulatory characteristic of individual restrictions imposed by the EU on Russia until February 24, 2022. The article pays considerable attention to the review of applicable EU regulations, which did not allow taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of restrictive EU measures reflected in the works of domestic and foreign authors.

Despite the presence in the domestic legal literature of publications concerning the restrictive measures of the EU listed above, it seems premature to say that this phenomenon has received a full and exhaustive doctrinal study, the works published to date affect only certain aspects of this phenomenon or consider it in general terms. At the same time, taking into account the prolonged (since 2014) application of EU restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, Russian legal entities and individuals, a thorough doctrinal study of EU restrictive measures seems not only necessary from both a scientific and practical point of view. In practice, this will allow taking into account the specifics of restrictive measures when doing business with European jurisdiction, in scientific terms, doctrinal study will provide a basis for further applied research and legislative developments in terms of countering the negative consequences of restrictive EU measures.

Within the framework of this article, it is not intended to establish and resolve existing doctrinal contradictions regarding how restrictive measures should be defined. It should be noted that this issue, despite the relative elaboration of sanctions issues, both in domestic and foreign literature, still does not have a unified approach among researchers [3, p. 5]. Thus, some authors believe that sanctions are legal instruments designed to restrict trade or financial relations with foreign states, governments, legal entities or individuals[2, p. 334]. A significant disadvantage of this definition is that it does not take into account the purpose of the application of sanctions. Other authors, which seems appropriate, define sanctions depending on their purpose as a punishment imposed through any means and processes with the intended purpose of changing the behavior of the target State of sanctions [1, p. 3-5]. This definition does not reflect the possible types of sanctions and is limited only to sanctions against States, while modern practice has long allowed the use of sanctions against private law entities.

Thus, although both of these definitions are correct, they separately appear to be somewhat incomplete. Despite the fact that the formation of the concept of restrictive measures is not the purpose of this work, for the purposes of the study, it is proposed to include trade or financial restrictions imposed by States or international organizations through legal mechanisms against States, organizations and individuals in order to "punish" behavior that does not correspond to the political guidelines of the initiators of sanctions, and for coercion to change this behavior.

The purpose of this article is to establish the reasons and prerequisites for the use of restrictive measures against private law entities, to define and classify the tools of restrictive EU measures used against private law entities. In order to achieve the stated goal, the EU restrictive measures applicable to the Russian Federation and its residents have been chosen as the subject of study of this article, since at present they involve the use of the widest range of possible restrictions that apply only to the Russian Federation. The methodological basis of the study was the dialectical method of cognition of legal phenomena, in addition to which the following logical and systematic methods were used – this approach allowed us to consider the problem under study from the point of view of the basic laws of dialectics, with the help of formal logic, as a whole as a system and separately as components of this system. In the process of studying EU regulations, a technical and legal method was also used. To a lesser extent, in particular, when studying the prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against private law entities, the historical and legal method was used.

1. Prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against private law entities (smart sanctions concept)Despite the fact that restrictive measures have been applied regularly throughout the history of the state and law, their targets most often became public law entities – sovereign states[8].

The use of restrictive measures against private law entities is a fairly new phenomenon and therefore little studied. The emergence of this practice is usually attributed to the XX century, to the period of world wars, when the United Kingdom, together with the United States, first turned to the practice of controlling business participants – with the help of intelligence services, they tracked individuals and legal entities of neutral states trading with Germany. Such persons were subject to inclusion in the so-called "black lists". British subjects were forbidden to conduct trade relations with the persons involved in these lists, and neutral states were forbidden to provide them with goods produced by Great Britain [9, p. 147-148].

At the same time, after the end of the Second World War, the practice of applying restrictive measures against private law sanctions faded into the background until the 2000s. Foreign legal literature provides estimates that the main prerequisite for the development of this practice was the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. It is noted that these events have become a catalyst for the international community, contributing to the increased use of restrictive measures against private legal entities (terrorists) both on the part of the UN, and on the part of the EU and other subjects of international law [11, p. 91].

These restrictive measures were applied both in a multilateral format on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, and in an individual format by individual subjects of international law. Foreign researchers note that the extraordinary scale of the application of EU "anti-terrorist" sanctions indicates that they are becoming not only an important component of the EU sanctions policy, but also a cornerstone of the common foreign policy and security of the Union [12, p. 288]. It should be noted that the changed approach was based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions – if before September 11, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions providing for sanctions related to terrorism, then after that date and until 2010 – 13 resolutions. The increased activity of the UN Security Council in this direction indicates the existence of a consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the need to use sanctions against private law entities to counter terrorism. The criticism of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council sanctions in the situation of conflict between its permanent members expressed in the domestic literature can be a confirmation of this. For example, M. G. Doraev determines the small number of UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions during the Cold War by the situation of permanent conflict between permanent members of the UN Security Council, which led to the de facto blocking of the UN Security Council and depriving it of the opportunity to effectively use international sanctions to force delinquents to comply with international law[5, p. 17].

It would be logical to assume that restrictive measures against private legal entities have proved to be an effective tool in the fight against terrorism – this is due to their extrapolation to international legal relations between States. An additional factor contributing to this process is probably the imperative principles of international law enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter and obliging States to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force, as well as to resolve their international disputes by peaceful means. Perhaps some States have begun to consider economic sanctions as a "peaceful" tool for resolving their international disputes.

There is a point of view in foreign literature according to which the active application of restrictive measures against private law entities is due to the EU's desire to reduce the negative humanitarian impact of such measures on the civilian population of the State that became their target. For this reason, restrictive measures against individuals are proposed to be considered "smart" or "targeted" [13, p. 63].

A similar approach can also be traced in the documents of the EU Council responsible for the application of EU restrictive measures. In particular, the Basic Principles on the Application of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), approved by him on June 7, 2004, indicate that restrictive measures should be applied in such a way as to have the maximum impact on those whose behavior they are aimed at changing. At the same time, targeted restrictive measures should, to the maximum extent possible, reduce any adverse humanitarian or unforeseen consequences for persons who are not targets of sanctions (relevant instructions are contained, for example, in the Basic Principles for the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), which were published on June 7, 2004). Although such documents are not legally binding for the EU and its member States, they are adopted by the EU Council with the intention of further use when introducing restrictive measures[13, p. 63].

In the domestic literature devoted to the issue of restrictive measures, this approach is seriously criticized. In particular, I. N. Timofeev points out that the introduction of targeted sanctions against companies strategically important for the country may entail severe negative consequences for the citizens of this country [14, p. 74]. Similar judgments can be found in the relevant foreign literature, in particular, Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, notes that targeted sanctions, which were supposed to reduce negative consequences compared to comprehensive sanctions, in practice cause humanitarian damage to the population of the countries concerned[20]. Recently, these conclusions were confirmed in connection with the US sanctions against individual members of the Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation), who became part of the new Government of Afghanistan. This situation significantly complicated the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and put the country on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe.

2. EU restrictive measures against third States and their persons. The example of Russia

2.1. Regulatory framework for the application of EU restrictive measures against RussiaThe European Commission, the executive body of the Union, classifies restrictive measures of a nature as instruments of a common foreign and security policy (See, for example, European Commission, Restrictive measures, Spring 2008).

Decisions within the framework of the Common Foreign and security policy are taken unanimously by all EU Member States in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Treaty on the European Union (signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, effective from December 1, 2009 with amendments and additions as amended on December 13, 2007). The meaning of the common Foreign and Security policy is to consolidate the principles and objectives of the EU's foreign policy activities, based on the political solidarity of the member States of the European Union.

By applying restrictive measures, the European Union pursues a number of goals:

— Protection of fundamental values and interests in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;

— Ensuring the security of the European Union;

— Protection of international peace and security in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe;

— development of international cooperation;

— development and strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The legal basis for the introduction of restrictive measures of an economic nature and financial sanctions of the EU is article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, effective from December 1, 2009, as amended on December 13, 2007). Decisions on the introduction of restrictive EU measures are taken by the EU Council, in which all EU member states are represented[19]. Since this decision relates to the common foreign and security policy, it must be unanimously approved by all EU Member States. The decision adopted by the Council of the EU comes into force from the moment of publication in the official press of the EU – the Official Journal of the EU.

In accordance with this procedure, the EU Council adopted the following regulatory legal acts establishing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation:

— EU Council Decision No. 2014/512/CFSP of July 31, 2014 and corresponding EU Council Regulation No. 833/2014 of July 31, 2014 "On restrictive measures in connection with Russia's actions to destabilize the situation in Ukraine" (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation 833/2014"). These regulatory legal acts provide for a set of sectoral restrictive measures (i.e. restrictions on Russia and Russian persons not related to the blocking of assets);

— EU Council Decision No. 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014 and corresponding EU Council Regulation No. 269/2014 of March 17, 2014 "On restrictive measures in connection with actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine" (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation 269/2014"). These regulatory legal acts provide for blocking restrictive measures against certain Russian individuals and organizations.

It should be noted that, in addition to the regulatory legal acts listed above, the EU has established a special regime of restrictive measures against the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. The basis for these restrictive measures is the Decision of the Council of the EU No. 2014/386/CFSP of June 23, 2014 and the corresponding Regulation of the Council of the EU No. 692/2014 of June 23, 2014 "On restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol". A detailed review of these regulatory legal acts, however, is not the purpose of this article, since they have already been repeatedly studied in the domestic literature and have not been changed since 2014.

Initially, all the acts listed above were adopted to create additional costs for the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to it, as well as to persuade the Russian Federation to change its policy towards Ukraine. In particular, the preamble to Regulation 269/2014 states that "the heads of EU member States stressed that a solution to the crisis should be found through negotiations between the Governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, including through potential multilateral mechanisms, and that in the absence of results, the EU will decide on additional measures, such as visa restrictions, blocking assets...". The preamble to the later adopted Regulation 833/2014 indicates that "... it was deemed expedient to introduce additional restrictive measures in order to increase the costs of Russia's actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis ...".

2.2 Scope and classification of EU restrictive measuresThe effect of EU sanctions is limited to persons who have a connection with EU jurisdiction.

They are mandatory for all persons on the territory of the EU (including on board aircraft or vessels flying the flag of an EU Member State), as well as for any persons in part of activities that are fully or partially carried out on the territory of the EU (hereinafter collectively referred to as "EU persons").

In addition, EU restrictive measures, regardless of the location and region of activity, must be observed by individuals who are citizens of EU member States and organizations registered in accordance with EU legislation.

Thus, if a person's personal law is not the law of an EU member State, while such a person is not located on the territory of the EU and does not conduct activities on the territory of the EU, he is not obliged to comply with EU restrictive measures.

The restrictive measures of the EU , depending on the consequences provided for by them , can be divided into three categories:

1. blocking – providing for the blocking of the property of a sub-sanctioned person;

2. non–blocking - providing for restrictions not related to the blocking of assets; and

3. visa – restricting the access of a sanctioned person to the territory of the EU.

In turn, non-blocking sanctions can be further classified into trade and financial (including investment).

Depending on whether the adoption of national regulation by an EU Member State is required for the entry into force of EU restrictive measures, one can distinguish:

1. blocking restrictive measures and the vast majority of non-blocking restrictive measures (except restrictions on the supply of weapons);

2. restrictive measures requiring the adoption of additional national regulation (visa restrictive measures and restrictions on the supply of weapons).

Blocking restrictive measures of the EU are imposed on individuals and organizations on the basis of decisions and regulations of the Council of the EU, which operate directly throughout the EU. Funds and economic resources owned or controlled by such sub-sanctioned persons are subject to blocking, in addition, it is prohibited to provide funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to sub-sanctioned persons or for their benefit. This type of restrictions applies to individuals and organizations listed in the annex to the relevant "sanctions" regulation of the Council of the EU.

For the purposes of blocking restrictive measures of the EU, broad definitions of what refers to "funds" and "economic resources" are provided. In particular, "funds" include financial assets and any kind of benefits, including, but not limited to (i) money, checks and other payment instruments; (ii) deposits in financial institutions or other organizations, account balances, debts and debentures; (iii) publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks, bonds, derivative contracts; (iv) interest, dividends or other types of profits or values derived from or created by assets; (v) loans, rights of set-off, guarantees, contractual guarantees or other financial obligations; (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, certificates of transfer of ownership; (vii) documents providing evidence of shares in funds or financial resources [5, pp. 115-116].

In turn, "economic resources" are assets of any kind (tangible or intangible, movable or immovable) that do not relate to funds, but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services [5, pp. 115-116].

The traditional companion of blocking restrictive measures are visa restrictive measures – they apply to sanctioned individuals whose assets are subject to blocking. However, unlike blocking restrictive measures, the regulatory legal acts of the EU Council on sanctions do not have direct effect in terms of visa restrictions. EU member States are obliged to additionally implement visa restrictive measures in their national legal order. In particular, the EU Council Decision No. 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014, which provides for blocking sanctions against Russian individuals, additionally obliges EU Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent access to their territory or transit through it of individuals under sanctions.

Visa restrictive measures are not applied to citizens of EU Member States, as well as in a situation where this would contradict certain international legal obligations of an EU member State (for example, if it would prevent such an individual from accessing an international conference held under the auspices of the UN on the territory of the relevant EU Member State). In addition, an EU Member State may, at its own discretion, make an exception to this prohibition if the trip is justified by urgent humanitarian needs or the need to attend an intergovernmental meeting, or such a trip is supported or organized by the EU [5, p. 117].

The greatest difficulties in practice seem to be related to non-blocking sanctions. This is due to an extremely wide range of tools provided for by this category of restrictive measures. Traditionally, this set includes a ban on the supply of weapons or military or dual-use goods, as well as the provision of related services and related financing to any persons located in the target State of restrictive measures, or to any persons for use in that State. In addition, EU regulatory legal acts on sanctions may provide for additional restrictive measures. For example, the EU Council Decision No. 2017/2074/CFSP of November 13, 2017 "On restrictive measures in connection with the situation in Venezuela" prohibits, among other things, the supply to Venezuela or for use in Venezuela: 

— goods that can be used for internal repression; and

— equipment and software that can be used to track and intercept communications in the interests of the ruling regime.

At the same time, traditionally trade restrictive measures prohibiting the supply of certain categories of goods also include a ban on the provision of technical and financial assistance, brokerage services and the provision of financing in connection with such "prohibited" supplies.

2.3. EU restrictive measures in force against RussiaThe set of restrictive EU measures that applied to the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea provided for blocking and visa restrictive measures, as well as non-blocking restrictive measures.

After the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, these restrictive measures were significantly expanded – blocking restrictive measures were introduced against a multiple of a larger number of Russian persons, and non-blocking restrictive measures were supplemented with new prohibitions that were previously absent in EU practice.

In order to apply blocking restrictive measures against a Russian person (and visa measures, if it is an individual), it must comply with any of the following criteria provided for in Article 3 of Regulation 269/2014:

— be a natural person who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies that undermine or pose a threat to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine, or that hinder the activities of international organizations in Ukraine;

— is a legal entity providing material or financial support to actions that undermine or pose threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine;

— is a legal entity in Crimea or Sevastopol, the ownership of which was transferred in violation of the legislation of Ukraine, or a legal entity that benefited from such transfer of ownership;

— is a person who provides material or financial support to Russian persons responsible for making decisions on the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine;

— is a person who performs operations with separatist groups in the Donbas.

After February 24, 2022, EU restrictive measures may be additionally imposed on persons receiving material or financial benefits from the Russian Government, as well as large Russian entrepreneurs and organizations that operate in sectors of the economy that bring significant income to the Russian Government.

The whole variety of non-blocking restrictive measures can be divided into three groups: trade, financial and others. Each of these groups, in turn, is divided into separate types of restrictions.

Trade restrictive measures usually include prohibitions on the sale, supply, transportation or export of certain categories of goods to Russia, as well as opposite prohibitions on the import, purchase or transportation of certain categories of goods from Russia. Since 2014, it has been prohibited to supply military goods to Russia or for use in Russia and from Russia, to supply certain categories of dual-use goods to Russia or for use in Russia, as well as some goods to be used in the oil and gas sector for oil production and exploration projects at a depth of more than 150 meters, north of arctic circle or for projects with shale oil production potential.

After February 22, 2022, trade restrictive measures were significantly expanded and, as of the date of this article, it is additionally prohibited to supply to Russia or for use in Russia any dual-use goods (any categories); goods that can contribute to the development of its military and industrial potential; an extremely wide list of oil and gas industry goods (including those necessary for gas liquefaction); goods intended for the aerospace industry and aviation fuel; high-tech products and quantum computers; marine navigation installations; and luxury goods.

In addition, it was prohibited to import a number of goods into the EU if they are of Russian origin or imported from Russia. This ban applies to steel products, coal and other solid fossil fuels, crude oil and petroleum products, as well as goods whose exports bring substantial revenues to the Russian Federation.

In addition to direct trade bans (i.e., the prohibition of direct import or export of goods), the EU sanctions regulation prohibits the provision of technological or financial assistance, brokerage services or financing in connection with prohibited supplies.

Financial restrictions in force since 2014 provided for a ban on providing medium- and long-term financing to the largest state-owned banks and state-owned companies in Russia (in particular, VTB, Sberbank and Rosneft), as well as their subsidiaries outside the EU and persons acting on their behalf or at their disposal. Thus, it was prohibited to purchase traded securities and money market instruments issued by these organizations (i) from August 1, 2014 to September 12, 2014 with a maturity of more than 90 days, (ii) from September 12, 2014 to April 12, 2022 with a maturity of 30 days. It was also prohibited to provide investment services in connection with the issuance of these securities and to participate in loan or loan agreements for a period of more than 30 days for any organization subject to these restrictions.

After February 22, 2022, it was additionally prohibited to make transactions and operations in respect of traded securities and money market instruments issued by organizations for which this ban applies, after April 12, 2022 with any maturity. In addition, the list of Russian legal entities to which this restriction applies has been significantly expanded.

The EU de facto blocked the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation under its jurisdiction, since EU persons were prohibited from performing any operations related to the asset management of the Bank of Russia.

It is also prohibited to invest in the energy sector of the Russian Federation, as well as any Russian persons are prohibited from opening deposits in European financial institutions in the amount of more than 100,000 euros and storing assets worth more than 10,000 euros on European cryptocurrency platforms. EU persons were also prohibited from providing financial services related to the transportation of Russian oil and petroleum products.

Other restrictive measures include:

— suspension of broadcasting in the EU of a number of Russian state-owned media (in particular, Russia Today); 

— a ban on providing access to ports and docks on the territory of the EU for ships under the Russian flag;

— prohibition of Russian motor transport companies to transport goods on EU roads;

— prohibition of Russian persons to participate in European public procurement;

— prohibition of providing state aid to companies with public participation over 50%;

— ban on the supply of banknotes denominated in the currency of EU member states to Russia;

— prohibition of providing registered addresses and services for the creation and management of trusts, foundations and other similar entities if their founder or beneficiary is a Russian person;

— prohibition of the provision of credit rating, auditing, accounting services, tax and management consulting services, as well as public relations consulting.

At the same time, it should be noted that, as a rule, any restrictive measures discussed above provide for a number of exceptions when they are not subject to application or when the competent sanctions regulator of the EU state has the right to issue permits for a prohibited transaction or operation. However, consideration of these exceptions within the framework of this article seems impossible due to their voluminous nature, as well as due to their inconsistency with the purposes of this article.

3. ConclusionIn the course of the study, it was found that restrictive measures against private law entities began to be actively applied only since 2001 in the framework of the international fight against terrorism.

The instrument, which has demonstrated its effectiveness in the process of using the UN Security Council, was adopted by individual subjects of international law, including the European Union, and the experience gained in the fight against terrorism was extrapolated by it to apply restrictive measures against sovereign states and their residents.

The EU regulatory legal acts on restrictive measures studied in the framework of this article indicate that the most active restrictive measures of the EU are applied to the Russian Federation and its residents. Thus, Regulations 269/2014 and Regulation 833/2014 contain an exhaustive set of restrictive measures used by the Union. The study of the EU restrictive measures in force against the Russian Federation made it possible to classify them into blocking ones, which, if applied to individuals, always follow together with visa ones, as well as non-blocking ones. Among the latter, within the framework of this study, trade, financial and other restrictive measures were identified.

At the same time, this sanctions regime is constantly and dynamically developing, which necessitates further doctrinal study of its foundations, features and practical consequences. It can be stated that in 2022 there was a significant expansion of the mechanisms of restrictive measures used by the EU – in addition to restricting the export of goods to the Russian Federation, the import of a significant number of goods of Russian origin was restricted. In turn, export restrictions were extended not only to a significantly larger number of goods, but also to some European services – they are prohibited for Russian persons. In terms of financial restrictions, in addition to the previously used restrictions on the access of Russian state-owned banks and companies to medium- and long-term European financing, an indiscriminate ban was established for Russian individuals to place deposits in excess of 100,000 euros in EU financial institutions. In addition, a mechanism was used to de facto block the assets of the Bank of Russia located in the jurisdiction of the EU.

The EU's restrictive measures against Russia are used to a much lesser extent by the EU against other states (in particular, against Belarus, Venezuela, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar and others). The results of this study will also be valid for the restrictive measures of the EU applicable to states other than Russia, since such restrictive measures partially provide for mechanisms that are similar in relation to those established by Regulation 269/2014 and Regulation 833/2014.

Additionally, it can be stated that the hypotheses expressed in foreign legal doctrine regarding the application of restrictive measures do not find their practical confirmation. In particular, the assumption that the use of restrictive measures against private law entities will reduce negative social and humanitarian costs compared with the use of restrictive measures against the whole state. Despite the official statements of the EU authorities on the application of "smart" and "targeted" sanctions, this work shows that in practice such restrictive measures are accompanied by indiscriminate comprehensive restrictions that apply not only to sanctioned persons, but also, in principle, to any persons of the relevant target State of sanctions.

In this context, it can hardly be called "smart" to ban the import into the EU of certain categories of products produced by any Russian persons, as well as the ban on the export from the EU of certain categories of goods for any Russian persons.  In addition, statements about the use of "smart" sanctions to reduce the negative humanitarian impact do not stand up to scrutiny when considering the actual blocking of the assets of the Bank of Russia by the EU, which partially paralyzes its achievement of the goals of protecting and ensuring the stability of the ruble, ensuring the stability and development of the national payment system and the financial market. Thus, these restrictive measures are theoretically capable of causing significant negative humanitarian consequences (such as, for example, hyperinflation). Thus, it can be concluded that, from a practical point of view, the restrictive measures of the EU provide for a set of hybrid restrictions combining simultaneously comprehensive sanctions against the relevant State and targeted sanctions against individual private law entities.

References
1. Ridi, N., Fikfak, V. (2022). Sanctioning to Change State Behaviour. Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Volume 13, Issue 2, 1-23. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4063662.
2. Derman, A. B., Melsheimer, A., Auner, T. J., & Sikes, S. K. (2019). The compliance dilemma: economic sanctions and the AIPN Model Form International Joint Operating Agreement. The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 12(4), 331-347. doi:10.1093/jwelb/jwz017
3. Zagel, G. M. (2015). Article 215 TFEU on Restrictive Measures. Smit/Herzog/Campbell/Zagel (eds.), Smit & Herzog on the Law of the European Union, 4. PP. 51.
4. Hovell, D. (2019). Unfinished Business of International Law: The Questionable Legality of Autonomous Sanctions. American Journal of International Law, 113, 140-145. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.20.
5. Дораев М.Г. Экономические санкции в праве США, Европейского Союза и России: моногр. М.: Инфотропик Медиа, 2016. [Economic sanctions in the law of the USA, the European Union and Russia: monograph. М.: Infotropic Media, 2016. PP. 205.
6. Klishas, A.A. (2016). The politic and legal analysis of some integration associations and nations restrictive measures against Russian Federation, russian citizens and entities. RUDN Journal of Law, (1), 41-64.
7. Voinikov, V.V. (2015). The EU vs. Russia legal nature and implementation of the Union's restrictive measures. Baltic region. 2015. № 1 (23). P. 89-100.
8. Alexander, K. (2009). Economic sanctions. Law and Public Policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]: Palgrave Macmillan. PP. 359.
9. Glandin, S.V., Panov, F.Yu. (2020). Sanctions and restrictive measures of the United Kingdom before and past Brexit. Zakon, 6, 142-158.
10. Hakimdavar, G. (2013). A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development. Routledge. PP. 213.
11. Jayakody, N. (2018). Refining United Nations Security Council Targeted Sanctions:‘Proportionality’as a Way Forward for Human Rights Protection. Security and Human Rights, 29(1-4), 90-119. doi:10.1163/18750230-02901003.
12. Cardwell, P. J. (2015). The legalisation of European Union foreign policy and the use of sanctions. Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies, 17, 287-310. doi:10.1017/cel.2015.11.
13. Baek, B. S. (2008). Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations. Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper. Paper 11. PP. 95.
14. Timofeev, I.N. (2020). "Sanctions for sanctions violation": U.S. Department of Treasury enforcement actions against financial sector. Polis. Political Studies, No. 6, 73-90. doi:10.17976/jpps/2020.06.06
15. Drezner, D. W. (2021). The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion. Foreign Aff., 100-142.
16. Тарле, Е. В. (1992). Нашествие Наполеона на Россию, 1812 год. М: Воениздат. [Tarle, E. V. (1992). Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812]. PP. 197.
17. Dobson, A. P. (2002). US economic statecraft for survival, 1933-1991: of sanctions, embargoes and economic warfare. Routledge. PP. 589.
18. Drezner, D. W. (1999). The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations (No. 65). Cambridge University Press. PP. 342.
19. Panov, F.Yu. (2022). International Legal Basis for the Introduction of EU Unilateral Restrictive Measures. Journal of foreign legislation and comparative law, No. 1, 137-146. doi:10.12737/jflcl.2022.018.
20. Kapustin, A.Ya. (2018). UN Sanctions: the international legal conceptualization of coercive measures. Journal of foreign legislation and comparative law. No. 6, 85-90. doi:10.12737/art.2018.6.7.
21. Glandin, S.V. (2015). Legal grounds for the lifting of restrictive measures (sanctions) against individuals in the Court of the European Union. International Justice, № 4(16). С. 103-117.
22. Glandin, S.V. (2016). Is it possible to make exceptions to the EU sanctions list? International Juctice, № 2(18). С. 46-60. DOI 10.21128/2226-2059-2016-2-46-60.
23. Glandin, S.V. (2017). The European law of restrictive measures after first Russian cases before the European Court of Justice. International Justice, № 2(22). С. 80-93.
24. Гландин С. В. Почему Роснефть останется в санкционном списке ЕС. Суд ЕС о судьбе "секторальных" ограничительных мер // Нефть, газ и право. 2018. № 2. С. 50-53. [Glandin, S.V. (2018). Why Rosneft will remain on the EU sanctions list. EU Court of Justice on the fate of "sectoral" restrictive measures. Oil, Gas & Law, № 2. С. 50-53]
25. Гландин С. В. Становление конституционного стандарта по хартии ЕС об основных правах в практике суда ЕС по категории дел об исключении из санкционных списков // Закон. 2019. № 7. С. 120-132. [Glandin, S.V. The Emergence of a Constitutional Standard under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU Court of Justice's Case-law on Sanctions List Removal. Law. 2019. № 7. С. 120-132].

First Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

for the article Restrictive measures of the EU against third states and their residents (for example, the Russian Federation), the title corresponds to the content of the article materials. The title of the article conditionally looks at the scientific problem, which the author's research is aimed at solving. The reviewed article is of relative scientific interest. The article does not formulate the purpose of the study, does not specify the object and subject of the study, the methods used by the author. In the reviewer's opinion, the main elements of the "program" of the study were not fully thought out by the author, which affected its results. The author did not present the results of the analysis of the historiography of the problem and did not formulate the novelty of the undertaken research, which is a significant disadvantage of the article. In presenting the material, the author selectively demonstrated the results of the analysis of the historiography of the problem in the form of links to relevant works on the topic of research and appeals to opponents. The author did not explain the choice and did not characterize the range of sources involved in the disclosure of the topic. The author did not explain or justify the choice of the chronological and geographical framework of the study. In the opinion of the reviewer, the author sought to use the sources competently, to maintain the scientific style of presentation, to use the methods of scientific knowledge competently, to observe the principles of logic, systematicity and consistency of the presentation of the material. As an introduction, the author stated that "in modern legal science, there is no unified approach to determining what is considered restrictive measures or sanctions." The author explained that he intends to refer to sanctions "trade or financial restrictions imposed by States or international organizations through legal mechanisms against States, organizations and individuals in order to "punish" behavior that does not correspond to the political guidelines of the initiators of sanctions, and to force a change in such behavior." The European Union, the author noted, "is the only regional international organization applying unilateral restrictive measures against third states and their residents," etc., and abstractly reported that "the degree of study of the "restrictive measures of the EU" seems insufficient," pointing the reader to three works by domestic authors: M.G. Doraev's monograph, articles A.A. Klishasa and V.V. Voynikov. In the first section of the main part of the article ("Prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against private law entities"), the author informed the reader that he did not intend to "analyze the world history of the use of restrictive measures", and suddenly announced that "a rethinking of this approach takes place in the XX century, in connection with the two world wars", etc. The author gave a number of examples related to the actions of the United Kingdom and the United States, the UN Security Council in relation to South Africa and Iraq. The author then explained that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 "became a catalyst for the international community, which contributed to the increased use of restrictive measures against private law entities." The author suggested that "sanctions as a tool for combating terrorism have demonstrated high effectiveness", which "caused this tool to be extrapolated to international legal relations between states," etc. The author noted that "in foreign literature there is a point of view according to which the active application of restrictive measures against private law entities is due to the EU's desire to reduce negative humanitarian the impact of such measures on the civilian population of the State that became their target," etc., and that "in the domestic literature on the issue of restrictive measures, this approach is seriously criticized." At the same time, the author stated that "similar judgments can be found in specialized foreign literature," etc. In the second section of the main part of the article ("A brief historical analysis of the practice of applying restrictive measures against Russia") The author stated that "throughout its history, the Russian Federation has repeatedly become the object of restrictive measures (sanctions) of third states," and unexpectedly turned to the topic of the conflict between Napoleonic France and Great Britain, then recalled the application of various restrictive measures against Russia adopted by the United States "during the Cold War." It remains unclear exactly what task the author solved in the second section of the main part of his article. There are no specific conclusions. In the third section of the main part of the article ("EU restrictive measures against third States and their persons. The example of Russia") The author identified three subjects at once: "The regulatory framework for the application of EU restrictive measures against Russia", "The scope and classification of EU restrictive measures" and "EU restrictive measures in force against Russia". The author reiterated that the European Union "is the only regional international organization that applies unilateral restrictive measures against third States and their residents." The author reported that the "situation" with the regulation of the application of restrictive measures "has changed in connection with the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht on February 7, 1992": EU restrictive measures relate to the sphere of common foreign policy and security, which has acquired key importance for the purposes of their application", "decisions within it are taken unanimously and They are mandatory for compliance by all EU members," etc. Then the author listed "the main EU regulatory legal acts establishing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation," explained that "all the above acts were adopted to create additional costs for the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to it, as well as to incline the Russian Federation The author divided the "restrictive measures of the EU, depending on the consequences provided for by them," into three categories and described in detail their content. The author highlighted the restrictive EU measures introduced after February 24, 2022. The author summarized that, "as a rule, any restrictive measures discussed above provide for a number of exceptions when they are not subject to application or when the competent sanctions regulator of the EU state has the right to issue permits for a prohibited transaction or operation," explaining that "consideration of these exceptions within the framework of this article seems impossible due to their volume of their nature, as well as in view of their inconsistency with the purposes of this article." The article contains minor typos, such as: "public law" (repeatedly), "high efficiency", "So since 2014", etc. The author's conclusions are generalizing. The conclusions allow us to evaluate the scientific achievements of the author within the framework of his research only partially. The conclusions do not reflect the results of the research conducted by the author in full. In the final paragraphs of the article, the author reported that "the EU sanctions regulation in force against Russia – Regulation 269/2014 and Regulation 833/2014 – contain an exhaustive set of variations of various restrictive measures," etc., that "the restrictive measures imposed by the EU against the Russian Federation, although to a much lesser extent, are applied by the EU against other states". The author stated that "the subject of consideration" of his article "also became the historical perspective of the application of sanctions and the prerequisites for the application of sanctions against private law entities," vaguely stating that "modern practice of applying sanctions does not correspond to this perspective and prerequisites," etc. Then the author stated that "in practice, "smart" and "point-based"sanctions are accompanied by indiscriminate comprehensive restrictions that apply not only to sanctioned persons, but also, in principle, to any Russian persons," etc., that "statements about the use of "smart" sanctions to reduce the negative humanitarian impact do not stand up to scrutiny when considering the actual blocking by the EU of the assets of the Bank of Russia, which partially paralyzes its achievement of protection goals and ensuring the stability of the ruble, ensuring the stability and development of the national payment system and the financial market," etc.
The author summarized that "a hybrid sanctions regime has been established in the EU with respect to the Russian Federation, when targeted sanctions against individuals are combined with comprehensive restrictive measures against certain sectors of the Russian economy," that "this sanctions regime is constantly and dynamically developing, which necessitates further doctrinal study of its foundations, features and practical consequences.". The conclusions, in the opinion of the reviewer, do not clarify the purpose of the study. In the reviewer's opinion, the potential purpose of the study has been partially achieved by the author. The publication may arouse the interest of the magazine's audience. The article requires significant revision, first of all, in terms of formulating the key elements of the research program and their corresponding conclusions.

Second Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

The subject of the study. The reviewed article "Restrictive measures of the EU against third states and their residents (on the example of the Russian Federation)" is devoted to the current problem of international law - sanctions (or in other words restrictive measures) against both public entities and private individuals. The author analyzes the legality of their application. Research methodology. The author of the reviewed article chose the dialectical method of cognition of legal phenomena as the basis of the methodology of his research, in addition to which he used: logical and systemic methods, which allowed him to consider the problem under study from the point of view of the basic laws of dialectics, using formal logic, as a whole as a system and individually as components of this system. In addition, in the process of studying the normative legal acts of the European Union, a technical and legal technique was used. To a lesser extent, in particular, when studying the prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against individuals (citizens and organizations), the historical and legal method of scientific knowledge was used. The relevance of research. The relevance of the research topic is beyond doubt. In fact, restrictive measures have been applied regularly throughout the modern history of international law, and the targets of sanctions were precisely public law sovereign entities. The use of restrictive measures against subjects of private law is a fairly new phenomenon and therefore little studied in domestic jurisprudence. Scientific novelty. Undoubtedly, despite the available scientific works on the problems of sanctions in international law, the author of this article chose a new aspect of the study - the application of restrictive measures against subjects of private law. Style, structure, content. The article was written at a high scientific level. The material is presented consistently, competently and clearly using special legal terminology. It seems that the author, after all, did not quite correctly replace the term "subjects of private law" (subjects of private legal relations) with "private legal entities". However, the remark does not detract from the work done by the author. The article is structured. According to the content, the article reveals the topic stated by the author. The author has done a lot of work on the relationship between the concepts of "sanctions" and "restrictive measures". All the conclusions and suggestions of the author deserve attention, because they are well-reasoned. Special attention should be paid to the final provision in the article that "from a practical point of view, the restrictive measures of the European Union provide for a set of hybrid restrictions combining at the same time comprehensive sanctions against the relevant State and targeted sanctions against individual subjects of private legal relations." This article makes a significant contribution to Russian jurisprudence. Bibliography. The author has used a sufficient number of bibliographic sources. The author has studied, among other things, the most important publications on the topic in recent years. The references to the bibliographic sources are correct. Appeal to opponents. Before expressing his own point of view, the author cites the opinions of other reputable scientists. The appeal to the opponent of the author of the reviewed article is absolutely correct. Conclusions, the interest of the readership. The article "EU restrictive measures against third states and their residents (on the example of the Russian Federation)" is devoted to a very relevant topic, has a high degree of scientific novelty, meets the requirements for scientific articles and therefore can be recommended for publication in the scientific journal International Law. Due to its special importance and significance today, this article will be of interest not only to specialists in the field of international law, but will also be interesting and useful to a wide range of readers.