Unambiguous determinism in the captivity of illusory perceptions

Determinism, as a philosophical doctrine about the causality of all phenomena of the objective world, their universal, regular relationship and interdependence "played an outstanding role in the development of modern science and itself, in turn, made a complex evolution in its development under the influence of the achievements of science and social practice" ^{[1, p. 182]}. However, since the middle of the nineteenth century, it has been increasingly criticized because of the allegedly obvious incompatibility of unambiguous cause-and-effect relationships with the presence of various possibilities, accidents, probabilities, expediency, and freedom, the role of which in scientific theories has significantly and steadily increased. At the same time, its supposedly obvious and indissoluble connection with the absolute predestination of all events, with the fundamental deducibility of the entire past and future from the present has been pointed out. But is all this really true?

The author aims to clarify the validity of the charges against unambiguous determinism, which makes us doubt its universality. As this important scientific issue requires deep and comprehensive philosophical consideration, this study's methodology is based on identifying the essence of all those phenomena that supposedly, by the very fact of their existence, indicate the limitations of unambiguous determinism. At the same time, the most important characteristic of this study is the consistent implementation of the principle of materialistic monism, which requires recognizing that there is nothing but moving matter at the heart of the world, and therefore, all its phenomena. According to the author, it is precisely this research logic that allows us to objectively assess the difficult situation in which the doctrine of causality has found itself at the present stage of its development.

1. The nature of possibilities and the illusion of the incompatibility of unambiguous determinism with the presence of various possibilities.

It would seem that the question of the relationship between possibility and reality has long been removed from the agenda as having received a sufficiently satisfactory answer for most philosophers. If we look at philosophical dictionaries, we will see that possibility and reality are the two main stages in forming and developing an object or phenomenon. In this case, the possibility is identified with the formation's objective tendency, which is expressed in the presence of appropriate conditions. This or that reality is considered the result of implementing the corresponding opportunities ^{[1, p. 118; 2, p.268; 3, p. 87]}. However, for a strict mind, the proponents of such an understanding of the possibilities still lack evidence and persuasiveness. Some rethinking is required.

Let's start with the fact that the words about this or that possibility hide this or that possible event. At the same time, a person speaks about the possibility of an event when he does not see any insurmountable obstacles in the way of its appearance, fulfillment. That's pretty obvious. But only what is not yet there can appear. This means that only that which is not present anywhere in the objective reality itself can be possible. This is a characteristic of the objectively non-existent. This is a characteristic of something that has only a subjective (verbal) form of expression, without which this characteristic would simply have nothing to apply. This is a characteristic of only imaginable human events and is related to the predictive activity of a person. The desire to look into the future makes people deduce it logically from information about the present while relying on the reflected general properties and patterns.

The forecast is carried out in two complementary forms: unambiguous and ambiguous. As for the unambiguous, this is a forecast, the result of which is an unambiguously defined picture of the future. This is a picture of what must be if we proceed from the unambiguously defined information available, which allows us to make an appropriate forecast. As for the ambiguous, this is a forecast that is based on what a person can think of, assumptions arbitrarily specifying the information available to it. This is the picture of what may be (if the corresponding assumption is true), a picture of this or that opportunity. At the same time, the ambiguity of the view of the future results from a lack of concretizing information.

The reason for the transition to an ambiguous form of the forecast is the desire to achieve a slightly greater degree of concretization of the forecast than that provided by the general nature of the information available to a person (no one, for example, doubts the arrival of tomorrow because this is a well-known pattern. However, for an unambiguous forecast of all that it will bring with it, this pattern is not enough). It is precisely because of the insufficient degree of concretization of the available information (often associated simply with the unwillingness to take into account the "unimportant") that a person, in his forecasts, indicates not only what clearly follows from the information available to them about a certain situation and the laws of its development but also what will happen under a particular set of circumstances that do not contradict the available information and, therefore, are logically valid.

This is the nature of possibilities if you do not close your eyes to some stubborn facts. From which it follows that a person only faces opportunities in their forecasts. They are present only in his subjective reality. Only among conceivable events does a person discover something whose appearance, on the one hand, does not follow from the information available to him, and on the other hand, does not contradict them (ambiguously specifying what follows from them unambiguously). In one's mind, these events give their mind the status of what's "possible," reflecting their special relationship with the information available and, thus, their special place in their forecasts. But all this means that in the most objective reality, there are no "possibilities." Everything in it is real, not possible. Behind the words about the existence of various opportunities for its development in the world, there is only the fact that a person does not see any obstacles in the way of various options for its development in their forecasts; nothing more. The world of possibilities is a world of only humanly conceivable events that are the product of an ambiguous form of its prediction. Everything that exists objectively is no longer possible but real. Hence, the notion of bifurcation points (representing the transitional points of material systems to a qualitatively new state) for the points of "branching." The "clustering" of various possibilities inherent in supposedly natural processes is the product of mere myth-making. Nature itself is never at the crossroads of different possibilities – neither in the macro nor in the mega or microcosm. This is natural since, in its self-development, it does not rely on identifying an objectively possible course of events (which would put it as the creator of a particular course of events! – on par with those trying to predict this move only) but on the achieved stage in their development, turning one reality into another. Only someone who is forced to resort to an ambiguous form of prediction in their forecasts of its development, associated with the assessment of the events they imagine from the perspective of their objective compatibility with the information available (if they are not deducible from this information), is faced with "bouquets" of various possibilities. The whole system limits such an independent compatibility of these events.

As can now be seen, there is no "step" in the formation and development of an object or phenomenon. As for the words about implementation opportunities, about their transformation, in reality, they hide nothing more than the appearance of such a real event, which, according to the description, coincides with the verbal image of the event that appeared as "possible" in someone's forecasts. This coincidence is the whole hidden mechanism of the "realization" and "transformation" of possibilities. The "implemented feature" is just a simple status of a real event, reflecting that the verbal image of the event that occurred coincides with the verbal image of the event that a person thought possible (for more information about the nature of status concepts and an important feature of their objective content, see ^{[4, p.18]}). At the same time, the "results of implementations of possibilities" are real events only to the subject, only in their perception of these material "doubles" of the events they imagine, reflecting the fact of this coincidence. Therefore, we can only talk about a certain transformation of possibility into reality as a metaphor.

But the widespread identification of opportunity with trends also does not stand up to criticism. The fact is that material processes and all trends have a material expression (without which there can be no real trends). At the same time, all trends, as the sprouts of a new phenomenon, manifest themselves in what already exists in reality and which, expanding this presence, transforms it in the appropriate direction. Therefore, the identification of possibility with tendency contradicts the very essence of these phenomena.

But it is precisely in the lack of awareness that the possibilities, in their origin, are a kind of human-conceivable event that has allowed us to interpret the real transition to reality – an ambiguous form of forecasting system behavior (dictated by a lack of specifying information). How does one proceed to consider systems with an ambiguous form of determination behavior, in which many people saw a panacea for the serious problems faced by modern physics on the threshold of the microcosm? Based on this erroneous interpretation, the illusion of incompatibility of unambiguous causality with the presence of various possibilities arose.

2. About the nature of randomness and the illusion of the incompatibility of unambiguous determinism with the presence of random events.

They did not fully reveal their true nature and accidents with necessities. At the same time, as in ancient times, randomness is understood as something that might not have happened and, under necessity, something that couldn't have happened. The range of opinions about the nature of these phenomena is still wide and contradictory. But we are interested in the truth.

We will begin its identification with the statement of a relatively obvious and inextricable connection between randomness and unpredictability. What is predictable is not random. Anything that is unambiguously predictable is necessary. Only those events that are not predictable, i.e., not deducible from the information available to a person, are random. It turns out that the most important condition for the randomness of events is their specified non-deductibility. This fact is very remarkable, and it requires a clear awareness.

However, the unpredictability of an event does not mean that it is accidental. For example, it is difficult to call an unpredictable encounter with someone on a supposedly uninhabited island an accident. This is just an unexpected event. i.e., the unpredictability of an event alone is not enough to make it random. On the other hand, the discovered impossibility of randomness without unpredictability rather eloquently points to their kindred spirits, and that randomness is a kind of unpredictability, its special form. But which one?

What, for example, is the difference between an unpredictable meeting with someone on a desert island (which does not allow us to talk about some randomness) and an unpredictable meeting with a familiar person in a crowded city, which is, one might say, a sample of randomness? The fact that the meeting with a friend, although not deducible from the information available to the person (but it does not contradict them) since the meeting in the city with its residents (one of which is an acquaintance) is entirely predictable. It is impossible to unambiguously predict only the specifics of such a meeting, i.e., with whom exactly it will happen. So the conclusion is obvious: random is only that of the unpredictable, which is a specific form of manifestation of the predictable; what is unpredictable due to the lack of clarifying, concretizing information. If we knew all the details about the plans and daily routines of the people around us, there could be no question of any chance of meeting with any particular person (including an acquaintance). That is why the same meeting of two people can be accidental for one person and not accidental for another.

Thus, randomness as "something that could not have been" appears to us as "something that is not deducible from the information available to someone, but does not contradict them," i.e., in the form in which it is reflected in the non-natural origin of this phenomenon. We found that the randomness of an event does not depend on the event itself. First, as a kind of unpredictability, it is a characteristic of impossible events without the subject and information available to a person. Secondly, events are accidental only in their verbal images. Therefore, only for the person who reflected the events in the corresponding images and only in relation to the information available to them. Thus, there are no natural causes of randomness.

But the result of evaluating events for their predictability depends not only on the volume and nature of the information available to someone. Since in the human mind, there are no events, but their verbal images, then one evaluates events not directly, not in their natural form (in the indissoluble unity of the general, "essential" and concrete, single, "insignificant") but through their verbal images, which have a certain degree of concretization of events. This implies the possibility of opposite options for assessing the predictability of the same reflected event. Any real event can appear to a person both as a necessity and as an accident. It all depends on which (according to the degree of concretization) image this event is evaluated. If, for example, a meeting with someone on a city street is presented as a "meeting with a passer-by," then the event appears inevitable. If it is presented as a meeting with a certain I. I. Ivanov, then this is already a pure accident. Even the occultation of the Sun will appear to be accidental to someone if you describe this event from the perspective of any of its individual characteristics.

On the other hand, the connection between the randomness of an event and the non-deductibility of its verbal image from the information available to someone (even though the appearance of this event does not contradict this information) allows us to speak of a certain kinship of the souls of accidents with possibilities (for all their differences, consisting in the fact that possible events are conceivable by a person and random events that actually occurred). They share the same nature of these characteristics of events, related to the degree of concretization of information and verbal images of events. This allows researchers to consider randomness as realized possibilities.

Thus, we found that the roots of randomness objectively go to the same place as the roots of opportunities – to the subject and its predictive activity. No real event can be either necessary or accidental in itself in its origin. This means that in the world itself, there are no necessary or accidental events. There is no such variety of events. Such events are not are, and only they turn out, act, are for a person. In one case, the inference of events from the information available to someone is reflected in his consciousness, and in the other, their non-inference if they are logically compatible with this information. It is only in his consciousness (which combines the image of the event with the corresponding characteristic, which has no expression in the event itself) that the events are the carriers of these non-physical characteristics.

Here, too, as in the case of opportunities, we are dealing with characteristics that express status-relevant events. In the corresponding status of objects and events, a person fixes a side of their existence that has no expression in them. Just as certain objects are spoons only to someone as a being who reflects on the non-physical characteristics of these objects in their perception of these objects and "what is eaten," so certain events are random only to a person as a being who reflects on his perception of events such a characteristic of them as "what is unpredictable, but does not contradict the available general information." At the same time, one can not do without accidents and necessities in everyday life only because one can not do without assessing the events taking place (represented by verbal images of a certain degree of concretization) from the side of their predictability based on the information available. But all this means that there is only one thing that happens. The illusion: the incompatibility of unambiguous determinism with the recognition of the randomness of certain events – the illusion that arises from the unjustified objectification of accidents.

Accidents and necessities are by no means "two types of objective connections of the material world, expressing the degree of determinism of the phenomenon" ^{[2, p.421]}. There are not "two beginnings" in the development of the world ^{[5, p. 135]} – hard (where necessary, natural) and plastic, flexible (where accidents appear, which are supposedly responsible for the emergence of the new, for development). There are no "two ways to turn a possibility into a reality" (as you can also hear). These are just two characteristics of real events from their predictability to someone based on the verbal images that these events are represented by and the information they have. At the same time, the characteristic of being "random" only reflects a special type of unpredictability.

As for relationships, if it is necessary and accidental, then it seems to be based on the inseparability of what is happening (accessible to foresight and therefore perceived as something necessary) from the concrete in it (acting as an accident to someone because of its unpredictability). It seems that it was on this basis that the formulated F. in the Dialectic of Nature, the concept of randomness as a complement and form of manifestation of necessity, paving the way through randomness ^{[6, p.532–536]}. A view that does not consider that the general and the specific are not necessary and are, consequently, accidental in themselves. Both the "accidental" and the "necessary," in their inseparability from man as a necessary condition for the very possibility of these characteristics, are completely indistinguishable from such characteristics of objective reality's elements as "pleasant" and "unpleasant," "edible" and "inedible," "significant" and "insignificant."

As noted by Karl Marx, "...the story would be very mystical if 'accidents' did not play any role" ^{[7, p. 175]}. However, history can not do without accidents, not in the sense that baking bread is incomplete without yeast or bread crust. Here, too, the randomness of events means only their special unpredictability.

But it is not chance that is the inventor who constructs the evolutionary process and is responsible for the formation of new forms ^{[5, p.135]}. The basis of all developments in nature is the diversity of causal circumstances at different levels of their concretization. Whether a certain combination of them is accidental or necessary for a person is absolutely irrelevant for natural systems' evolutionary or revolutionary development. Therefore, there are no real contradictions of unambiguous causality within the theory of evolution. Charles Darwin explained the diversity of the living through the mechanism of random mutation. It was considered a milestone on the way to the objectification of chance because it pointed to the special role of random events in the evolutionary process. But the point is that events are not accidental in themselves, but only in their verbal images and only to someone as a carrier of these images and information, on which the output of these images depends. As a result, it turns out that it is not the evolution of organic nature itself that cannot do without accidents, but only a person who talks about the evolution of nature and is forced to admit a specific unpredictability (based on the information available to him), those abnormal circumstances that caused the corresponding mutations.

We emphasize that it is not from the randomness of events (supposedly predetermined by their special nature) that their unpredictability follows, but on the contrary, from their unpredictability to someone (predetermined by the degree of concretization of the information available to him and the verbal image of events) that their randomness follows. It is their unpredictability, its specific form, that makes a person consider them random. That is, it finds expression in this status. To explain the unpredictability of an event by its randomness is like explaining gusts of wind by the swaying of trees. But this is how many physicists "explain" the unpredictability of the behavior of, for example, Brownian motion particles by chance, covered by probability. Mathematicians even tried to isolate randomness in its "pure" form with a sequence of "random" numbers (i.e., which are supposedly random in themselves), without noticing that it is the lack of an algorithm for constructing numbers that causes them to be random to a person.

It is impossible to distinguish from nature in its pure form what is not in it in any form. It is useless to puzzle over how the causes that operate everywhere in nature can lead to any accidents because random events are not due to natural causes but because of the non-deducibility of their verbal images from the information available to man. Only the lack of sufficient clarity in this matter allows us to consider the transition points of the system to a qualitatively new state, which is unpredictable to the observer, as is the natural realm of randomness ^{[8, p. 90]}. At the same time, the classical picture of the world, in which there is no place for either possibilities or accidents as something objectively existing, is presented as something static, timeless, as something in which development is impossible, and only the repetition of already set forms is possible ^{[9, p. 95–126]}. As it is based on unambiguous causality, there are voices (in the person of, for example, L. Eddington ^{[10, p. 42]}) that the very concept of causality, which for a long time served as the basis of the scientific worldview, should be declared obsolete.

The prevailing opinion was that by studying the microcosm, science allegedly crossed the border, beyond which the same conditions apply, they lead to various consequences, which are presented as "accidents." An opinion that does not consider that nothing is exactly the same in nature itself. Everything in it is extremely concretized and, therefore unique, inimitable. Soothsaying minds have long noted that it is impossible to enter the same river twice. Something in nature repeats itself only in certain parameters, properties. Therefore, something in it turns out to be the same, repeatable only for human use as a being able to fix something similar in the unlike. The conditions of experiments are the same only in verbal images that have a limited degree of concretization of the reflected reality. But it is precisely based on this erroneous opinion that it is argued that unambiguous, dynamic patterns should give way to probabilistic and statistical ones, which, allegedly, the behavior of micro-objects obey.

Moreover, if for the macrocosm the unambiguous form of determination is not generally denied but only moderately "diluted" with ambiguity, then its role in the microcosm as an allegedly absolute realm of randomness in which there is no place for causal relationships is completely denied by the vast majority of physicists. At the same time, as noted by the well-known researcher of randomness and probability, G. D. Levin, the question of the very possibility of causeless events is relegated to the background or even transferred to the realm of faith ^{[11, p.95]}. The question of the suitability of probabilistic patterns for the role of behavior determinants is also avoided. But these questions concern the deepest foundations of physics, its foundation. The results of this study just help to answer them.

3. On the nature of dynamic and probabilistic regularities and the illusion of probabilistic determination.

As can be seen now, only the non-manifestation of the nature of such a characteristic of "random' events allows us to assert that "randomness" does not speak of the incompleteness of our knowledge but of the special physical nature of those material formations in the analysis of which the methods of probability theory have proved fruitful" ^{[12, p.124]}. In particular, to assert that in quantum physics, the processes described are probabilistic. At the same time, probabilistic patterns were declared more fundamental than dynamic ones (as they are also applicable where dynamic ones are supposedly already inactive). Thus, the antipodes of dynamic regularities were elevated to the rank of the laws of nature itself. But was this not wishful thinking? And are these the antipodes?

It is an indisputable fact that dynamic patterns are of little use when explaining the behavior of some complex, nonlinear macrocosm systems and microcosm processes. But it does not follow that anything in the world can happen without their participation. This is prevented by nothing more than unity. The world, as we know, consists in its materiality, which is proved not by a couple of conjuring phrases but by a long and difficult development of philosophy and natural science ^{[13, p. 43]}.

But here, it is important not to limit ourselves to the well-established idea of the material as only that, which, acting on our sense organs, causes sensations. The concept of matter is denoted by the most common property, all that a person learns with the help of the senses (supplemented by devices). Because everything that manifests its existence through interaction with its environment is material while having its own properties, representing such a side of existence, the result of interaction, mutual influence, and thus mutual change depends. This is a more general and, therefore, a more precise definition of materiality, which allows us to rightly consider material phenomena as not only what is available to the senses but also, for example, magnetism. It is precisely because of its materiality (which manifests itself in the impact on the senses) that the world is cognizable. To her, too, he owes the objectivity of his existence. Moreover, since the changes that occur in it result from interactions, and everything that interacts is material, the world owes its materiality and all its variability. There is no other source and determinator of its changes, except for material interactions, in it. This should not be surprising since it is the property of having a material effect that is different from everything non-material. "Interacting" means "material," these are synonyms.

Now there is a lot of talk and, without a shadow of a doubt, about non-physical influence (the influence of goals, ideas, information, etc.). But to talk about the influence of the immaterial on the material allows only the behavior of something material to respond to some goal, idea, or note. However, it is quite obvious that, for example, it is not the goal set in front of automatic doors that ensures their compliance (somehow forcing them to open in time), but their internal structure, using impulses from the motion sensor, forcing them to behave in accordance with the set goal. What is important, such a correspondence is provided that gives reason to talk about the impact of the goal based on dynamic patterns. But we can also talk about informational influence only because the person who receives the information provides a reaction to receiving it, which corresponds to this information, its significance to the person. It also provides it based on the dynamic patterns involved in the manifestation of the ability to behave properly. But if the " influencing" factor does not itself provide the correspondence from which one speaks of its influence, then what kind of "influencing" is it?! This means that the words about non-material impact hide the illusion of such an impact, associated with this compliance and arising in the conditions of the mechanism's ignorance for ensuring this compliance (which is discussed in more detail in the next part of the article, as well as in ^{[4, p.19–21]}). It's just a quasi-shock.

But even Hegel in the Science of Logic concluded that the essence of causal dependence is revealed by the category of interaction ^{[14, p. 208–221]}. Friedrich Engels wrote in the Dialectics of Nature that interaction is the true causa finalis of things. We cannot go beyond the knowledge of this interaction precisely because there is nothing more to know behind it ^{[6, p. 546]}. He emphasized separately that "only based on this universal interaction do we arrive at a real causal relation," without forgetting to point out that the main thing in this view of causality is the necessary change and objective generation of one movement by another. In saying that "a cause that does not work is not a cause at all" [ibid., p. 570], he came very close to realizing the indissoluble connection of causality with materiality. We had only to highlight it and expose it as a reliable criterion in the question of what can and cannot be considered an influencing factor.

But, having discarded the glasses of anthropocentrism in understanding the world's materiality (focusing all attention on the important but particular), one can notice another important consequence of its materiality. The fact is that dynamic regularities are just the regularities of interaction and mutual influence of the owners of their own properties. In these patterns, the causal relationships of the material world are reflected, which are unambiguous due to the unambiguous certainty of the properties of the interaction participants. From the fact that it is the material interactions that are the source and determinator of all changes in the world, it follows that it is unambiguous determinism, represented by dynamic patterns, that underlies all the changes taking place in the world. Where there is materiality, there is unambiguous determinism as its inherent side. Everything that is accessible to the senses or devices is subject to dynamic laws. Since materiality lies at the very foundation of the universe, it inevitably follows a fundamental, universal, unambiguous form of determinism. At the same time, it is the world's materiality, as the most common cause of all changes occurring in it, that leaves no room for any causeless phenomena that are not conditioned by material interactions.

On the other hand, the materiality of the world and thus the universal subordination to dynamic laws does not prevent the presence of both immaterial phenomena and non-dynamic laws of material systems behavior (physiological, biological, social, etc.). However, the correspondence to non-physical factors and laws, which creates the effect (appearance) of their influence, occurs only due to dynamic laws and the material influences behind them. Here, it is important to realize that impact is a form of manifestation of materiality; it is an attribute of matter and its property. As noted, it is this property that distinguishes the material from the ideal (whose existence is manifested, as will be shown in the next part of the article, only in the behavior of self-governing material systems corresponding to its existence). Therefore, to talk about the impact of the immaterial means to talk about the impact of something that by its nature is not capable of this.

Thus, we concluded that it is unambiguous causality (causal relationship) due to the manifestation of materiality. It determines the direction and nature of all processes occurring in the world. Moreover, the world's materiality also determines the general way of its self-renewal by transforming one reality into another in full accordance with the laws of conservation and without any opportunities and accidents for the world itself.

But it's one thing – everywhere displays unambiguous causality in material interactions that consider all the nuances of a particular set of circumstances. It is quite another thing to try to eliminate its use, to explain processes that are reflected only in the most general terms, i.e., without considering the details of their course that are subject to dynamic laws. But it is precisely in such situations that a person faces when studying complex, nonlinear systems of the macrocosm and processes of the microcosm. Moreover, it seems that it is precisely in the limited possibilities of its use as a means of explanation that the roots of the probabilistic style of thinking are hidden.

It is generally believed that the emergence of probabilistic thinking is associated with the presence of randomness, presented at the same time as something objective, completely independent of a person. "At the heart of all attempts to interpret the concept of probability objectively is the 'doctrine of chance.' According to this doctrine, the characteristic feature of relations described by probability theory is their randomness. But what is chance, random? This question touches upon the deepest philosophical foundations of probabilistic representation" ^{[15, p. 41]}. Since the theory of probability helped scientists to somehow navigate not only in the world of chance but also in the world of possibilities, it is not surprising that it has become prevalent, allowing us to talk about the "great probabilistic revolution in science" ^[16] and even to consider our entire modern civilization as probabilistic in general ^{[17, p. 223]}.

So what are these "worldview foundations of probabilistic representations"? And what is the fundamental difference between probabilistic patterns and dynamic ones? Consider these questions in the classic example of a coin toss.

Is there no force of attraction, no force of rotation, no vibration of motion, no resistance to motion acting on the coin toss? Of course, they do. But to the observer, all these forces are not reflected in the information available to them. Hence the unpredictability (based on dynamic patterns) of any coin toss result. However, in the course of multiple tosses, such a pattern was found to be the result of the mutual correlation of the number of heads and tails that fell out to a certain ratio, allowing us to numerically estimate their relative chance of appearing when flipping a coin. The identification of such relationships is associated with the identification of the corresponding events' probability. Thus, according to Andrey Kolmogorov, "probability" is the ratio of the number of favorable cases to the total number of equally possible cases ^{[18, p. 178]}. In our example, the ratio of "heads" and "tails" is 50/50. This ratio (representing a certain total result of the coin's behavior) is considered to be a probabilistic regularity of the appearance of "heads" and "tails" in the same type of coin toss situations.

But here, we immediately note that "the same type" does not mean "the same." It is quite obvious that each particular case of whether a "heads" or "tails" appears is predetermined by the momentum the coin receives (at the moment of the toss), i.e., it is the result of its subordination to the all-encompassing (due to the materiality of the world) laws of dynamics. At the same time, the results of the coin's behavior in the same type of situation are different because the "uniformity" of this situation does not interfere with the different confluence of circumstances uncontrolled by the observer that affect the result of the coin toss in the least. These circumstances (and the corresponding dynamic patterns) determine the coin's behavior every time it is thrown. The fact that the observer does not take these circumstances into account (or are not available for accounting) does not change the essence of the case. The question is different. The question is, why does the behavior of a material system, subject to dynamic patterns, also correspond to the ratio of various repetitive lines of its behavior, allowing us to talk about a certain subordination to probabilistic patterns?

To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the fact that the uniformity of the situation completely allows for the possibility of a different set of circumstances but also that the individual uniqueness of each toss does not prevent the appearance of the same results of each toss. At the same time, the ratio of "heads" and "tails" tends to be 50/50 when repeatedly tossing a coin because it is in it that the ratio of the repetition frequency of those circumstances that are not accounted for by the observer, which lead to the appearance of "tails," with those that lead to the appearance of "heads," is implicitly expressed. Since it is in this ratio that the circumstances leading to the opposite results of its behavior are repeated when the coin is flipped, it is not surprising that the total result of its behavior (expressed by the ratio of "heads" and "tails") will correspond exactly to this ratio. It turns out that behind the words about probabilistic regularity lies the regularity of the relative frequency of the occurrence of circumstances subordinate to dynamic regularities, leading to different variants of the material system's behavior in the same conditions. Since, at the same time, the probabilistic regularities reflect the ratio of the behavioral options of this system, which arises due to the influence of material causes on its behavior, it must be recognized that the probabilistic influence is also only a simple one: apparent.

This apparent influence of probabilistic regularities corresponds only to their apparent fundamental nature (associated with the apparent limitation of dynamic regularities). Since probabilistic regularities implicitly express the relative frequency of repetition of circumstances subordinate to dynamic regularities that ensure the relationship reflected in these regularities, this means that probabilistic patterns are secondary to dynamic ones, impossible without them, derived from the results of their manifestation. So, the marksman hits the target not because he has a very high probability of such a hit but because he can consider the influencing physical factors and correctly use the corresponding dynamic patterns. The total results of the manifestation of which are reflected in the probabilistic pattern of his hitting the target. Historical processes take place exactly this way, and not otherwise, also not because of the different probability of one or another of their course (expressing only the chances of such a course) but because this is the total result of unambiguously determined social behavior of a huge number of individuals.

As we can see, "probabilistic" does not mean "not subject to dynamic laws." The objective, true nature of probability, on the one hand, does not allow us to consider the probability of any material system's behavior as the cause of such behavior, and on the other hand, does not allow us to consider random, probabilistic events as causeless, not caused by material interaction. This is also stated by G. D. Levin, who says that "by defining random events as causeless, we are, in fact, claiming that they occur contrary to the laws of conservation" ^{[19, p. 102]}.

As already noted, probability theory and its regularities are pushed by the lack of concretizing information only because it has an acute shortage of clarifying information that a person encounters when studying the microcosm. For researchers, these patterns were in the foreground of the microcosm, pushing aside the dynamic ones. However, at the same time, the role of these secondary (relative to dynamic) laws was absolutized, overblown to the detriment of the laws of material interactions. Secondary patterns were mistakenly elevated to the rank of primary, fundamental ones.

Having realized that only material factors, to which probability does not belong, can influence the behavior of material systems, we have taken an important step towards revealing the philosophical background of the idea of the world as a physical reality in which probabilistic laws supposedly limit the domain of subordination to dynamic laws. As it turned out, such a vision of the world objectively corresponds to a "patchwork," inconsistent worldview, which somewhere recognizes the materiality of the world, and somewhere implicitly denies it (as if it is not at all to it that the world known by man owes both cognizability and variability, and the objectivity of its existence).

According to Levin, the already mentioned researcher of randomness and probability, the most serious argument against unambiguous determinism is the conclusion (which follows that unambiguous reasons cannot lead to randomness) that "consistent determinism leaves probability theory without objectively existing. It is he who inclines serious researchers to abandon it and move to soft determinism, according to which in the objective world, along with unambiguously deterministic events, non-deterministic events occur in any way" ^{[11, p.99]}. But, as it is now clearly seen, unambiguous determinism (which Levin and others call "consistent" for its denial of causeless phenomena) does not prevent material systems from behaving differently in the same type of situations and thus, does not deprive the theory of probability of the subject of its study (which is to identify the ratio of different possible variants of their behavior in the same type of situations). However, since these are regularities of a certain ratio and not of an impact, they are suitable only for guessing or assessing the chances of a particular behavior in a certain situation. No, for example, specific fallout of "heads" or "tails" is explained by the probability of their fallout.

At the same time, it would seem that the logic of those who are ready to abandon unambiguous causality is impeccable: if an event can happen, or may not happen, then it means that it is not sufficiently causally conditioned. However, this logic, which leads to the trap of the corresponding illusion, does not take into account the fact that the words "may or may not " hide only the non-deducibility of certain events from the information available to the observer, even though their appearance does not contradict this information. This is the logic of those who unreasonably see behind these words something more than just logical validity, the appearance of certain events under a particular set of circumstances that do not contradict the information available to the observer.

The fact that a physicist cannot unambiguously explain the different behavior of electrons in the same type of situation does not mean that it is causeless in these situations and not subject to unambiguous determination. "Humanity has two fundamental limitations: we cannot know infinity, and we cannot deterministically describe the events of the microcosm. But there is no logical need to conclude on this basis that in the most objective microcosm, events do not occur according to dynamic and statistical laws, but only according to statistical laws, and in particular, to assert that quantum theory is complete. You can't flatter yourself so rudely" ^{[19, p. 106]}. By the way, James Clerk Maxwell, thanks to whom probabilistic concepts were introduced into physics when he developed the molecular-kinetic theory of gases, did not at all abandon the idea that individual acts of collision between particles obey dynamic laws and in this sense are strictly deterministic. But after all, the "uncertainty ratio" says that it is impossible only to simultaneously reflect with maximum accuracy both the coordinates and the momentum of the electron, and not at all that it does not possess them at the same time (which would contradict the laws of conservation, the indestructibility of matter and energy). The principle of complementarity shows that even at the level of the microcosm, it is impossible to explain the observed processes without dynamic regularities as the basis of all other regularities.

Thus, the nature of probabilistic regularities revealed by us indicates their absolute inability to replace dynamic regularities in some way, to displace them. And from the fact that unambiguous causality is a consequence of the world's materiality, it just follows that its fundamental nature, before which classical physics worshiped. Therefore, when we talk about the determination of the behavior of material systems, we can only agree with Levin's words: "Let's call things by their proper names: there is no other determinism than rigid, i.e., consistent. Soft determinism, determinism with exceptions, is the same as the law of conservation with exceptions: it is identical to 'soft' indeterminism" ^{[11, p. 96]}.

To believe in the reality of ambiguous determinism is like believing in the existence of round squares. Determinism is inseparable from materiality, and it is inseparable from unambiguity. Ambiguous causality is just a myth in which wishful thinking is passed off as reality. A myth that arose, among other things, because of science's unwillingness to abandon the principle of causality, which in practice has proven its effectiveness in the knowledge of the world. "With the rejection of this most important heuristic principle, physics would cease to be what it has always been, namely, science" ^{[15, p. 169]}. However, the wave of discrediting this principle raised by modern physics continues to grow, increasing doubts about its fundamental nature. At the same time, in studying the microcosm, probability is already considered a real alternative to causality: the prevailing opinion has become that at the level of the microcosm, the behavior of material objects is dictated by probability and only by it. This, given the inseparability of the determination of material systems from material influence, is nothing more than an implicit rejection of the principle of causality with all the verbal admonitions to the contrary. The objective situation is such that the transition to an ambiguous form of forecasting (caused, as noted, by a lack of concretizing information) is wrongly presented as a transition to the field of ambiguous causality.

It is necessary to finally realize in full measure that the probability of events is not connected with any "special nature" of events, and the explicit or implicit recognition of the causelessness of events turns scientific activity into myth-making. To realize that under the guise of ambiguous determinism, bacilli have infiltrated science and indeterminism to realize that the doctrine of ambiguous determinism is an internally contradictory one that deprives science of the most important objective guidelines and criteria. To recognize that the eclectic worldview of modern physics, corresponding to this internally contradictory, irrationally mystical determinism, allows philosophers to call it "surreal" ^{[10, p. 8]}.

4. The nature of free behavior and the illusion that unambiguous determinism is incompatible with it.

For two millennia, the indeterminists have argued for the existence of free will, and the determinists, on the contrary, have denied it on the grounds that all volitional acts are motivated. "Causal determinism is still the most common metaphysical position and, apparently, represents the main obstacle to free will. This is the core of the problem of free will" ^{[20, p. 178]}. "It is very difficult to imagine the boundary of the emergence of free will on the border between the inanimate world and life. It is much more natural to assume that free will is an intrinsic, i.e., inherent property of the whole world. Only on the basis of this initial position can we move away from a meaningless, completely deterministic mechanistic world to a living and developing one" ^{[21, p.332–333]}. These are the most common points of view on this problem. However, they do not differ in persuasiveness or evidence. In addition, the modern understanding of free will is extremely narrow and has acquired a specific shade. "If we analyze the method used in modern research to justify the existence of free will, it turns out that it does not, strictly speaking, follow that metaphysical free will can even theoretically take place. The fact is that in modern philosophy, the category of free will is usually considered in connection with that of moral responsibility, and the assumption of the existence of free will is derived from the existence of moral obligation" ^{[22, p.20]}. However, in the history of philosophy, it was the opposite. Giving this concept a very narrow meaning does not help clarify the question of the existence of metaphysical freedom of will. Instead, it interferes. Therefore, in our study of the relationship between unambiguous determinism and free behavior, we will return to the broadest interpretation of free will.

Freedom is usually associated with the availability of various opportunities. But does a billiard ball, for example, have freedom of behavior when nothing prevents it from moving in different directions? Of course, it does not because it does not determine the choice of direction of its movement. He has neither his own desire to realize any possibility nor the ability to realize it. This means that freedom of behavior is associated with the presence of more than just opportunities. Only those who are able are free to self-determine the line of their possible behavior. Free behavior is managed itself, itself a deterministic behavior of material systems.

It turns out that the essence of freedom is self-governance, self-determination. From the analysis of the general properties of self-managed systems, it follows that their self-management is provided by their special internal structure. An important place is occupied by management structures in these systems (their self-governing body, their brain). It is due to the internal structure that gives the constituent elements of self-governing systems certain functions. These systems have not only properties (as purely physical determinants of their behavior) but also abilities as internal security for certain independent actions. Actions possess the fact that, unlike properties, they may or may not manifest. The specific form of free behavior depends on the manifestation of abilities in their various combinations.

Since all the structures of self-managed systems are material, these systems function (showing the corresponding ability in one or another form of free behavior) in full accordance with unambiguous cause-and-effect relationships. The self-governance body of these systems simply skillfully uses (for its management purposes) these connections and their corresponding dynamic patterns. So we have to admit that free behavior is carried out on the basis of dynamic patterns. Using only free behavior is not explicable as it does not consider the influence of the most important participant in such behavior – the management body of a self-governing system (its influence on which dynamic patterns are involved in free behavior).

We emphasize that the combination of freedom with rigid determinism allows nothing more than a special internal structure of self-governing systems that function based on dynamic laws. Here is a simple example: An automatic self-opening door will open "at its own discretion" when its "brain" (of which the motion sensor is an element) activates its ability to open. That is when it will use its cause-and-effect relationships leading to its discovery.

As we can see, free behavior is not causeless behavior. But nothing else could be expected in the world of moving matter, which recognizes only materially conditioned and, therefore, unambiguous causality. Only in the absence of a clear understanding of the essence of randomness and freedom can it be argued that "ideas about freedom have their roots in randomness" ^{[12, p. 128]}. Only in such conditions could there be a situation where "...very, very many researchers consider randomness and probabilistic concepts as a necessary prerequisite for the analysis of such an important characteristic of social phenomena as freedom, freedom of will. Already in the period of the formation of probability in physics, was it often associated with the problems of free will, which can be traced in the works of Maxwell, one of the founders of statistical physics" ^{[12, p. 127]}. Such reservations that "...freedom is brought not just by chance, but by a subtle interweaving of something almost random and unpredictable and something resembling restrictive or selective regulation, such as a goal or standard, but, of course, not strict control in any way" ^{[23, p. 526]}, nothing changes. It is now quite clear that it is not accidents (in whatever form they may be represented) that really bring freedom. The source of freedom is in the unique internal structure of material systems, which ensures their self-management. Freedom is an attribute of self-governing systems. It is inherent not only in all living beings but also in all systems of artificial origin, endowed with the ability to react to something at their own discretion. Thus, we can say that everything that is self-governing is free by definition.

But where there is free behavior, there is also expediency (purposefulness) as an integral part of it. It is the expediency of behavior that allows us to meet the vital needs of all natural automata (i.e., living beings, organisms). It is connected with all artificial automata's purposes. Each step of free behavior is a step towards achieving a particular goal that is present in free behavior as something perfect (since this presence of the self-governing system manifests itself only in the behavior corresponding to this presence of the self-governing system). At the same time, self-managed systems have reached the conceptual level of self-government and volition as a conscious desire to achieve a particular goal. The correspondence of free behavior to a specific goal, conscious or unconscious, allows us to say about the dictation, respectively, goals or free will. But how is such a dictate carried out?

Let's go back to our example. The free, self-controlled behavior of automatic doors fully corresponds to the goal set for them to open on time. There is such a correspondence due to the timely manifestation of their ability to open up, which is provided by the activity of their brain. There is no mysticism in such ideal "acts of influence" of the material's behavior! The brain, "conducting" the manifestation of the various abilities of the system it controls in accordance with the patterns, connections, and dependencies reflected in its structure, provides the necessary correspondence predetermined by the internal structure of this system. At the same time, the main form of free purposeful behavior of all living beings is a variety of reflexes. Any reflex is a manifestation of the ability to react in accordance with one's own interests. The brain is responsible for this correspondence. As the goals in a person's head take on a verbal form, the form of a particular expression of will, the essence of the matter does not change. Therefore, behind the words about the dictate of purpose or free will lies nothing more than the dictate of the particular internal structure of self-governing systems. They provide a correspondence that creates the illusion of the influence of the immaterial on the material.

Thus, we came to the following conclusions.

First of all, free will still exists but not in the field of physical phenomena. It comes from the realm of ideal phenomena. Its roots go back to the management activities of the management bodies of self-managed systems. At the same time, by representing a verbally expressed desire for something, it is present in the management activities of intelligent beings only and not at all in the role of a "commander-in-chief," since the brain still reasons and concludes at the level of consciousness, not consciousness itself, which is the highest form of managerial activity of the brain associated with the appearance of speech. It is the brain that embodies its choice in the corresponding "free expression of will" (as evidenced by the fact established by neuropsychologists that the brain's choice outstrips the person's awareness of the choice made by a completely measurable amount: about 300 milliseconds). At the same time, we note that the presence of free will in human activity is reflected not only in the words "I must" (as if the expression of will is associated only with overcoming certain difficulties) but also in the words "I want," the meaning of which is "this is my will."

Secondly, and this is the main thing for us, objectively, there is no conflict, no confrontation between an unambiguous form of determination and the possibility of free behavior, including on the basis of free will, does not exist. It is not there for the simple reason that any free behavior is carried out on the basis of an unambiguous form of determination. Since all "freedom-loving" systems are material, they cannot, by their very nature, be outside the range of material and, therefore, unambiguous causality. The peculiarity of the determination of the free behavior of material systems consists only in the manifestation of the dynamic laws involved in determining this behavior under the control of these systems themselves in the person of their self-governing bodies. Therefore, the tired thesis about the incompatibility of an unambiguous form of determination with free behavior is nothing more than a myth born in the conditions of a vague idea of what the essence of freedom is, where it will come from, and what the essence of the freedom mechanism of its dictate is.

Third, because the origins of freedom and free will are in self-managing material systems, which are provided by the presence of certain abilities controlled by self-governing bodies, then material objects or systems that do not have a special internal structure that ensures their self-management are not suitable for any free behavior. Therefore, to look for the roots of free will in the supposedly free behavior of some elementary particles (to which physicists most often attribute a tendency to free behavior) is a hopeless task. In addition, attempts to replace the dictate of dynamic laws with the dictate of free will or probability (by presenting both as the bearer of a certain soft form of determination, which supposedly allows some "backlashes," "gaps" in the system of rigid determination) lead philosophers to a dead end of irreconcilable and irremediable contradictions in this approach.

But to understand the mechanism of determination of free behavior, it is necessary to clarify the question of the soul as a specific factor of influence. Here everything points to the fact that nature, following the path of improving self-governing systems, provided their brains with the ability to designate for themselves the origin and significance of the impulses coming from various sense organs by "coloring" them with various sensations (based on which subjective images of objective reality arose). Therefore, it is not surprising that people have discovered the ability to experience a variety of sensations and experiences, from which they are repelled when they express their will. However, they explained this ability by the presence of a soul, supposedly providing their life with a spiritual component, their spiritual "I." At the same time, all living things began to be called animate, emphasizing the presence of a certain "life-giving principle" in them. But, as confirmed by science, the center of all the experiences of a living being and its "life-giving principle" is its brain. It is the brain that acts for a living being as what is commonly called the soul of this being. But here, it is important to realize that the behavior of all living things is not at all subordinate to sensations and experiences but to the brain, which fills life with sensations and experiences. So, it is not pain that makes a person pull his hand away from a hot object, but his brain, expressing with pain his extremely negative attitude to the impulses from the skin receptors he receives during such contact. It is not willpower itself, as an active element of the human soul, that makes a person pour cold water to harden himself, but the same brain that dresses its decision in a set of sounds pronounced mentally or aloud, endowed to a person with the role of a verbal command to execute.

This is just a metaphor that a person is driven by his desires, his will. In fact, a person, like an atom, is really driven only by "physics." But not just physics, but physics that is hidden behind the manifestation of human abilities for certain actions and is used by the human brain as a tool for purposeful influence on behavior. On the other hand, only the ability to use physics to achieve a particular goal is limited and influences the brain's free behavior. So, it is not our brain itself that moves our hands and feet. The brain influences the movement of our limbs, not by any influence of its own, but by controlling the internal mechanisms of such influence, which function based on the "rigid" dictate of dynamic laws.

As for responsibilities, the logic of those who oppose such responsibility usually boils down to the fact that a choice under the pressure of any circumstances is not a free one. However, in reality, a person is free to choose under any circumstances. He, of course, is forced to take into account objective circumstances, but this does not make his choice any less free since it is always carried out by the person himself so that in this free choice, he does not forget about the public interest; it is just necessary to be responsible for the actions he has committed. Moreover, some predestinations of human actions do not interfere with freedom of choice. Does not a person who is not an enemy to himself always (i.e., predictably) choose the lesser of two evils? Doubts about the compatibility of freedom with predestination are related to the fact that many philosophers understand free behavior as causeless, unprovoked behavior (whereas by its nature, "free" is identical with "self-determined"). This erroneous understanding of free behavior makes them question, "how can one choose freely in conditions of predetermined choice?" "rhetorical."

Moreover, the universal mechanism of responsibility of self-managed systems for their "arbitrariness" was created by nature long before the very question of responsibility arose in human minds. This mechanism has found its embodiment in such a functional element of the management structure of a self-managed system, which is commonly called a positive or negative feedback system. It is this system that underlies all the instincts of living beings. It determines the "general" line of their free behavior, controlling its compliance with the interests of these creatures with the help of positive or negative feedback impulses, indicated by their brain, respectively, positive and negative sensations. For example, a person is free to commit senseless, thoughtless acts. However, the negative consequences of such a choice make themselves felt through negative feelings, forcing them to continue to treat free will more responsibly. The presence of this mechanism in the structure of the brain of "the carrot and the stick," which controls free choice and generates, in one case, the fear of making mistakes, and in the other, the hope of good luck, just indicates the responsibility assigned to the brain (during its formation) for the results of its management activities. The social influence system simply "connects" to the work of this natural mechanism of responsibility for the results of free behavior. We feel His work in our everyday "spiritual experiences."

But in general, free will is such a "gift" of nature, which requires very careful handling and, if used ineptly, easily turns from a means of existence into one of self-destruction.

5. About the absolute predestination of events and the illusion of its inextricable connection with unambiguous determinism.

As it turns out, there are no objective grounds to accuse classical physics of "absolutizing the role of dynamic laws" because, without these laws, nothing can really happen in the material world. However, the rejection of unambiguous determinism was also prompted by the allegedly resulting absolute predestination of all events. Unambiguous determinism even began to be called Laplacian after the man who presented this doctrine as a tool for unlimited foresight. On the other hand, the desire to discover some "natural antidote" to such a predestination in the development of the world pushed scientists to fully objectify possibilities and accidents and give probability a "soft" status, an ambiguous determinator of material bodies' behavior and processes. Thus, it is the frightening image of Laplace's determinism as a realm of rigid necessity, where "all existence is embedded in a frozen state in a single instant... neither the past nor the future has any real meaning. In fact, there is nothing that happens" ^{[24, p. 14]}, in every way contributed to the spread of the opinion that the idea of an unambiguous determination of events being outdated. It is believed that if there were such a world-mind that could get accurate and complete information about any current moment of the world's existence, then, in the conditions of universal subordination to unambiguous causality, this mind would open up all the past and futures of this world.

But how can we be so sure that the world can be reflected and represented with absolute accuracy in data, in the results of measurements? How, for example, would one measure the clouds and the distance between them without endowing them with conditional (i.e., objectively non-existent) borders? Or how would one "accurately" count the number of trees in a forest without making a whole list of all sorts of conventions (starting with the boundaries of the forest and ending with an explanation of what exactly is considered a "full-fledged tree")? Where is the "natural" boundary of the Sun, with its protuberances pointing into space and the gravitational field extending beyond the boundaries of the solar system? How would one measure the distance between galaxies or atoms without any degree of convention? Where exactly are the "true" boundaries of bodies if their surface consists of individual molecules and atoms that are never at rest? Moreover, there are no clear boundaries in nature itself and in the time of its objects' existence. Everything in it goes through gradual formation, development, extinction, aging, destruction, and transformation. All boundaries in nature are more or less blurred, vague, or ambiguous, which does not allow a person to do without a certain amount of conditionality.

But in this case, absolute accuracy of reflection is impossible in principle. It is impossible to reflect something that does not have clear outlines accurately. There can be no accurate information about what does not have absolutely clear and, in this sense, ideal boundaries. Nature itself does not need such boundaries. Moreover, they are unacceptable because, as is shown in detail in a separate author's study of this problem ^{[25, p. 88–97]}, the ideality of borders means their absolute continuity and thus their fundamental insuperability, impenetrability, inviolability, which is incompatible with either variability or development. In nature, everything that exists is in a state of transition from one state to another – both in space and time. Therefore, all boundaries in nature, which skillfully combine continuity with discreteness, are "dotted," ambiguous, and voluminous. These are "transition zones": from an object to a non-object (or another object), from what the object (or process) is now, to what it will be. At the same time, in human practice, this natural vagueness of boundaries constantly reminds us of a fundamental impossibility to get rid of this or that "measurement error." The error is not a random measurement, an estimate of the deviation of the obtained knowledge of the value from its true value ^{[26, p. 12]}. This is not some "fundamental embodiment of randomness in natural science" ^{[27, p. 38]} but a manifestation of such a fundamental regularity of the world's existence as the absence of absolutely clear distinctions in it. By the way, the unconscious idealization of spatial and temporal boundaries contributed to the appearance of the Laplace horror story and the appearance of purely logical problems presented in Zeno's aporias.

But what absolute predestination of all the world's states can we talk about in a world that does not have absolutely clear boundaries of these states of its own?! Where there is no absolute certainty of existence, there can be no absolute certainty before the certainty of existence. This means, first of all, that it is not the possibilities with randomness and probability that save the world from the absolute predestination of events. And secondly, unambiguous determinism does not open the way to absolute predestination. Yes, it provides the ability to anticipate. However, this possibility has natural limits. The share of uncertainty and vagueness present at all levels of natural distinctions (which does not interfere with unambiguous determination but increases sharply in the microcosm) acts as an insurmountable and irremediable obstacle to the absolute predestination of events. Consequently, the last arguments that call into question the universal character of unambiguous causality do not stand up to criticism. At the heart of this argument, too, is just an illusion, the illusion of the very possibility of absolute predestination. It turns out that Laplace, as a staunch proponent of the limitlessness of unambiguous determinism, was wrong only in that he associated this unambiguity with absolute predestination. Let's take into account that all the teachings alternative to unambiguous determinism are internally contradictory and eclectic. We can only agree with Levin's words that the only way out of this difficult situation is to return to the bosom of consistent determinism and resolve the primary difficulties arising in it, based on its initial principles ^{[11, p.103]}.

6. Conclusion.

Today, the prevailing view is that the overthrowing of the principle of unambiguous causality from the pedestal of the fundamental scientific principle is objectively inevitable. However, the results of this study suggest that its overthrowing is the result of delusions as it is caused only by the apparent limitation of unambiguous causality; its apparent incompatibility with the presence of various possibilities, accidents, free behavior; and its apparent inseparability from absolute predestination and the mechanism as a doctrine that ignores the qualitative specifics of various phenomena and their subordination to non-physical, "supra-physical" laws. But a very negative role was played here by the general mathematization of science, which by no means contributed to the philosophical understanding of a particular scientific concept and the identification of the essence of the phenomena under study (in particular, to the identification of the indissoluble connection of unambiguous determinism with the materiality of the world known by man).

It would be logical before saying that "determinism leads to fatalism, to absolute predestination, taking away from man the freedom of will," and that "nature wisely chose something in between (between determinism and indeterminism–N. P.). At the same time in life, there is both free will and predictability of events" ^{[28, p. 39]} to get to the bottom of the essence of the corresponding phenomena first. However, in the context of an anthropocentric understanding of the world's materiality, a clear guide was not enough to confidently move along the difficult path of revealing the essence of possibilities, accidents, freedom, and probability. The inextricable link between causality and materiality has also not been revealed. As a result, it turned out that the modern doctrine of the causality of phenomena presents a cause and the fact that by its very nature, the cause of any changes in the material world can not be. That is, it brings quasi-causes to science under the guise of causes. From this conclusion, if you call a spade a spade and do not deny the world its materiality, there is no escape.

The euphoria caused by the seemingly revolutionary probabilistic thinking style was stronger than healthy skepticism and fear of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It could only be curbed by the consistent implementation of that worldview principle, which reflects the most general properties of our world, confirmed by science and centuries-old practice, called materialism. Only based on the fact that the world is based on nothing but moving matter, it was possible to come to an understanding, on the one hand, that possibilities and accidents, being the "breeding ground" for probability, are not natural phenomena. On the other hand, absolutely all-natural processes are inseparable from dynamic laws. However, the materiality of the world was taken into account by scientists, as a rule, very one-sidedly – only from the recognition that matter is primary and consciousness is secondary. But the world's materiality is manifested in its variability in the presence of dynamic laws (including conservation laws), their fundamental nature, the impossibility of causeless phenomena, and much more.

But here, we will have to make a small digression, connected with the fact that even today, as in the time of Ernest Mach, there are voices that the concept of matter is "outdated." In connection, for example, with attempts to assign information to the role of the "primary substance of all things," it is explicitly stated that "there is a need to introduce a new category, more general than matter" ^{[29, p. 31]}. The possibility of this is justified based on Lenin's definition of matter, according to which: the only thing the "property" of matter, with the recognition of which philosophical materialism is associated, is a property should be an objective reality, to exist outside of our consciousness"^{[30, p. 255]}. They say that from "being an objective reality," it is not at all deduced "to be the only reality" ^{[29, ibid.]}. This is the loophole found for the "overdue" replacement of ideas about the primary basis. But the fact is that the definition of matter that identifies it with objective reality is inaccurate. Do the connections and relations that arise in the world (spatial, temporal, causal, and other), being objective, have their own materiality? And what about the ideal phenomena that are objectively present in the management activities of self-managed material systems?

In addition, the objective reality of all material things is only in the human consciousness, which reflects such a characteristic of the material (not expressed in itself) as its independence from human consciousness. And so, the one is impossible without the subject and his consciousness. Therefore, we have to admit that without a subject, there can be nothing subjective but also nothing objective (given the attachment of this characteristic of the material elements to the subject's presence). Moreover, a person reflects not an objective reality but something materially conditioned, which only after reflection acquires a status objective in a person's head, expressing the relationship of the material with the subject.

In fact, as pointed out when identifying the nature of dynamic patterns, the main property of all material things is existence, manifested through interaction with its environment (which ensures the objectivity of such existence in a particular place and form). It is no longer possible to distinguish a more general property of everything that makes up the world that a person knows with the help of sense organs and devices. Therefore, the concept of matter, which denotes everything whose existence manifests itself through interaction, cannot ever become obsolete.

This means that materialism, i.e., the materialistic worldview, can never become obsolete. But here, it is important not to limit it to recognizing the primacy of the material over the spiritual. It should be borne in mind that it was precisely this limitation that did not allow us to fully take advantage of its inexhaustible heuristic potential, nor allow us to appreciate its scientific significance. Therefore, it is not surprising that materialism has been supplanted in some areas of science by positivism as a teaching that denies the cognitive value of philosophical research and declares that the only source of true knowledge is concrete (empirical) science, whose task is supposed to describe facts purely, and not to explain them. To a large extent, it was a reaction to scientific philosophy's alleged inability in the face of materialism to give clear answers to the accumulated philosophical questions (including about the nature of chance, probability, and free will).

As a result, there is a situation where philosophy is generally denied the status of science. This is supposedly not a science of universal properties and laws but simply a "form of spiritual activity" ^{[1, p. 714]}. Philosophy is put on par with everyday, artistic, religious, and mythological knowledge. It is assigned the role of an obsequious servant girl interspersed with the role of a retired wedding general. And to remind about the partisanship of any philosophy has become to have a bad tone. At the same time, the status of materialism as scientifically grounded and confirmed by practice, the direction of the development of philosophical thought is reduced to the status of just a certain "point of view." But positivism also manifests itself in the rejection of the worldview criterion of the truth of scientific theories, in the actual absence of the requirement for scientific theories to correspond to the worldview as the entire universe is based on its property. This ensures its cognizability with the help of sensory organs and devices and the very fact of its objective existence. But it is precisely this worldview that restricts those "free fictions" that Albert Einstein openly hoped for in his time, who argued that "physics is a developing logical system of thinking, the foundations of which can be obtained not by isolating them by any inductive methods from experienced experiments, but only by free fiction" ^{[31, p.58]}. "There was a rejection of the most important reference point in the search for objective truth. At the same time, the main criterion for evaluating scientists was the number of publications... and illusory 'novelty' (instead of eternal TRUTH)" ^{[32, p. 203]}. In addition, it has a negative impact on science itself.

"Modern physics has a number of fundamental shortcomings that hinder the further development of natural science: physics is phenomenological, i.e., it prefers the external description of phenomena to the detriment of the research of their inner essence; physics has become subordinate to mathematics, it has disappearing ideas about the nature of phenomena, about their essence, their internal mechanisms. The generally accepted methodology of physics has become the promotion of postulates, under which natural phenomena are then sorted. Instead of studying the movement of matter in the phenomena's internal mechanisms, theoretical physics reduces physical phenomena to distortions of space and time; physical theory ignores the task of cognition of the structures of micro-objects ^{[33, p.47–50]}. Moreover, positivism is also a worldview, but it denies the existence of certain objective guidelines common to all sciences and is, therefore, barren by definition. His populist motto is every science is its own philosophy. But this is also one of the incessant unsuccessful attempts to find a middle ground in philosophy, which the classics of dialectical materialism warned against: "Realists"... the positivists, the Machists, etc., are all a shameful mess – a middle party in philosophy, which confuses the materialistic and idealistic trends on each individual issue. Attempts to jump out of these two fundamental trends in philosophy contain nothing but "conciliatory quackery" ^{[30, p. 332]}. Anyone who, while studying science, ignores the materialistic worldview, thereby ignores in his theories the most general property of the world, the phenomena of which he tries to somehow explain, interpret, or foresee in these theories.

There are very few open, convinced idealists who ignore both their own and universal practical experience in their theories and consider everything visible, audible, and felt to be the product of consciousness. Therefore, the dispute between the adherents of unambiguous and ambiguous determinism is not a dispute between materialists and idealists. This is, in fact, a dispute between consistent and inconsistent materialists, who most often act under the flag of positivism. Under this flag, the proponents of "soft" determinism find themselves, who assume the limited scope of the dictate of dynamic laws (as if they leave no room for either possibility, accidents, or freedom, and lead to absolute predestination). Their worldview myopia and inconsistency simply do not allow them to notice that some kind of limitation of an unambiguous form of determination is possible only in the conditions of the limited materiality of the world around us.

It is generally accepted that the subject of new physics is inexplicable from the point of view of classical physics. But this is not entirely true. New physics is a physics that is faced with a situation where it is necessary to explain the behavior of a system in the conditions of complete or partial lack of information about the factors that affect its behavior (as can be clearly seen in the example of the coin toss). This is the kind of physics that, due to problems with information (with the degree of their concretization), is forced to explain the behavior of material systems not causally but based on the theoretically most possible variants of their behavior. Therefore, she turned to the theory for help, which allows us to estimate the chances of different behaviors of such systems. That is, it is not the subject of physics that has changed, which is the behavior of material systems, but the situation with its consideration, when, either because of the lack of concretizing information or because of the inability to embrace their vast number, we have to limit ourselves only to assessing the chances of realizing various "possibilities." But should we lose sight of the fact that even in this case, all the phenomena observed in the material world are still materially conditioned and therefore still subject to dynamic laws? However, such an omission still occurred, and science was in a worldview impasse. This is what the physicists themselves say: "It was hoped that the latest theories would help to eliminate the contradictions in classical theories. But these dreams were not destined to come true. The new theories found themselves in a difficult position, and the difficulties of the newest theories had classic roots" ^{[34, p. 74]}.

At the same time, even "positively" thinking scientists do not abandon the concept of objective reality (realizing then that their activities will generally go beyond the scientific boundary). But after all, a person's objective reality can only be that whose existence is manifested through some interaction with their environment and, therefore, by definition, is material. Hence, the recognition of objective reality conceals an implicit, hidden recognition of the original materiality of the world known by man (which is a condition not only for its objectivity but also for its cognizability). Moreover, it is hidden behind the recognition of public practice as a criterion of truth. "If what our practice confirms is the only, last objective truth, then it follows that the only way to this truth is the path of science, which stands on the materialist point of view" ^{[30, pp. 138–139]}. This means that the ideological core in the face of materialism in science is still inexhaustibly present, even under the masks of recognition of objective reality and objective truth. What is missing is a conscious and full-fledged reliance on it. There is a lack of awareness that calls to abandon the worldview proven by science and practice, which requires taking into account the most general properties of the world that man has discovered, are equivalent to calls to the ship's captain to abandon a reliable compass as allegedly interfering with free navigation.

But we must also realize that for a science that recognizes both objective reality and objective truth, the only acceptable way out of the impasse of contradictions is to justify unambiguous determinism fully. We have to choose: either to proceed from the idea of the universality and fundamental nature of unambiguous causality, which hides the recognition of the world's material unity and leaves open the way to the discovery of the true causes of the mysterious behavior of some objects of the macro and microcosm, or to proceed from the idea of a certain limitation of unambiguous causality, which hides (in the form of proclaiming the probabilistic nature of some phenomena) an implicit disregard for the material unity of the world and, as a result, an implicit refusal to search for a truly causal explanation of phenomena. But where there is a pseudoscience, there is a pseudoscience.