Abstract: The subject of the study is the problem of the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in Soviet-Chinese relations in the early 1920s. The object of the research is Soviet–Chinese diplomatic relations in the context of resolving the issue of the CER as a key economic, transport, and strategic asset in Manchuria. The article analyzes the contradiction between the officially proclaimed renunciation by the Soviet state of unequal treaties and the actual practice of maintaining control over former Russian positions in China. Particular attention is paid to the manifesto of L. M. Karakhan of July 25, 1919, which became an important instrument of Soviet diplomacy under conditions of international isolation, as well as to its subsequent transformation and revision in the early 1920s. The central research problem is to explain the reasons and mechanisms behind the transition of the Soviet state from anti-imperialist rhetoric and the declared readiness to transfer the CER to China to a policy aimed at preserving its dominant position on the railway through the agreements of 1924 concluded with the Beijing government and the government of Zhang Zuolin. The significance of this issue is reinforced by its historiographical debatability. Scholarly literature offers various interpretations of both the content of Karakhan’s manifesto and the motives of the Soviet side, ranging from the influence of the military-political situation during the Civil War to a deliberate combination of ideological and pragmatic considerations. The study employs the method of historicism, which предполагает analyzing phenomena in their development, interconnection, and conditionality within specific historical contexts. The novelty of the research lies in the use of both published sources and newly introduced archival materials from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), allowing the author to examine understudied aspects of Soviet–Chinese relations related to the CER issue in 1919–1925. Special attention is given to the contradiction between official Soviet declarations on the renunciation of unequal treaties and the actual diplomatic practice aimed at preserving control over the Chinese Eastern Railway. Based on archival documents, the article analyzes the content and political significance of Karakhan’s manifesto, the negotiation process between the USSR, the Beijing government, and the authorities of Manchuria, as well as the mechanisms that enabled the Soviet side to consolidate its influence over the CER through the agreements of 1924.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the internal logic of the Soviet negotiation strategy in concluding the fishing convention with Japan from 1922 to 1928 and the transformation of the Soviet side's demands during the negotiations. The object of analysis is the diplomatic and economic mechanisms of Soviet-Japanese interaction, including the use of the fishing issue as a tool for pressure, where economic concessions were linked to political demands, such as the evacuation of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin and Japan's actions in Manchuria. The initial demands are examined – reserving up to 35% of fishing areas for state enterprises and extending the concession regime to canning factories – and their subsequent softening. Special attention is given to the convention of January 23, 1928, which established mechanisms for sovereign control, as well as the connection of the negotiation process with internal decisions and the outcomes of implementing the agreement in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The methodological basis of the study consists of the principle of historicism, the comparative-historical method, as well as document analysis and reconstruction of the negotiation process. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the reconstruction of the course of Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the fishing convention from 1922 to 1928 in historical and chronological order, which made it possible to reveal the logic of changes in the Soviet side's negotiation strategy. The main conclusions are the establishment of the regularity of the sequential softening of initial demands – including reserving up to 35% of fishing areas for state enterprises and extending the concession regime to all canning factories – under the influence of the threat of disrupting the fishing season and the tactics of Japanese diplomacy. It is shown that the convention of January 23, 1928, established new mechanisms for sovereign control that were absent in the 1907 agreement, including regulation of labor relations, a system of deductions from canned production, and the provision of 20% of fishing areas to state enterprises without auctions. It has been revealed for the first time that a secret resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars was adopted on September 23, 1927, creating an internal legal framework for the industry. It was established that as a result of the 1929 auctions, the share of Soviet sections increased from 14% to 36%, and in 1934, the production of canned goods reached 55.4%, exceeding the Japanese production.