The connection of language and culture in the socio-institutional dimension: solving the problem in the analytical tradition

Nikitin Anton Pavlovich ORCID: 0000-0001-5534-7931 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor, Department of Civil Law and Criminal Law Disciplines, Katanov Khakass State University 655017, Russia, respublika Khakasiya, g. Abakan, ul. Lenina, 90 nikitinanton5891@gmail.com

Introduction

The relevance of the topic is due to the intensification of interdisciplinary research aimed at solving the question of the generative power of language, that is, its ability not only to designate phenomena and reflect reality, but also to form a picture of the world, which is a fundamental element of any culture. The problem of the connection between language and culture is solved at the junction of many sciences, such as linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. In this paper, an attempt is made to look at this problem in a socio-institutional aspect, since each culture can carry both universal social phenomena and local ones that demonstrate its specificity. The research is more based on the traditions of the analytical philosophy of language, in which, since the second half of the XX century, the relationship of language with an extensive class of social phenomena (legal, economic, political, etc.) has been discussed, which is accompanied by the involvement of data from the relevant sciences and provisions from the general theory of language and semiotics.

In particular, in the analytical philosophy of the second half of the XX century, in the works of J. Searle ^[1], D. Dennett, and D. Roy ^[2] and other representatives of the analytical tradition raise the question of the connection between the functioning of language and the formation of social institutions, the connection between the development of human consciousness and the trends of institutional uncertainty. Analytical philosophy considers the connection between language and culture in a wider range of aspects than socio-institutional interactions; these aspects are described in detail in A.L. Zolkin's monograph ^[3]. This paper aims to analyze the relationship between language and culture specifically in the socio-institutional dimension, that is, it is necessary to determine how language is able to form social institutions and build social ontology, and how the language reflects the specifics of social relations within a given culture. In accordance with the set goal , the following tasks are solved: 1) consideration of the socio-constitutive function of language; 2) consideration of the socially representative function of language in the context of the concept of linguistic relativism.

The main research methods are the standard methods of the philosophy of everyday language – the method of thought experiment, the method of language games, contextual and conceptual analysis. The theoretical basis of the research is the theory of speech acts of J. Austin and J. Searle in its application to the study of social institutions (the position on language as a fundamental condition for the construction of social reality). The practical significance of the research lies in the possibility of using the results obtained in solving general scientific problems related to the question of the relationship between language and culture.

 The main part

The social-constitutive function of language

Consider the meaning of a number of expressions: "This car costs 2 million rubles," "Ivanov is a professor," "This apartment is John's property." All these phrases state facts, but in such a way that their structural relationship cannot be fixed by direct observation. An individual can see a car in front of him, but cannot see the value of the car (only the value designation on the price tag); Ivanov is subject to observation, but his status as a professor is not subject (although he can show the appropriate paper); looking at the apartment and at John, we may not find any evidence that she is his property (but there is a document certifying the ownership of this apartment). Such and similar expressions are the designation of institutional facts that should be distinguished from simple factual judgments such as "This car is red", "Ivanov is a brunette", "John often throws parties".

At first glance, the lack of the ability to determine the meaning of expressions about institutional facts intensively unites them with other judgments where the same difficulty is present: "This car is very valuable to the seller", "Ivanov is proud of his title", "John loves his friends". But, although it is impossible for people to directly see the relationship of value, pride and love, their existence is not considered dependent on language practice. The situation with institutional facts is exactly the opposite, since they are ontologically completely dependent on the presence of language.

The socio-constitutive function of language is that institutional facts that create a special type of social ontology exist insofar as they are presented linguistically. The idea that language not only states, but also generates various phenomena, goes back to the theory of speech acts of J. Austin ^[4]. The connection between the linguistic theory of social institutions and the theory of performativity has been described by us in a number of works ^[5-6], here we will only highlight its basic provisions formulated by J. Searle. 1) An institutional fact can exist only insofar as it is presented as existing in the language. 2) The institutional fact presupposes deontic powers, which can only be represented by linguistic means. 3) Deontology can continue to exist after it has been created, and even after all agents forget about its creation, but this is possible only if there is a language. 4) "Fourth, the key function of language is to recognize an institution as such" ^{[7, p. 19]}.

In order for the car to have a value, Ivanov had an academic title, and John owned an apartment, it is necessary to have social institutions of monetary exchange, higher education and science, property rights. All these institutions exist, being represented in the language. They are objective in relation to a person in the sense that they are not the subject of preferences of certain persons, but have a coercive nature to all members of society, but at the same time "institutions cannot be seen, felt, felt and even measured. Institutions are constructions created by human consciousness" ^{[8, p. 137]}. How are they created? Explanation of J. Serla is linguistic and operates in terms of status functions and constitutive rules.

Status functions and constitutive rules are formed by collective intentionality. Intentionality in general is a special property of consciousness, which consists in focusing on objects and developing a specific attitude to them. There are intentional states (intentions, beliefs, desires, beliefs, etc.) inherent in social systems and subsystems and implemented in collective behavior. They constitute collective intentionality. "The most important form of collective intentionality is collective intentions in planning and action, that is, collective preliminary intentions and collective intentions in action" ^{[9, p. 43]}.

A status function is a function that is performed not due to the physical properties of its carrier, but due to collective intentionality. A car can be red regardless of whether people recognize this color in it; Ivanov can be a brunette also outside of this conditioning. It will be possible to buy a car for money only if something is recognized as money; Ivanov can be a professor only if the corresponding status is recognized for him. The status function can exist only if there is a collective idea of the subject as having the status that carries this function.

The general formula of the status function proposed by J. It looks like the relation "X is considered Y in the context of C": "Rubles are considered money in the Russian Federation", "Ivanov is considered a professor in accordance with the order of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education", etc. Another important term of the institutional theory of J. Searle is the notion of constitutive rules that are opposed to regulatory ones. Regulatory rules have the form "Do X" or "Do not do X", these are the rules of permission and prohibition. Constitutive rules do not regulate, but form the behavior itself, these rules are the actions themselves. When we consider something as money, someone as a professor, someone as the owner of something, then we follow the constitutive rules and behave in accordance with them. Constitutive rules can be violated, as well as regulatory ones, because with the general recognition of the status function, there are also those who deny this function. However, such a violation practically excludes an individual from public life, because it is difficult not to recognize rubles as money while in Russia. This is how the objectivity of institutional facts is formed.

In the context of our topic, the thesis about the fundamental nature of language in relation to institutional facts is important – none of them can exist without linguistic representation. J. Searle cites the simplest cases as an example: Barack Obama is one of the presidents in the history of the United States, J. Searle himself. Searle is a professor, he has a twenty–dollar bill in his hands, the car at the window is his property. All these facts "require linguistic representation in order to exist" ^{[9, p. 110]}. Without language, there are no presidential powers, professor status, money and property. This is the socio-constitutive function of language.

The socially representative function of language and linguistic relativism

In his theory of social institutions, J. Searle develops the position of J. Austin says that a word can be an action, like any action, it is successful or not according to the result. If the provision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation "the ruble is the monetary unit in the Russian Federation" (Chapter 3, Article 75, paragraph 1) is successful, then all Russian citizens use rubles as money. If Petrov claims that he is a professor, and no one recognizes this, then his word is unsuccessful. As a result, the expressions "rubles are money in Russia" and "Petrov is not a professor" already act as a statement of fact, a reflection of reality. That is, the function of language is not only to construct institutional facts, but also to discover them, to represent them in the process of social interactions. "The linguistic representation of reflective activity manifests itself in the linguistic signification of the real (primary) reality perceived by the linguistic consciousness or the results of its reflection and signification presented during their transmission in the process of oral or written communication" ^{[10, p. 68]}. The peculiarity of the representation of institutional facts is their social meaning, which maximally demonstrates the cultural uniqueness of the linguistic community.

Here is a simple example. As you know, in the Russian Federation there has been a postgraduate institute for a long time as an institute for the preparation of candidates of sciences (the question of whether to consider postgraduate studies as a level of higher education or a form of scientific activity in this case does not matter). And when the question arose about what this training corresponds to in English-speaking countries, certain difficulties appeared, since the traditional expression "postgraduate studies" as a whole includes a variety of training programs based on higher education, most often ending with a Doctor of Philosophy degree. As a result, Russian candidates of sciences began to be designated as PhD, which does not distinguish them from Russian doctors of sciences. Thus, when we translate the expression about the institutional fact "Sidorov is a graduate student" from Russian into English as "Sidorov is a graduate student", we get two judgments that are interpreted differently in Russian and English culture.

This is only a special, but not the only case that shows that it is in words related to institutional reality that cultural specificity is revealed clearly. That is, when an individual learns a language unfamiliar to him, he does not just encounter unknown words, the meaning of which may be unclear to him, but discovers the presence of unique social institutions reflecting the peculiarities of social relations of the studied culture.

Imagine a language community whose members have never seen bears and have never used money. Let a native speaker of the Russian language face the task of explaining to them the meaning of the words "bear" and "money". Since the concept of money is more abstract than the concept of a bear, there will obviously be more difficulties with explaining its content. You can simply draw a bear, indicating that it is one of the varieties of animals. Speaking about money, the translator will have to touch on such concepts as exchange, accumulation, cost, payment, etc. Similarly, in order to explain the meaning of the word "property", it is necessary to refer to the concepts of appropriation, use, possession, disposal, etc. But even this is not as important as the answer to the question: how much does a person learn about life in Russia when he determines for himself the meaning of the words "bear" and "money"? Yes, some citizens of the Russian Federation often meet with bears, but still this does not determine their existence in society, whereas money is a necessary element of their social existence.

At this moment, the connection between language and culture in the socio-institutional dimension is revealed. The traditional interpretation of the connection between language and culture proceeds from the position that "the culture of an ethnic group is an inseparable unity of material and spiritual. The material component can include production, economy, commodity-money relations, spheres of life, family, culture in a narrow sense. The spiritual sphere is formed by morality, morality, education, religion, and familiarization with folk rituals. These individual components are realized in the motivation of life activity, in the behavior of each individual. It is also important that traditional culture belongs to people with characteristic ethnographic characteristics, including those who speak their native language" ^{[11, p. 45]}. At the same time, "language and culture are connected in a natural and necessary way, but not in any parts of the language – directly and directly" ^{[11, p. 46]}. It can be added that language plays a significant role in demonstrating the uniqueness of culture in relation to those phenomena that are "invisible to the eye", and social institutions and institutional facts still exist – "invisible", but objectively.

Natural, observable facts are also reflected in the language variably and to varying degrees of classification. However, if we assume the existence of a language in which only two words similar to the words "light" and "dark" are used to designate colors, then this circumstance tells us practically nothing about the uniqueness of the culture of native speakers, since the absence of the words "yellow" and "blue" in a person does not at all imply that he cannot distinguish yellow objects from blue ones. If there is no analogue of the phrase "state property" in the language, then this fact already says a lot about this culture.

It may be objected that the features of the translation of subject words also say a lot about the culture of the community, as well as the features of the translation of words bearing a socio-institutional meaning. The classic example about the word "snow" among the Eskimos here is indicative. The followers of the Sepir-Whorf hypothesis argued that the linguistic fixation in the difference between snow lying on the ground, falling from the sky, circling during a blizzard, being under a sleigh, etc. vividly illustrates the features of the material culture of the Eskimos, which is conditioned by living conditions in the Far North. However, it is overlooked that such linguistic differentiation of snow demonstrates what is already obvious to an outside observer, that is, we have an ad hoc hypothesis that combines observation of the living conditions of Eskimos and fixation of their vocabulary.

A researcher of Eskimo culture personally observes the importance of snow in their lives, the differentiation of snow in the language only confirms the observed picture. Similarly, a philosophy teacher can know only one word for nails ("nail"), and a professional builder can name ten or more such words, but what does this give in terms of comprehending the life of both, other than understanding the specifics of their professional activities? In addition, it is quite correct to assume that there are people who know dozens of names of nails, but have never worked as builders; and, conversely, in the history of mankind there have been people who did not know the word "nail", but this did not prevent them from working with them, and they considered themselves builders. Similarly with the word "snow" – in many languages there is a differentiation of snow on different grounds, which does not mean that all these cultures were formed in constant snowy conditions.

Another well-known example is the example of the word "gavagai" from the fictional language of a conventionally taken community in the work of U. Quine's "Word and Object" ^[12]. In this thought experiment, the translation of a word is based on a specific situation in which both a linguist and a native speaker are. A rabbit runs past them and a native speaker pronounces the word "gavagai". At the same time, there are no similarities between the two languages, and the linguist has not recorded a single meaning in the dictionary before. Can a translator assume that "gavagai" translates as "rabbit"? W. Quine argues that the unambiguity of such a translation is unacceptable, since in this situation this particular rabbit, any rabbit in general, the visible side of the rabbit, its fluffiness, etc. can be implied. The linguist has only one way out: to look for such visible cases and ask the informant "gavagai?", waiting for signs of agreement and disagreement. However, the difficulty of the task is not the most important thing in relation to another point, namely the translator's confidence that a native speaker can distinguish in his thinking between a particular rabbit and a rabbit in general, distinguish between the sides of a rabbit, fluffy and non-fluffy animals, etc.

Why, then, can the reflection of institutional facts in the language be considered a reliable criterion for establishing the specifics of culture? That is, why, if there is no word "sand" in the language, then it tells us nothing about the activities of the community, and if there is no word "property", then it says a lot? The answer lies precisely in the position on the linguistic origin of social institutions, in the theory of speech acts in its application to social ontology, which was described above. Objects exist without language, institutional facts cannot exist without language. There is sand regardless of whether it is expressed as a concept in the language. Bedouins may not name the sand in any way, and it will be present before their eyes around the clock. If there are no expressions for property in the Bedouin language, then in the legal sense no Bedouin will have it as such (although it may exist as a claim to property based on coercion, custom, religious beliefs). When an individual says, "This is my property," he appeals to the right of ownership, fixed linguistically. In general, it turns out that if there is no analogue of the word "rabbit" in a language, this does not mean that representatives of the corresponding culture cannot distinguish a rabbit from other animals; and if there is no analogue of the word "property" in the same language, then it follows that native speakers of this language cannot isolate this social attitude in their social existence. The deontology of institutional facts is generated by language, is recognized with the help of language and cannot exist without language, and snow, sand, nails and rabbits can exist even if there is not a single word for them. Therefore, it is in the socio-institutional dimension that the connection between language and culture is most evident, and it is in the field of understanding the linguistic representation of institutional facts that relativism is maximally justified.

Conclusion

The study of the relationship between language and culture in the socio-institutional dimension leads to the following conclusions: 1) Language performs a constitutive function in relation to social institutions and institutional facts. Their formation, deontology and recognition depend on the presence of a language in which institutional facts are presented. 2) Language not only constitutes institutional facts, but also represents them, reflecting the peculiarities of the culture of the linguistic community. It is the analysis of the representation of institutional facts that is most fruitful for substantiating the concept of linguistic relativism, since if an institutional fact is not represented linguistically, then it is not in principle.

The prospects for further research of the topic are to attract specific linguistic data that could demonstrate the variability of expressions about institutional facts and, accordingly, the variability of cultures interpreting these expressions. It also requires a more detailed comparison of statements about institutional facts with other judgments, the content of which are events that cannot be directly observed.