Abstract: The subject of this research is the measures for halting the flow of bribes (product of the number of bribes by the average value). One of the key factors of corruption rampant in modern Russia consists in the weak stimuli and absence of adequate motivation among the representatives of law enforcement agencies. The research was conducted using the methods of mathematical modeling, and is based on the assumption that penal sanctions are the only punishment intended for the official caught in the act of accepting the bribe. In order for the controller who imposes penalty not to have stimulus to accept a bribe from the official in the amount lower than the amount of penalty for concealing his offence, the penalty becomes the property of the controller in full. It is assumed that each of the parties aims for maximization of their net income. Conditions are established, under which the flow of bribes a) only increases, b) along with efforts of the controller, makes periodic fluctuations in time, c) monotonously tends to zero.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the barriers that must be overcome by a collective of individual for the effective use of their self-governance and self-organization resources. Until the moment when Elinor Ostrom was awarded with the Nobel Prize, the majority of economists and politicians were assured that a collective is incapable of managing the common resource effectively. Most popular opinion was reflected in a metaphor: the tragedy of communities. This opinion was traced by an  entire number of theoretical models and concepts. Due to high incidence of pessimistic view, the corresponding issues were considered resolved, and thus, were displaced to the periphery of economic science. The falseness of such views was established in the course of field and experimental research of E. Ostrom. This article analyzes the factors that served as the foundation for formation of pessimistic views upon ability of the collective to efficient management of common resource. On the reasons consists in inappropriate identification of the regime of open accesses with communal property. Another one – in the axiom on the inability of a collective, which members pursue egoistic intentions, to efficient usage of common resource in the regime of self-governance and self-organization. These prerequisites led to a conclusion on the need for privatization or nationalization of such resource. The goal of this work consists in theoretical analysis of such opportunities that allow a collective to successfully resolve the faced social dilemmas, when each of them tries to achieve a maximal individual profit.  

Abstract: The subject of this research is the barriers that must be overcome by a collective of individual for the effective use of their self-governance and self-organization resources. It is assumed that members of the collective are capable to jointly create an additional cost by making individual efforts. Value of the expected gross income increases with the efforts put by each agent, and subordinated to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each member of the collective consists in maximization of the own individual profit. Within the framework of mathematical modeling, it is demonstrated that in the regime of independent choice of the volume of applied effort, the agents achieve outcome that is the equilibrium by Nash, but inefficient by Pareto. Each member of the collective due to their egoistic intentions is interested in applying the limited amount of efforts that meet the maximum of his individual profit, but all his partners should apply as much efforts as possible. Overcoming of ineffective equilibrium requires coordination of efforts invested by all members of the collective. As follows from the model, the main obstacles on the way to effective usage of human resources by a collective in the regime of self-organization and self-governance is a post-contractual opportunism in form of shirking. The free-rider problem and motivation to opportunistic behavior are generated by the desire of each member of the collective to maximization of their own individual profit in the conditions of force of the law of diminishing returns.

Abstract: The subject of this research is opportunities for effective use of human capital members of the collective in the conditions of self-governance and self-organization resources. It is assumed that members of the collective are capable to jointly create an additional cost by making individual efforts. Value of the expected gross income increases with the efforts put by each agent, and subordinated to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each member of the collective consists in maximization of the own individual profit. Overcoming ineffective equilibrium faced by the collective as a result of independent choice of amount of effort applied by the members, and achievement of Pareto-preferred outcome requires corresponding coordination of collective actions. The key goal of coordination consists in overcoming opportunistic behaviors in form of shirking and such setting of incentive system that would results in application of optimal efforts by all members of the collective. Within the framework of mathematical model structured on the general principles, the author determines the essential conditions for achieving this goal. One of them dictates a corresponding strategy, another one – formulates the ex post rule of distribution of value of the expected gross income, perceived by all members of the collective as ex ante. According to this rule, the portion of each member of the collective in gross income must be equal his portion of efforts. Acceptance of this rule allows implementing a strategy, which motivates each member of the collective to apply efforts that would meet the maximal combined profit.

Abstract: The subject of this research is opportunities for effective use of human capital members of the collective in the conditions of self-governance and self-organization resources. It is assumed that members of the collective are capable to jointly create an additional cost by making individual efforts. Value of the expected gross income increases with the efforts put by each agent, and subordinated to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each member of the collective consists in maximization of the own individual profit. Achievement of the socially optimal level of applied efforts requires coordination of actions based on the high level of trust between all members of the collective. Within the framework of mathematical model, it is demonstrated that the lack of trust to some extent can be compensated by the incentives based on the use of violence potential. Most successful implementation of such type of incentives is possible only in the relatively small collectives in the conditions of inevitability of punishment for violation, and cautions use of force. In large collectives, a low probability of punishment for violence turns out either in low significance of the expected punishment, or extremely high meaning of nominal punishment. In first instance, a threat of punishment can play a role of a constraining factor; while on the other instances – lead to a stiff punishment that may reduce the usefulness of a violator to an extremely low level. Therefore, the achieved by the collective result can be incomparable by Pareto even with Nash equilibrium.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the problems of combating corruption crimes in modern Russia. The article analyzes certain measures essential for significant lowering of the current level of corruption, as well as reducing the negative impact of business corruption on the economy and society. The author challenges the popular social views, according to which the successful deterrence of corruption requires severe punitive measures, including death penalty. Special attention is given to the analysis of factors, which lead to the loss of deterrent effect of punishment. The research uses an economic approach towards crimes and penalties. Based on the obtained estimates of the expected penalty for corruption, the author demonstrates that the typical for the Russian law enforcement practice ultralow value of probability of penalty for an offence deprives the penalty of any deterrent effect. The author acquires a quantitative assessment of such threshold value of probability of penalty for corruption, the overcoming of which would allow restoring the deterrent effect of penalty and successfully reduce the number of corresponding offences. It is concluded that even the repeated reduction of the number of corruption offences, accepted by the society as great breakthrough in combating corruption, can be achieved solely by petty corruption. In such case, the total annual volume of bribes will drop by just few percentage points, which reflect in continuous negative impact of corruption on the economy. Therefore, the process of increasing the likelihood of penalty for corruption offences should certainly be accompanied by decisive measures of the government aimed at gradual revocation of the immunity the officials currently possess.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the impact of the corruption component of the institutional environment upon the investment decisions of agents and the size of public gain. Within the framework of incomplete contract, it is demonstrated that consideration of the corruption component leads to one of two cases, one of which could be interpreted as extortion, and the other – as conclusion of a mutually beneficial corrupt deal. Special attention is given to the analysis of the capabilities of the agents for maximization of their personal gains, which are defined by their stimuli towards carrying out investments into the growth of mutual profit. It is demonstrated that in the case of extortion the stimuli of the agents diminish, resulting in the decrease of public gain. The determination is made on the existence of the baseline level of stake of the “corrupt tax”, exceeding which makes it preferable to transfer the right to leftover profit to the bribe extortionist. It is demonstrated that widespread practice of corrupt cooperation can lead to negative deformation of the structure of national economy.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the analysis and possibilities of the economic approach of Gary Becker towards the crime rate control problem. Special attention is given to the examination of the controlling effect of punishment. For description of the behavior of a criminal neutral towards the risk, the work employs a simple mathematical model of comparison of profit versus loss, which found its implementation in economic approach towards criminal and law enforcement activity. The profit of the criminal is the size of the “score”. The losses of the criminal consist in costs of preparation for the crime, its execution and the subsequent cover-up. Consideration of the possibility of being caught, as well as subsequent punishment of the criminal and the monetary equivalent of punishment, allows acquiring expression for the mathematical expectation of profit for the criminal. Within the framework of economic mathematical model the impact of various factors upon the amount of losses and the controlling effect of punishment are being analyzed. The conclusion is that the controlling effect of the punishment is in direct proportional dependence on the likelihood of punishment, thus in the case with a very low likelihood of punishment (such situation is characteristic for the corruption crimes in modern Russia), the increase in severity of punishment will not result in somewhat noticeable decrease in the number of corresponding crimes.

Abstract:  
The subject of this research is the corruption and portrait of a corruptionist in modern Russia, as well as the measures necessary for constraining corruption and further decrease in the level of its negative impact upon economy and society. The article disputes the views, according to which the successful fight against corruption requires enhanced nominal severity of punishment, up to the death penalty or incarceration for extra-long terms. Special attention is given to the description of the image of Russian corruption, its infiltration into the daily life, which encourages accepting it as a social norm. The research applies the economic approach to crimes and punishments. It is demonstrated that the established in Russian practice of fight against corruption marks the extremely high level of latency, which results in the inadmissibly low likelihood of punishment for the crime, and the nominally severe criminal responsibility. The author underline certain side results of the selective justice, which are capable of manifesting as factors that produce distortive effect upon the sociocultural norms and complicate the law enforcement activity. For achieving the sustainable trend towards the reduction in the level of corruption, it is necessary to increase the presumption of punishment alongside the decisive steps aimed at gradually depriving the officials of their “status inviolability”.
 

Abstract: The subject of this research is the reasons of transformation of matrimonial relations in the Christian world. The article contests the views and concepts, according to which the main causes of such transformation can be found either in tragic indifference to the traditional values and ideologies that lead to deformation of the perception of love, duty, and intergender relationships; or autonomy of the demographic processes manifesting as a key factor that defines changes in the economic and social spheres. Special attention is given to determination and analysis of the factors that had a stabilizing impact upon the traditional family in pre-industrial period, as well as such that caused certain inner tension. The research carries interdisciplinary characters with application of the economic approach. It is demonstrated that as a result of economic growth and realization of women’s ability to earn a living reached through industrialization, the level of her financial dependence from a man has significantly lowered. The further economic growth alongside women’s acquirement of economic independence resulted in revolutionary liberalization of gender morality and drastic changes in priorities within the system of family values and attitude towards marriage. The analysis of trends allows suggesting  that the established as a result of industrialization and urbanization nuclear quasi-planned family represents a certain transitional type from the traditional (patriarchal) family towards the new type of family with the inherent diversity of forms and models of relationship.

Abstract: The subject of the research is the analysis and applicability of Gary Becker's economic approach to crime control. In his research Tsurikov opposes to the idea of individual's rational behavior being purely egoistic in the common sense thereof. According to the author, interpreting  maximizing behavior as self-interested can make us to deny the economic approach and, consequently, impede efficient application of the economic approach to describing and analyzing various social phenomena and processes. By using a rather simple mathematical example, the author illustrates how application of arguments that describe emotional states of other individuals to the utility function of a rational economic agent allows to present such economic agent not only as a heartless egoist but also as a man-hater or absolute altruist. Special attention is paid to the ideas of Gary Becker's predecessors, in particular, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Detailed analysis is applied to a surprising similarity of conclusions regarding crime control that can be made on the basis of the economic approach and concept of a sociologist Émile Durkheim. While the economic approach proves that it is impossible to completely eliminate crime and that there is an optimal crime rate, social science presented by one of its founders postulates that every society has a normal and even 'useful' crime rate. Both approaches state that not all crimes must be solved and, therefore, some part of criminals should be left unpunished. 

Abstract:  
 The subject of this research is the traditional sexual morality in Christian world, and particularly in Orthodoxy, as well as the causes of formation of the most characteristic to it peculiarities. The author contests the opinions, according to which the main causes of the currently observed transformation of the marriage-family relations can be found in the tragic neglect of the traditional values and orientations that resulted in deformation of the ideas about love, responsibility, and relation between the genders. Special attention is given to the analysis of the influence of Christian asceticism upon the establishment of the traditional sociocultural norms that regulate sexual and reproductive behavior. The research carries an interdisciplinary character and is conducted primarily within the framework of the historical method, which allows determining the inner logic and prerequisites for changes in sexual morality, as well as the family and marriage institution.  The main conclusion consists in the following: the norms of Christian asceticism produced a tremendous and rather ambiguous effect upon the history of the Christian world. The negative side of such influence is expressed in the spread and imposing of the false and disingenuous attitude towards the sexual love and something “dirty” and sinful. In Russia alongside many Western European countries, the main reason for contraposition of the spiritual and carnal components of love between a man and a woman consisted in the early Christian asceticism, the initiator of which was Apostol Paul.
 

Abstract: The subject of this research is the excessiveness of the criminal law in modern Russia, as well as the problem of decriminalization of victimless crime. Based on the examples of several articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the author demonstrates a noticeable excessiveness in criminalization of certain types of behavior, and conditionality characteristic to the notion of “crime”. The main method of this research is the economic approach. Using the example of the illegal market of sex services, the article analyzes the correlation between the gains and costs justified by the existence of such ban for society as a whole, or specific social groups. It is highlighted that decriminalization of victimless crimes can be hindered due to the following factors: legislators, who are elected officials, can be dependent upon the senior (the most active) part of the electorate, which mainly supports traditional values; violators of the norms are not interested in legalizations of any actions, since the legalization will result in the growing level of competition, which in turn, leads to decrease of their income.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the impact of the natural conditions, in which the Eastern Slavic people have live and cultivated land, upon the formation of certain features of the Russian economic mentality. The author analyzes the role of the landscape specificities and geographical factors of the Eastern Europe concerning the establishment of peculiar attitude of the first settlers towards the surrounding space, as well as their place of residence and property. The specific environmental conditions necessitated the farmers towards the unequal work rhythm in the course of year, which later spread over the entire lifestyle of their descendants. Nature and climate dictated to the first settlers and their successors the difficult living conditions in the woody and swampy lands, forcing them to concentrate on farming and husbandry, which impeded development of the trade-economic relations, thus prolonging the economic lag behind Western Europe. The research is conducted primarily within the framework of the historical method, which allows determining the inner logic and prerequisites for education and strengthening of the certain mental characteristics. The main conclusion consists in the following: the popular among Eastern Slavic people fire–fallow form of cultivation forced the farmers to lead the migrating lifestyle, under the influence of which the mental characteristics of the migrants have formed.  

Abstract: Object of research is influence of weak security of the property rights to investment decisions of agents and on the size of public wealth. In the conditions of insufficient security of the property rights and the contract law agents, in addition to investment into increase in a comprehensive income, perform additional investments into post-contractual redistribution of negotiation force. In article influence of need of private protection of the property rights or temptation for their redistribution in own favor at investment choice of agents and, respectively, at a size of cumulative usefulness is analyzed. The method of a research consists in mathematical modeling. Within model of the incomplete contract the analysis of behavior of partners in the modes reliably and unreliably protected property rights is carried out. In the conditions of poorly protected rights cases of limited and unrestricted resources which agents have are considered. It is shown that in both cases need of protection of the rights to a comprehensive income turns into decrease in incentives for investment into increase in the income that negatively affects the size of cumulative usefulness. In case of limited resources in respect of creation of additional value the agent yields more effective with other things being equal to less effective agent in that amount of investments which go to redistribution of the rights to the income. The advantage in poskontraktny redistribution of the rights is got by richer and/or less effective agents. The conclusion that less effective and richest owners can be interested in a situation in case of which the property rights and the contract law are protected insufficiently reliably is drawn. In article only the verbal method of a statement of the received results is used.