The Problem of the Correlation between Ideological Declarations and the Pragmatic Policy of the USSR in the Issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway (1919–1924)

Gerasimov Dmitrii Igorevich PhD in History Lecturer; Historical and Archival Institute; Russian State University for the Humanities Associate Professor; Institute of the Russian Language; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 125047, Russia, Moscow, Tverskoy district, Miusskaya pl., 3 p. 6 dmitriigerasimovtmb@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Problem statement

Railways in China at the beginning of the 20th century acted not only as an economic infrastructure, but also as an important instrument of political and geopolitical influence. Control over them allowed external powers to penetrate into the interior of the country, gain a foothold outside the treaty ports and form stable zones of influence. In this regard, the China-Eastern Railway (hereinafter referred to as the CER) occupied a special place, representing not just a transport line, but a key element of regional control in Manchuria. The role of the CER grew especially in the context of international rivalry, since ownership of the railway network meant de facto control over the territory and its resources. Manchuria, through which the CER passed, turned into a space where the interests of several powers intersected, where the railway infrastructure became the basis of a political and military presence. In this sense, railways performed not only economic functions, but also acquired strategic importance, acting as a means of ensuring military mobility and consolidating influence. As a result, the CER found itself at the center of international contradictions and became the object of a struggle for control in which economic, military and diplomatic aspects were closely intertwined. It was this circumstance that largely determined its special place in the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet state after the October Revolution. Under these conditions, the analysis of the position of the Soviet leadership, recorded in the first declaration of L. M. Karakhan in 1919, in which the main approaches to the issue of the CER, the Chinese people, and the governments of Southern and Northern China were formulated, is of fundamental importance^[1]. Consideration of this document makes it possible to identify a contradiction between the proclaimed principles of abandoning the imperialist legacy and the practical line of maintaining control over the CER.

In recent years, the problem of the declaration of L. M. Karakhan, the status of the CER and, in general, Soviet-Chinese relations in the early 1920s continues to be actively developed in Russian historiography, which in itself indicates the continued relevance and discussion of this topic. The emergence of new studies on both Soviet policy in China and the diplomatic, legal, and international aspects of the CER issue shows that many subjects still require clarification and rethinking. This is indicated by the works of V. G. Datsyshen^[2], I. N. Sotnikova^[3], D. A. Malyuchenko^[4], P. N. Dudin^[5] and other researchers addressing various aspects of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in the Far East. The continuing interest in this issue is explained both by the complexity of the source base and by the presence of controversial issues related to the content of the declaration of L. M. Karakhan, the evolution of Soviet policy towards the CER and the relationship of ideological declarations with the foreign policy practice of the USSR. At the same time, it should be noted that this issue occupies an important place in English-language historiography, where it is also considered one of the key issues for understanding Soviet-Chinese relations in the post-revolutionary period. Foreign researchers pay special attention to the issues of ownership, management and political control over the CER in the 1920s, which for a long time remained uncertain and contradictory.

To date, historiography has not developed a unified approach to assessing the nature and extent of control over the CER. Thus, Tao Xingzhang^[6] noted the presence of a "dual control" system on the road. In turn, Sou-Teng Leong^[7] considered the processes taking place in Manchuria in line with "decolonization", believing that the Chinese side had assumed the functions of the supreme administration of the CER for a certain period. A different position is held by Bruce Elleman^[8], who believes that, despite the revolutionary upheavals, the Soviet Union managed to regain control over most of the railway. According to Blaine Chiasson^[9], China was trying to consolidate its own influence, while taking into account the continued Russian presence. Finally, Yiwei Cheng^[10] comes to the conclusion that "parallel power structures" exist on the CER^[11].

In this regard, it seems necessary to proceed to the analysis of the specific historical conditions in which the Soviet policy towards the CER was formed after the October Revolution. Of particular importance is the consideration of the role of the railway as a strategic resource and instrument of influence of the USSR in Manchuria, as well as an assessment of its place in the system of foreign policy priorities of the Soviet state in the early 1920s. An appeal to the actual development of events allows us to trace how the CER turned from an object of declarative statements into a key element of the practical diplomatic strategy of the USSR in China.

The Declaration of L. M. Karakhan and the problem of the CER in Soviet-Chinese relations

After the October Revolution, the Soviet government gradually regained its positions in a significant part of the territories of Manchuria adjacent to the CER line. Under these conditions, the road acquired special importance, becoming an important element of Soviet policy in China and one of the main channels of influence in the region. Even during periods of aggravation of relations around the CER, in particular in 1926, its strategic role remained obvious and emphasized at the highest party level.The importance of the CER was also emphasized in party discussions. At the July plenum of the Central Committee and Central Committee of the CPSU(b), N. I. Bukharin considered the railway as an important strategic resource and a means of the USSR's political presence in China. Criticizing the position of the opposition, which proposed to abandon the road as an onerous asset, he insisted on preserving this tool, pointing out the inadmissibility of abandoning political opportunities, despite the attendant difficulties^[12].

A special place in the formation of the Soviet approach to the Chinese direction was occupied by the declaration of L. M. Karakhan of July 25, 1919, which consolidated the basic guidelines of Soviet Russia's foreign policy. The document declared a break with the practice of unequal agreements, cancellation of obligations for payments related to the events of the Boxer rebellion, and, according to one interpretation, it was supposed to transfer the CER to China without financial conditions. In addition, the waiver of rights to economic resources and concessions previously owned by pre-revolutionary Russia was announced. The final part of the declaration emphasized the idea of a political rapprochement between the two States on an anti-imperialist basis.The appearance of this document was associated with the need for Soviet Russia to break out of international isolation and seek the support of Chinese public opinion. In this sense, the declaration has become an important tool for diplomatic positioning and has played a significant role in establishing contacts with Beijing. Later, its provisions were repeatedly discussed and interpreted during the Soviet-Chinese dialogue. It is characteristic that already at the stage of publication, the content of the declaration changed. In the original version, published in July 1919, there was a mention of the CER, but in a later publication in Izvestia (August 1919) this paragraph was deleted. This transformation of the text created the opportunity for a flexible diplomatic interpretation: subsequent interpretations allowed for the idea of compensation, and then Soviet policy finally shifted towards the rejection of the transfer of the railway to China^[13].

The pamphlet by V. D. Vilensky-Sibiryakov, published in 1919 by an employee of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, apparently reflected one of the early versions of the declaration by L. M. Karakhan and contained a provision on the gratuitous transfer of the CER to China.: "The Soviet government renounced all the conquests that the tsarist government had made by taking Manchuria and other regions from China. Let the peoples living in these areas decide for themselves which State they want to be in and what kind of government they want to establish. The Soviet government returns to the Chinese people, without any remuneration, the East China Railway, as well as all mining, forestry, gold and other concessions seized under the tsarist government, under the Kerensky government and during the actions of Horvat, Semenov, Kolchak, Russian generals, merchants and capitalists"^[14].

In historiography, the question of the original content of the declaration remains controversial. The very existence of the formula about "transfer without compensation" in one of the sources does not give grounds to unequivocally consider it part of the source text. Probably, such a position could be used by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as a tactical diplomatic device designed to attract the Chinese side, without the intention of actually relinquishing control over the railway. In particular, American researcher Allen Whiting links the content of the declaration to a specific military and political situation during the Civil War. The picture of tension in the Far East reflected in Vilensky's brochure, caused by the rivalry of external forces and military instability, sets the context for understanding the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Under these conditions, Moscow's policy in the summer of 1919 was shaped by uncertainty on the eastern borders of the former empire. Vilensky's materials indicate that in July doubts remained about the ability to keep the CER: "But the feverish spirit of the upcoming battle is felt not only by America and Japan, but also by other members of the big five who have their own interests in the Far East. We recently had a report from the London newspaper Export that part of the British fleet, consisting of one armored cruiser, four new light cruisers, 18 destroyers and 11 submarines, will be in Chinese waters. This message greatly agitated Japanese public opinion. Two hours after the publication of this note, the Japanese Admiralty announced that the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters was on full alert. This is the situation in the Far East, i.e., where the defeated Siberian reaction is now fleeing and where it is destined to perish"^[15]. However, already in August, the military-political situation changed: the defeat of the white forces in Siberia led to the strengthening of Soviet positions and became a factor in the revision of foreign policy guidelines: "for Soviet Russia, the time for active policy in the Far East is coming again"^[16].

Allen Whiting^[17] links the content of the declaration to the military-political situation of 1919. In his opinion, the decisions of the Soviet leadership were determined by the instability of the situation on the eastern front of the Civil War. As follows from Vilensky-Sibiryakov's brochure, doubts remained about the possibility of holding the CER in July, but by mid-August, after the defeat of the white forces in Siberia, the position of the Soviet government had strengthened, which influenced the subsequent adjustment of its course. A similar interpretation is expressed by the American researcher Sou-Teng Leong, who largely shares the arguments of A. Whiting. At the same time, he offers a different interpretation of what happened, pointing to the presence of two different approaches within the Soviet foreign policy leadership. In his opinion, Soviet diplomats and politicians were divided into conditional groups of "realists" and "idealists", which largely determined the fluctuations and inconsistency of the current line regarding the CER ^[18].

B. Elleman suggests considering this problem through the prism of analyzing the 1924 agreements, believing that they make it possible to clarify the logic of Soviet diplomacy. In his opinion, the existence of different editions of the declaration of L. M. Karakhan was not accidental, but reflected the conscious strategy of the Soviet leadership. One version of the document focused on ideological influence and served a propaganda function, helping to accelerate the negotiation process with the Beijing government. The other line was forward-looking and assumed that more favorable terms would be obtained during subsequent negotiations. Under these conditions, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs varied the interpretations of the declaration, adapting them to the current foreign policy objectives in the Chinese direction. The promise to return the CER was used primarily as a means of involving the Chinese government in negotiations, which was achieved by 1921^[19].

The Foreign Ministry of the RSFSR sought to influence the Chinese intellectual environment, contributing to the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the formation of the CPC. After achieving these goals, the issue of the original wording of L. M. Karakhan's declaration, including the version on the gratuitous transfer of the road, remains controversial^[20]. Regardless of the interpretation, the declaration was used as a political mechanism that made it possible to re-establish control over a significant part of the CER^[21].

From declaration to practice: Soviet Policy towards the CER (1920-1924)

In 1920-1924, the Chinese authorities established control over the CER exclusion zone. At the same time, the changes were implemented in such a way that the situation of the Russian population did not significantly deteriorate: living and working conditions were generally preserved. Despite the dissatisfaction with the abolition of extraterritoriality and fears for the future, the interaction between the Russian and Chinese sides has become more intense. This situation was caused by the peculiarities of the political structure of the region, the existence of a system of balances and compromises, as well as the relative flexibility of the political practice of the Republic of China. The creation of the Far Eastern Republic on the border territory and the abandonment of the policy of "war communism" by Soviet Russia in 1921 had an additional impact.

The beginning of the settlement of the CER issue in 1920 was associated with the restoration of contacts with the Beijing government. The reaction to the declaration of L. M. Karakhan was the severance in September 1920 of ties with representatives of the former Russian diplomacy, who had retained their positions since the time of the Provisional Government. At the same time, L. M. Karakhan's statement itself was rather declarative in nature: in the absence of real control over the railway, it probably served as a diplomatic instrument of influence and by no means meant the intention of real concessions by the young Soviet government. At the same time, Wang Jinzhong drew attention to the risk of further destabilization: in his assessment, Manchuria had repeatedly become a zone of armed conflict and retained the potential to become the center of a new international conflict. In this situation, he emphasized the key role of the CER as a factor of regional tension and pointed out the need to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations. At the same time, in a letter to Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing, he noted that the current international situation creates a favorable window of opportunity for China. The weakening of Russia's position and its confrontation with Japan, with limited activity by other powers, opened up prospects for reviewing property issues related to the railway^[22]. On October 2, 1920, L. M. Karakhan, during a meeting with the Chinese military mission in Moscow, presented an updated program for building Soviet-Chinese relations, providing for other conditions for interaction.

In general, the new declaration reproduced the main provisions of the 1919 declaration: it was supposed to cancel the previous Russian-Chinese treaties, renounce the "boxer" indemnity, liquidate Russian concessions without compensation, as well as the abolition of extraterritorial rights for Russian subjects in China. At the same time, it contained a new provision concerning the CER. It was proposed to conclude a special agreement on the procedure for its use with the participation of not only the RSFSR and China, but also the Far Eastern Republic, as well as to resolve related issues in subsequent agreements. This formulation indicated the desire of the Soviet side to maintain a certain influence on the functioning of the railway. Despite the seemingly accommodating nature of the proposals, they actually transformed the model of Soviet-Chinese cooperation on the issue of the CER. The ambiguity of the wording created space for different interpretations and contributed to the involvement of the Beijing government in the negotiation process^[23]. Despite the seemingly generous nature of L. M. Karakhan's proposals, they actually changed the very structure of Soviet-Chinese relations on the issue of the CER. The ambiguity and ambiguity of the wording regarding the status of the railway allowed the NKID to persuade the Beijing government to start the negotiation process.

The appointment of A. K. Paikes as the first official representative of the Soviet state in China in 1921 marked the transition to a new stage of Soviet-Chinese contacts on the issue of the CER. A. K. Paikes pointed out the incorrect understanding by the Chinese side of the contents of the first declaration of L. M. Karakhan and urged not to focus on its discrepancies^[24].

After replacing the representative in 1922, A. A. Ioffe continued his policy of convincing the Chinese leadership of the need to introduce joint management of the CER. In response to the reproaches of the Chinese side, which pointed out the inconsistency of the new proposals with previous statements, Ioffe referred to the text of the declaration of July 25, 1919, which the Soviet mission had and did not contain direct obligations to transfer the CER. It was not possible to reach an agreement. Under these conditions, on August 8, 1923, L. M. Karakhan was sent to China with expanded powers. His mission involved the simultaneous solution of two tasks: normalization of relations with the Government of the Republic of China and support for the revolutionary movement. He had four tasks: restoring diplomatic contacts, protecting the interests of the USSR, and negotiating with Zhang Zuolin on the issue of the CER. At the same time, Karakhan was instructed to establish cooperation with the southern government of Sun Yat-sen and promote its political strengthening^[25]. The negotiations with Zhang Zuolin were of particular importance, since his policy in Manchuria was determined by the desire to establish control over the region's railway infrastructure. He developed a three-pronged strategy for the development of railways, including ousting Russian influence, limited cooperation with Japan in order to curb its expansion, as well as the construction of its own lines to weaken the position of foreign powers. Zhang Zuolin formed special security units and placed them along the railway line, hoping to claim it in the future. At the same time, the struggle for the CER was not limited to the confrontation between the Soviet and Manchurian sides. Other powers also sought to use the current situation to their advantage, fearing the strengthening of Japanese influence in the region.

I.N. Sotnikova, in a recently published article^[26], rightly notes: "Such geographical dispersion of tasks was explained by the peculiarity of the political situation in China, which was called the "era of the militarists." A country dependent on Western powers with a weak central government in Beijing, it was split between militant groups that disregarded any laws and possessed their own governments and armed forces. There were several centers of influence among the groups: in the northeast of the country, the pro-Japanese Fengtian faction of Zhang Zuolin; the central Beijing government led by President Cao Kun, dependent on the leading powers and under the influence of the head of the Zhilian militant group Wu Peifu; and, finally, the democratic government of Sun Yat–sen in the south in Canton (Guangzhou)."^[27]. These groups of warlords have been fighting each other for control of the Beiyang government for almost two decades. Despite frequent leadership changes, the various Beiyang regimes have managed to standardize the width of the railway gauge throughout China. They have upgraded the system and improved the service; in addition, they have implemented a national management system through the introduction of regulations and a unified form.

Major military leaders had the ability to concentrate significant financial and material resources needed to develop the railway network. At the same time, there were many less influential military leaders who had scattered and poorly organized armed formations; they established control over individual sections of tracks and stations within the territories under their control. For example, Zhang Xun held the site in the Xuzhou area on the Jingpu Line under his control, while Ni Sichong's influence extended to the Benbu station. Similar examples were widely distributed. The railways were considered by the military leaders as the most important strategic resource, however, in the conditions of armed clashes they simultaneously became objects of primary seizure^[28].

Upon arrival in Beijing, L. M. Karakhan confirmed the readiness of the Soviet state to develop friendly relations with China. During a conversation with Foreign Minister Gu Weijun on January 18, 1924, he informally outlined the position of the Soviet side regarding the impossibility of the gratuitous transfer of the CER. The main arguments included potential economic losses caused by previously invested funds, China's internal political fragmentation, the presence of anti-Soviet forces, and the likelihood of increased Japanese influence if the USSR relinquished control of the railway.

However, a significant part of these arguments does not seem convincing enough. The economic aspect was not crucial, since a significant proportion of investments belonged to foreign holders, and some of the Russian depositors were outside the borders of Soviet Russia. Obligations to foreign shareholders, primarily French ones, as well as to financial structures associated with the former regime, created an additional difficulty.

The 1924 Agreement on the CER

In these circumstances, Wellington Koo found it advisable to focus on concluding an equal agreement on the CER, postponing the issue of compensation. However, on February 27, 1924, L. M. Karakhan adjusted his position, declaring his readiness for compromise. Abandoning the previous concept of joint management, he allowed China to transfer formal control over the road and the surrounding area, while preserving for the USSR the right of transit through Manchuria to Vladivostok and the possibility of subsequent purchase of the road. At the same time, the proposed management scheme provided for the creation of a board of directors with equal representation of the parties. Despite the declared equality, the institutional structure provided the Soviet side with key positions: control over the audit body and the appointment of a manager. The principle of "uniformity" was interpreted not as an actual distribution of positions, but as a formal equality of rights, which made it possible to maintain a predominant influence with the necessary human resources^[29]. According to the draft, strategic decisions were assigned to the board of directors, while their implementation was transferred to the Chief Executive Officer. However, the high quorum and the requirement for almost unanimous decision-making made the Council vulnerable: if Russian representatives did not participate or abstained, its work was blocked, which effectively ensured the dominance of the chief executive.

L. M. Karakhan enlisted the support of the Kuomintang and Sun Yat-sen through public opinion: "On this point, I will have public opinion on my side, and especially the professors and students, they had to agree... This point is, of course, of great importance to us, because the order of expenditure on which I will insist will be Our representative should take part in a committee that will distribute and manage the spending of these amounts. This will give us the opportunity, firstly, to create a number of Chinese educational institutions with our influence, where we can attract our teachers to study the Russian language and, in general, with these funds we can create an instrument of our propaganda, an instrument of our cultural and educational activities in China"^[30].

The decision of the United Front in favor of joint management of the CER actually predetermined the position of the Chinese side: Foreign Minister Gu Weijun was deprived of the opportunity for maneuver, and L. M. Karakhan's proposals were accepted. Following this, L. M. Karakhan, together with Wang, prepared a draft agreement as soon as possible, which was completed by March 1, 1924. In correspondence with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, he described the position of the CER in the draft as follows: "Article seven concerns the issue of the CER. I think the People's Commissariat of Finance may be quite satisfied with this article, since Sokolnikov insisted on buying back the road as one of the possible ways to resolve it. This article caused the most controversy. I will write about this in particular after we have signed the agreement. Now I just want to point out that it doesn't actually give China anything. Formally, it means our consent to the early purchase of KVZH, but, firstly, the conference should determine the figure of the purchase amount, which, of course, based on the calculation of the People's Commissariat of Finance will reach 600-700.000.000 gold rubles, then the reservation that the purchase should be made with national funds of China, also makes it impossible for China this ransom will be made someday, because in the current financial situation, when the cabinet crisis often depends on the fact that the finance minister cannot get 1-2 million to pay off officials, of course, the possibility of paying such a large amount is excluded, and we, of course, will insist that the road can be It will be transferred only after the entire amount has been fully paid to the Russian government. The point that we assume responsibility to shareholders and creditors before February 1, 1917, should not frighten anyone, because we ourselves are the only creditors. According to clause 8 of this contract, we have the right to transit troops and military materials via this railway.… We determine the budget of the road, and this is the main instrument of our pressure on the Chinese, on the employees, on all the fate of the road"^[31].

The main parameters of the agreement were approved by the Beijing government on March 13. However, by March 24, L. M. Karakhan noted the increased external influence from Japan, the United States and, above all, France, which issued an official note against the settlement of the CER issue without its participation. In the Soviet assessment, this protest was seen as an attempt to prevent the conclusion of an agreement, and its legal grounds were considered extremely unconvincing and not supported by available documents.^[32]. Despite this, the Chinese side has not changed its line. The signing of the draft by Wang Zhengting on March 14, as well as subsequent clarifications from Chinese authorities, indicated that foreign pressure did not have a significant impact on the negotiations. The final settlement took place only in May 1924, after about a two-month pause. In the part concerning the CER, the agreement consolidated its status as a commercial enterprise, allowed for the possibility of subsequent purchase by the Chinese side with the definition of conditions at a special conference, imposed responsibility on the USSR for pre-revolutionary obligations and excluded the participation of third powers. Until the final settlement, the joint management regime was maintained, and previous contractual acts, including the 1896 agreement, continued to operate temporarily^[33].

A crucial role was played by the reservation in the preamble of the ninth article, which provides for the postponement of the discussion of the CER to a separate conference. Thanks to this, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was given the opportunity not to rush to convene it, in fact postponing the final settlement^[34]. Against the background of the confrontation between the Beijing government and the Fengtian Group, L. M. Karakhan managed to realize key tasks. The result was the signing of an agreement on May 31, 1924, supplemented by a number of related documents. The decisions made strengthened the position of the Soviet state: control over the expenditure of funds on contributions after the Yihetuan uprising came under its influence, the possibility of the presence of the Soviet military in Mongolia was fixed, and the rights to concessions previously owned by Russia were confirmed. At the same time, the Soviet government formally renounced its former advantages, including extraterritorial privileges and consular jurisdiction, which meant recognition of Chinese sovereignty. Despite the fact that all contradictions were not resolved, the agreement was of fundamental importance.: It formed a new format of relations and was accompanied by the restoration of diplomatic contacts, which corresponded to one of the priorities of Soviet policy^[35].

Zhang Zuolin did not recognize the agreement, which called into question its implementation. In response, the Soviet leadership began to consider more drastic options. At a meeting with Wellington Koo on June 14, 1924, Karakhan outlined a dilemma: either the central government ensures the implementation of the agreement in the controlled territories, or the RSFSR will be forced to negotiate directly with the Mukden regime^[36]. However, G. V. Chicherin's position changed his line of conduct: by opposing the agreement with Mukden, he actually focused the negotiations on the central government, while at the same time supporting the course of delaying the conference on the CER^[37]. Formally, its opening was planned for the end of June 1924, but L. M. Karakhan insisted at the negotiations on June 28 that the convocation was only formal and should be postponed until the conditions for joint management of the road were fulfilled. The Soviet side proceeded from the fact that discussion was impractical before the implementation of the agreements already reached.

Wellington Koo limited himself to a restrained reaction, expressing the expectation that L. M. Karakhan would receive appropriate instructions for the start of the conference. Soon, G. V. Chicherin, having revised the initial position regarding the regime of Zhang Zuolin, began to adjust it^[38]. Wellington Ku refrained from direct accusations of violating the agreement, limiting himself to waiting for confirmation of L. M. Karakhan's credentials for the start of the conference^[39].

Meanwhile, G. V. Chicherin revised his position regarding the regime of Zhang Zuolin: recognizing the desirability of an agreement with Mukden, he insisted on the inadmissibility of differences between treaties with central and regional governments, proposing to unify their contents with separate clarifications^[40]. As a result, negotiations with Zhang Zuolin were initiated with formal notification from Beijing, which ended on September 20, 1924 with the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the government of the three eastern provinces.

The document as a whole reproduced the provisions on the CER: its commercial status was consolidated, the purchase by the Chinese side was allowed, the terms of the concession (reduced to 60 years) were clarified, and the revision of the 1896 agreement was envisaged within four months. An innovation was the article on the mutual restriction of political campaigning. The Soviet state was not formally included in the list of powers in respect of which China planned to eliminate the concession regime, since it had previously renounced the relevant rights in the 1924 agreement^[41] Nevertheless, publications in the Chinese press indicated no intention to make any exceptions in the issue of restoring sovereignty^[42].

Two agreements in 1924 – with Beijing (May 31) and Mukden (September 20) – set the further line of Soviet policy, while they were concluded with a departure from the proclaimed rejection of "behind-the-scenes" diplomacy. At the same time, the USSR regained control over the personnel system of the CER, despite previous declarations that allowed for the possibility of its transfer to China. The agreement with Japan of January 20, 1925, which provided for mutual recognition of spheres of influence on railway lines in Manchuria, also helped to consolidate positions. The signing of the Mukden Agreement was due to the inability of the Beijing government to implement the agreements of 1924; in March 1925 it was recognized as their complement. Zhang Zuolin probably acted based not only on external pressure, but also on pragmatic considerations^[43].

In historiography, the reasons for this step are interpreted in different ways. Thus, G. S. Kretina associates it with the desire to eliminate the use of the CER by counterrevolutionary forces^[44]. R. A. Mirovitskaya points out the influence of Sun Yat-sen's position, expressed in a conversation with A. A. Ioffe^[45]. N. E. Ablova emphasizes the priority of the early entry of the USSR into the management of the road as a key motive^[46]. Zheng Yangwen in his recently published monograph "Railway Imperialism in China: a Political Biography" concludes that after the stabilization of the USSR in China by 1924, the Soviet leadership actually reproduced the practice of pre-revolutionary foreign policy, replacing the agreements concluded by the tsarist government with new agreements. At the same time, according to the researcher, Soviet policy differed little from imperial policy, representing a peculiar variant of "Bolshevik imperialism." The agreements concluded largely reproduced the previous conditions, and the proclaimed principle of joint management of the CER was not fully implemented in practice^[47].

A comparison of these assessments allows us to conclude that the practical steps of the Soviet leadership went beyond the initially stated principles and reflected, above all, the pragmatic objectives of consolidating control over the CER. This, in turn, was reflected in the changing nature of Soviet propaganda. On the one hand, official rhetoric continued to appeal to the rejection of unequal treaties and demonstrate commitment to anti-imperialist attitudes. On the other hand, the importance of the CER as a key economic and strategic resource providing influence in Northern Manchuria was increasingly emphasized.

The final stage of this transformation was the agreement of February 26, 1925, under which the Soviet side actually agreed to a number of Japanese demands and at the same time took measures to consolidate its own influence, including making claims to territories related to the functioning of the CER. These actions were carried out without wide public publicity and did not cause a significant response in Chinese society, where anti-imperialist sentiments were mainly directed against other powers. In the long run, this line of behavior was ambivalent. On the one hand, it ensured that the Soviet Union retained control over the strategically important railway. On the other hand, it contributed to the formation in Chinese public opinion of the USSR as a more benevolent partner compared to other external actors. This, in turn, became one of the factors of the strengthening of the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the deepening of Soviet-Chinese relations in the subsequent period.

The main conclusions

1. The Declaration of L. M. Karakhan in 1919 became an important stage of Soviet policy in China, but its content and significance were controversial from the very beginning. The proclaimed renunciation of unequal contracts and promises regarding the CER were used by the Soviet state to establish relations with the Beijing government, strengthen its position in China and expand its political influence in conditions of international isolation.

2. In 1920-1924, Soviet policy on the CER issue evolved from revolutionary ideological rhetoric to a more pragmatic foreign policy course. While in the declarations the Soviet government emphasized the rejection of the imperialist legacy, during the negotiations with China it increasingly consistently sought to maintain a real position on the CER through the revision of previous formulations, delaying the final settlement and securing favorable conditions for the management of the road.

3. The 1924 agreements with the Beijing government and the Manchurian authorities consolidated the mechanism for maintaining Soviet control over the CER while formally recognizing the principle of joint management. Despite declarations of equality and the possibility of future purchase of the road by the Chinese side, the structure of the agreements reached provided the USSR with key administrative, financial and political levers of influence, which indicated the predominance of pragmatic interests over the initially stated ideological principles.

The article is published in the version approved by the reviewers (after receiving a positive review recommending the manuscript for publication) with corrections made by the author (after receiving the editor’s comments, if any).
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