Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the fishing convention (1922–1928): strategy, tactics, and diplomatic compromise

Gerasimov Dmitrii Igorevich PhD in History Lecturer; Historical and Archival Institute; Russian State University for the Humanities Associate Professor; Institute of the Russian Language; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 125047, Russia, Moscow, Tverskoy district, Miusskaya pl., 3 p. 6 dmitriigerasimovtmb@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Problem statement

The Soviet-Japanese fishing Convention, signed on January 23, 1928, was the result of two years of negotiations and is still controversial in research on the history of Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s. In Russian historiography, this topic was usually considered in the broader context of Soviet-Japanese relations: for example, L. N. Kutakov interpreted the fishing issue as part of the process of normalization of relations between the two countries. ^[1], V. E. Molodyakov — within the framework of a broad geopolitical concept of Russian-Japanese interaction ^[2]. The history of the industry in the Far Eastern dimension is presented in the works of A. T. Mandrik and E. A. Vorobyeva, which give a quantitative picture of Japanese dominance in the industry ^[3][4]; legal conflicts during the Japanese occupation of Northern Sakhalin were investigated by V. G. Datsyshen ^[5]. A comparative Russian-Japanese view of the negotiations of 1925-1932 is proposed in the MGIMO collective monograph ^[6], where the positions of both sides are considered in comparison (including in the chapters by Tomita Takeshi ^[7] and V. A. Grinyuk, Ya. A. Shulatov and A. S. Lozhkina ^[8]). In foreign historiography, the key difference remains in assessing the nature of Soviet concessions: Tomita Takeshi, based on Russian and Japanese archives, shows how both sides consistently compromised ^[9]; J. Lansen, analyzing the negotiation process based on materials from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, focuses on the tactics and tricks of Japanese diplomacy ^[10] Kaminaga Eisuke places the 1928 Convention in the triangle of Soviet-Japanese-American rivalry for the resources of the Bering Sea ^[11]. The general context of Soviet-Japanese diplomacy in 1918-1931 It is covered in the works of R. Hattori ^[12] and J. Ferguson ^[13]; Chinese historiography is represented by the study of Liu Zhongjing, who examines the Far Eastern rivalry between the USSR and Japan in the 20th century ^[14]. The difference between these positions is primarily in the question of to what extent the final agreement consolidated Japanese dominance, and to what extent it created a mechanism for its gradual displacement. This is the main historiographical problem to which this article is devoted. Its solution involves analyzing the internal logic of the Soviet negotiation strategy based on the documents of the Politburo in comparison with the text of the convention and the decree of 1923.

The source base of the article consists of published sources. The main body of diplomatic documentation is a two—volume collection "Moscow — Tokyo: politics and Diplomacy of the Kremlin. 1921-1931" ^[15], which includes notes and telegrams by G. V. Chicherin, B. S. Stomonyakov and L. M. Karakhan, resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party(b)/VKP(b) and transcripts of interdepartmental meetings. The decisions of the Politburo on the Japanese direction were also drawn from the collection "The CPSU(b), the Comintern and Japan. 1917-1941" ^[16]. The regulatory framework consists of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR dated March 2, 1923 on the procedure for the operation of fisheries in the Far East ^[17] and the fishing convention itself on January 23, 1928 with all protocols, published in the Collection of Existing Treaties ^[18]. The chronological scope of the article (1922-1928) is determined by the course of the negotiation cycle: from the first probes to the signing and the beginning of the application of the convention. The starting point of this cycle was the Russian-Japanese Fishing Convention of 1907 ^[19], a document that consolidated the results of Russia's military defeat and formally lasted until 1928, which, according to A. T. Mandrik, became "the economic price for military defeat" ^{[3, p. 191]}: its practical consequence was almost monopoly domination Japanese capital in the Far Eastern fishery — out of 252 offshore conventional sites, Japanese tenants invariably received about 207, while Russians accounted for from 15 to 18 percent of the fisheries and only 11 percent of the total production ^{[3, p. 192]}. Russian Russian side rejected Japan's most radical demands, but the final agreement granted Japanese entrepreneurs the right to set up processing plants, canneries and repair facilities on the Russian coast with the involvement of their own workforce: "Based on the fishing convention and using the extremely weak maritime security of the Russian Pacific coast, the Japanese uncontrollably operated in Russian territorial waters" ^{[20, p. 129]}. In 1907, of the 232 marine fishing plots put up for auction, the Japanese leased the vast majority, despite the fact that "6 plots were taken by Russian industrialists, the rest by the Japanese" ^{[4, p. 9]}. Moreover, the convention "not only did not solve the problems related to Japanese fishing, but also gave rise to new ones": its application was complicated by technical inconsistencies between maps of different departments, systematic violations by the Japanese with the connivance of local officials, as well as an acute "conflict of interests" between central and local Russian authorities ^[4]. Violations of the convention by the Japanese side were systematic from the very beginning: 183 violations were registered in 1909 alone, and the Russian government was deprived of real tools to prevent them ^{[1, pp. 329-330]}.

The fishing issue (1922-1925)

The Soviet-Japanese fisheries negotiations took place in conditions of incomplete normalization of relations: diplomatic ties had not yet been established, Japanese troops continued to hold Northern Sakhalin, and the Soviet fishing industry was seriously undermined by the war and intervention. By 1922, about 85% of the fisheries in the lower reaches of the Amur River and about 500 leased plots were under the control of the Japanese side (compared with 200 in 1917). For several years, the Sakhalin region and the Amur estuary actually functioned as a territory under Japanese control ^{[3, pp. 82, 92]}. Disagreements appeared from the very beginning: the Japanese side avoided linking military, political and economic issues, while Soviet diplomacy insisted on their comprehensive solution, considering a separate settlement unprofitable ^{[15, M. 36-38]}. The fishermen exerted constant pressure on the Japanese government to normalize relations; together with the naval circles, they formed a stable pro-Japanese-Soviet coalition ^{[1, 65-66] [21, pp. 28-29]}. Already at the Dairen Conference of 1921-1922, the Soviet side used the fishing issue as a means of pressure to force Japan to accept recognition. ^{[10, pp. 241-245.]}. The first result was the agreement of May 21, 1922: the Japanese side recognized Soviet sovereignty over territorial waters, 255 of 511 sites were leased. This was the first step towards legally regulated relations" ^{[2, p. 240]}.

In parallel, the USSR was forming a legal framework. The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of March 2, 1923 (Article 378) annulled all previous agreements in a single act — "all agreements, concessions, contracts and other conditions ... are annulled" (paragraph 1) — and established a new regime: the right to fish is granted "by leasing at public auction" to citizens of the USSR and foreigners on equal terms On the grounds (paragraph 2). Paragraph 10 is fundamentally important: preference at auctions is given to citizens of states with which the USSR has a "special agreement on fisheries" ^{[17, p. 676]}. Thus, the decree created a direct economic incentive for Japan to conclude an interstate fishing agreement sooner ^{[15, pp. 160-162]}. The legal conflict over the fisheries manifested itself even earlier: in December 1920, the Japanese military command declared all the fisheries of Northern Sakhalin under the jurisdiction of the Japanese army, which immediately provoked a note of protest from the Soviet side; an attempt to resolve the situation at the Changchun Soviet-Japanese Conference (September 1922) was unsuccessful ^{[5, pp. 203-204]}. At the same time, the People's Commissariat of Finance assessed the resources of Northern Sakhalin, determining the potential of fisheries at 250 million rubles; the total estimate of all the island's resources was about 1.5 billion gold rubles ^{[15, pp. 204-210.]} — these figures set the Soviet "question price" in all subsequent negotiations. By the autumn of 1923, G. V. Chicherin directly linked concessions, including fishing, with political concessions to Japan: the evacuation of troops from Northern Sakhalin and the normalization of relations ^{[15, pp. 226-228]}.

The legal outcome of the stage was the Beijing Convention on January 20, 1925. In terms of fisheries, it established a "frozen status quo": the 1907 convention was subject to revision, "and before that, the status quo for 1924 was maintained" ^{[2, p. 275]}. The convention specifically stipulated the revision of the 1907 Fisheries Convention ^{[1, p. 68]}. This mechanism did not consolidate Japanese privileges forever, but it also did not allow the USSR to immediately rebuild the fishing regime according to the decree of 1923, thereby inevitably pushing the parties to conclude a special agreement as soon as possible. It was an undoubted success of Soviet diplomacy. "The establishment of ties with Japan provided an opportunity for maneuver on the world stage" ^{[6, p. 334]}.

Formation of negotiating positions (1925-1926)

After the conclusion of the Beijing Treaty, the parties moved on to detailed negotiations, which began in December 1925 in Moscow. At the same time, the USSR had a vulnerable spot: the sale of Far Eastern fish products and the financing of the industry were largely dependent on the Japanese market, which significantly limited the opportunities for pressure ^{[15, pp. 403-408]}. The essence of the contradiction was as follows: the Soviet side sought a guaranteed quota of state fishing areas, while the Japanese sought to retain the rights previously secured under framework contracts ^{[9, pp. 330-334]}. The economic logic of the Soviet demands was determined by objective restrictions: the Far Eastern government had only the right to fishing grounds, but had no fishing facilities, equipment, or fleet ^{[3, pp. 103-104]}. By the end of March 1926, the Soviet leadership had formed a program document — "Basic provisions for the revision of the fishing convention with Japan" (March 29, 1926), which defined the basic guidelines of the negotiating position: the introduction of limited leases of fishing areas (1, 3 and 5 years), allowing only temporary seasonal development, and the consolidation of the principle according to which the activity of canning processing was allowed exclusively on a concessional basis ^{[22, pp. 23-24]}. The goal is to prevent the Japanese fishing industry from becoming a permanent infrastructure. The fishing issue was interdepartmental from the very beginning: the updated theses were coordinated interdepartmentally in March 1926 ^{[22, pp. 22-23]}.

The canning issue became the central conceptual conflict of the negotiations. The Soviet side drew a fundamental distinction between the right to fish and the right to process it: canneries, according to the Soviet position, can only be established in a concessional format. The Japanese side insisted on a broad interpretation of the 1907 convention, from which the right to processing automatically followed ^{[22, pp. 34-37]}. In August–September 1926, the Politburo and the subcommittee on Japanese Affairs consistently consolidated the Soviet line: By Decree of August 5, 1926, all Japanese canning enterprises with more than 20 workers were subject to mandatory concession, and the construction of new factories outside the concession order was prohibited ^{[22, p. 41]}. In parallel, People's Commissar G. V. Chicherin, in a Note to the Politburo dated September 6, 1926, described the logic of acceptable concessions: the USSR is ready to expand the geography of fishing and recognize the right to processing in exchange for restrained Japanese policy in Manchuria ^{[22, pp. 53-57]}. An interdepartmental meeting on September 14, 1926 specified the parameters: the quota for Soviet state—owned enterprises is reduced from 35% to 20%; the duration of the convention is up to 8 years; geographical expansion of fishing is permissible ^{[22, pp. 59-61]}. Economic concessions were informally linked to Japanese behavior in Manchuria, but were not officially recorded ^{[22, pp. 57-59]}.

The acute phase of negotiations (1927)

By the beginning of 1927, the negotiations were at an impasse. A note by B. S. Stomonyakov dated March 4, 1927 stated a crisis on the main issues: on the Amur Estuary, the Japanese side rejected any decisions that effectively deprived it of participation in the fishery; on issues of cooperation and the activities of state-owned enterprises, no compromise could be reached; the Soviet side stated that it could not sign the convention on the imposed conditions ^{[22, p. 99-101]}. The April package of Japanese proposals, analyzed by B. S. Stomonyakov in a report to Stalin dated April 5, 1927, was characterized as a comprehensive attempt to minimize Soviet control: cooperation is allowed to bid only up to a limit of 70 thousand pounds; mixed societies with any share of state capital are excluded from bidding; canneries go into safe mode without concession agreements ^{[22, pp. 108-111]}. The Politburo's reaction was tactical. The decree "On Japan" of April 7, 1927 ordered, if necessary, to cancel the auctions that had already taken place, to hold new ones with a guarantee to Japanese industrialists of their former sites, and to temporarily suspend cooperative organizations ^{[22, pp. 111-112]} — the USSR made a tactical sacrifice to keep Japan at the negotiating table. The delay in negotiations was asymmetrically disadvantageous for the USSR: the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, A. P. Serebrovsky, in a note to L. M. Karakhan dated May 10, 1927, pointed out that legal uncertainty paralyzed the entire fishing season — without approved tenders it was impossible to hire workers or organize the supply of fisheries ^{[22, pp. 123-125]}. By the middle of 1927, another key issue was at the center of negotiations — the regulation of working conditions at Japanese fish canneries. The Soviet side insisted on introducing an 8-hour working day and limiting overtime, while the Japanese side categorically rejected any labor regulations during the mass movement of fish ^{[22, pp. 125-128]}. B. S. Stomonyakov, in a Note to V. M. Molotov dated June 20, 1927, stated that it would not be possible to achieve concessions on the labor issue and The Soviet side will have to accept the Japanese conditions in order to complete the negotiations ^{[22, pp. 128-131]} — this is how the content of Protocol B subsequently developed.

In the summer of 1927, the Japanese side tightened its position. Despite the package of Soviet concessions outlined by Boris Stomonyakov on June 27, 1927, Ambassador Tanaka "very indifferently accepted these messages, avoiding discussing them," demonstrating "unwillingness to conclude a convention now" ^{[16, p. 40]}. The Japanese response on July 12, 1927, was a step backwards. Japan insisted on the right to initiate a review of the participation of cooperatives at any time, demanded the introduction of restrictions on their catches with the possibility of canceling already provided plots, sought to maintain an extended working day during fishing and opposed tax increases [22 pp. 143-148]. A note by N. P. Kolchanovsky to B. S. Stomonyakov dated July 29, 1927, qualified these requirements as a threat to the "fishing Brest-Litovsk": their adoption would consolidate control over 75% of the resources of the Soviet Far East for Japanese industrialists ^{[22, pp. 156-160]}. At the same time, the same N. P. Kolchanovsky was forced to admit that, following the results of previous negotiations, "the only major Japanese conquest was the legalization of canneries... The Japanese attempts to expand fishing rights for themselves in comparison with 1907 ended unsuccessfully for them; on the contrary, a number of issues were resolved in the sense of narrowing Japanese rights" ^{[22, p. 157]}. B. S. Stomonyakov, in a Note to L. M. Karakhan dated July 30, 1927, outlined a more fundamental danger: Japan was seeking more than just favorable terms, but the elements of the condominium in Soviet territorial waters are the actual elimination of the bidding system and the assignment of "historical" plots to the Japanese side without competitive procedures ^{[22, pp. 160-169]}.

Final compromise (September 1927 — January 1928)

The turning point came in the autumn of 1927. The resolution of the Politburo of September 15, 1927 read as follows: "To accept the NCID's proposal: to allow the NCID to conclude a fishing agreement with Japan on the basis of their latest proposal on the issue of participation in cooperative auctions" ^{[16, p. 41]}. This decision marked the official transition to a strategy of managed compromise. Already on October 10, 1927, negotiations were completed: the issue of cooperative rights "was settled on the basis of proposals made by the USSR delegate T. Karakhan" ^{[16, p. 41]}. At the same time, the USSR undertook a proactive legal maneuver: on September 23, 1927, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a classified decree on the right of Soviet citizens to open processing plants in fishing areas — the document entered into force only simultaneously with the convention and remained inaccessible to the Japanese side ^{[22, pp. 175-176]}. The mission of Viscount Goto Simpei (Moscow, December 1927), specially investigated by Tomita Takeshi, played a decisive role in the final approval ^[23]. The pro-Soviet lobby in Japan — naval circles and fishermen — provided Tanaka Giichi's cabinet with domestic political cover for signing the convention ^{[21, pp. 28-29]}. Ambassador Tanaka Tokichi "had been negotiating since his arrival in Moscow and had almost completed it, but he could not sign without special powers" ^{[2, p. 344]}; it was Goto who achieved their receipt. In a conversation with Ambassador Tanaka, G. V. Chicherin admitted: "The local population [of the Far East] is outraged by our concessions. All the local authorities are protesting that we have made so many concessions" ^{[10, p. 268]}. In a letter to Stalin dated January 16, 1928, the People's Commissar was frank: the Soviet formula "actually meant replacing Japanese demands with an empty phrase that gave them nothing, that is, it meant the surrender of Japan" ^{[22, p. 2221]}. On January 21, 1928, the Japanese government, allowing Tanaka to sign the convention without additional requests from Tokyo, ensured the final result, including under pressure from the dissolution of Parliament and the upcoming elections ^{[10, p. 268]}. On January 23, 1928, the convention was signed; by that time, the parties had held more than 160 meetings: 7 plenary sessions, about 81 meetings of plenipotentiaries and about 71 meetings of experts ^{[10, pp. 268-269]}.

The Convention consisted of a main text and three protocols. Article I granted Japanese subjects the right to fish along the coast of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, with the exception of 37 closed waters: 33 bays in the numbered list of Protocol A, plus four more (De Kastri Bay, St. Olga Bay, Peter the Great Bay, Posyet Bay) in a separate paragraph, closed to foreigners in general ^{[18, pp. 89-105, 94-96][24, p. 427]}. According to the 1907 convention, there were 34 closed water areas, and the number increased. Article II established the principle of public bidding, allowing exceptions for sites agreed by both parties. The final protocol (Part I) established the Soviet quota: state-owned enterprises receive plots without bidding in the amount of "no more than 2 million pounds, approximately corresponding to 20% of the total catch rate" [22. p. 329]. Protocol B regulated labor: an 8-hour working day, a minimum wage of at least 15 yen per month. Protocol C established share deductions from canning production: 20 kopecks from a crate of red fish, 40 kopecks from a crate of crab ^{[18, pp. 101, 104]}. The term of the convention is 8 years with a possible extension for 12-year periods (Art. XV). A comparison with the 1907 convention reveals a qualitative difference: it provided Japanese entrepreneurs with "full national treatment" ^{[22, p. 156]} without any tools of Soviet control; the 1928 convention was the first to legally fix labor regulation, shared contributions and a guaranteed quota for Soviet state-owned enterprises. According to the 1907 convention, Russian industrialists retained only 11-15% of the offshore areas in equal competition ^{[3, pp. 162-163]}; the new convention guaranteed the Soviet side a minimum threshold of presence regardless of the market outcome. According to the results of the first convention auctions in 1929, the Soviet industry leased 144 out of 423 (34%) plots, securing 18 plots previously owned by the Japanese ^{[22, pp. 329-330]}; in general, the number of Soviet plots increased from 42 in 1928 to 313 in 1930 ^{[25, p. 565]}. The Japanese share in the lease decreased from 86% in 1928 to 65% in 1929 and 51% in 1931 ^{[10, p. 332]}. Soviet Ambassador O. A. Troyanovsky, in an interview with Prime Minister Tanaka on April 25, 1929, explicitly stated that "the 1928 Convention gave the Japanese more rights than the 1907 convention" ^{[10, p. 325]} — nevertheless, it was the built-in mechanism of redistribution in favor of Soviet state-owned enterprises that determined the long-term trend. American researcher Bruce Hopper, analyzing the results of the first decade of the convention, showed that in 1924 Japan controlled 80% of the lease and 97% of canning production in the convention waters; by 1934, Soviet crab (55.4% of the total) exceeded Japanese for the first time, and Soviet fishing exports from the convention waters increased from 1.58 million gold rubles per year. 1928 to 20.34 million in 1933 ^{[25, pp. 566-567]}. The Convention was ratified by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on May 7, 1928, the instruments of ratification were exchanged on May 23 in Tokyo, and it entered into force on May 28, 1928 ^{[18, pp. 89-105]}. Even before it was signed, in 1927, the USSR created the Kamchatka Joint Stock Company (AKO), a large state—owned company described by local historians as the "Soviet answer" to Japan ^{[11, p. 48]}. AKO immediately began buying up plots: already in 1929, Soviet companies acquired 36% of all plots at auction against 14% in 1928; Soviet investments in fishing increased from 5 million rubles in 1928 to 18.8 million in 1929 [11. p. 48]. The Politburo resolution of March 14, 1929 consolidated the long—term course: Soviet citizens were instructed "not to assign to the Japanese the most important areas previously in use by the Japanese" ^{[16, p. 44]} - thus, the convention acted not as a finale, but as a starting point for the consistent displacement of Japanese capital.

A characteristic episode dates back to the autumn of 1927, when, when discussing the appointment of the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Tokyo, the board of the NKID opposed the candidacy of S. I. Aralov, pointing out his tendency to excessive concessions. His previous experience of negotiations with the Japanese side on the conclusion of a new fishing convention was cited as an argument ^{[2, p. 286]}. There was a position within the NCID that considered the compromises reached to be excessive. The contradiction between Chicherin–Karakhan's pragmatic line and the more rigid attitudes of part of the apparatus was an important internal political dimension of the negotiations, which was also reflected in the final content of the convention.

The main conclusions

The fishing issue was never considered on its own: from the very beginning, it was part of broader negotiations where economic concessions were linked to military and political interests.

The initial Soviet demands steadily declined under economic pressure and the tactical flexibility of Japanese diplomacy; the task of preventing the Japanese fishery from becoming a permanent infrastructure was only partially completed. At the same time, the classified resolution of September 23, 1927, adopted simultaneously with the convention, shows that the USSR considered the agreement not as a final settlement, but as a temporary compromise — a starting point for a consistent build-up of positions, which was confirmed by the revisions of 1932 and 1936.

A comparison of the conventions of 1907 and 1928 reveals the true significance of the final document. Despite the formal similarity of geography and principles of fishing, the 1928 convention contained fundamentally new elements of sovereign control that were absent in the 1907 regime: labor regulation (Protocol B), share deductions from canning production (Protocol C) and, most importantly, a quota of 20% for Soviet state—owned enterprises that received plots without bidding. According to the 1907 convention, Russian industrialists invariably retained only 11-15% of the offshore areas ^{[3, pp. 162-163]}; the 1928 convention legally guaranteed the Soviet side a minimum threshold of presence regardless of the outcome of market competition.

The article is published in the version approved by the reviewers (after receiving a positive review recommending the manuscript for publication) with corrections made by the author (after receiving the editor’s comments, if any).
Read all reviews on this article