The development of the Arab-Muslim direction of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy after 1979

Ostanin-Golovnya Vasily Dmitrievich ORCID: 0000-0001-5937-8786 Researcher; Department of Middle and Post-Soviet East; Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAS) 125284, Russia, Moscow, Polikarpova str., 9, sq. 95 ostanin-golovnya@yandex.ru

In the evolution of the Middle Eastern subsystem of international relations, 1979 can be interpreted not only as the beginning of the so-called "Islamic awakening", but also as a key date marking a turning point in the political and ideological space of the region. This year's events, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the seizure of the al-Haram Mosque in Mecca by radical Salafists, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, significantly influenced the trajectory of Saudi Arabia's development.

After the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, his brother Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz took the throne, whose reign lasted until 1982. Despite the fact that modern researchers such as William B. Quandt consider his leadership to be less effective, this period was a time of significant transformations in the country's public policy. The actual management of the kingdom, as is known, was in the hands of Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, who carried out large-scale changes both internally and in foreign policy ^{[1, p. 79-80.]}.

During the reign of King Khalid, there was a relative decrease in tensions within the Al Saud dynasty, which contributed to the continuation of the reform process initiated under Faisal. This period was marked by the active development of the civil infrastructure and a significant increase in the welfare of the country. By the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia had achieved a high level of economic development, becoming one of the leading states both in the Middle East and globally. The growth of the state's oil revenues was particularly noticeable: if in 1977 They amounted to about 40 billion US dollars, and by 1980 this figure had increased to 90 billion ^{[2, p. 271]}.

One of the key events of that time was the completion of the Saudi buyout on March 9, 1980 of Aramco, which was de jure owned by the Americans. However, an interesting feature was that the company continued to operate in accordance with the laws of the state of Delaware (USA) for the next eight years. As the first Saudi CEO of the company, Ali al-Naimi, noted, this, according to the first Saudi CEO of the company, Ali al-Naimi, created a "funny situation" in which the kingdom fully owned the company, but it remained under the jurisdiction of American law ^{[3, p. 119]}. It was not until 1988 that Aramco was fully integrated into the Saudi Arabian management system, receiving its current name Saudi Aramco. From that moment on, the company began its evolution from a traditional export-oriented production structure into a fully integrated oil company into the national economy.

Nevertheless, the reign of King Khalid was marked by serious challenges that forced the country's leadership to radically rethink its political strategy. On November 26, 1979, mass demonstrations of the local Shiite population began in the Al-Hasa and Al-Qatif regions. The main demands of the protesters concerned the permission to publicly celebrate Ashura Day, as well as ensuring equal rights and improving living conditions ^{[4, p. 109]}. Initially, spontaneous actions quickly escalated into armed clashes with law enforcement forces, which forced the Government to take harsh measures. In response to the escalation of tension, a series of large-scale arrests followed throughout the kingdom.

It later turned out that the organizers of the riots were the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIRAP), led by Shiite leader Hassan al-Saffar. After the suppression of the protests, key figures of the organization were forced to leave the country, finding refuge in Iran and European countries. In 1980, OIRAP activists founded a publication in London called the Journal of the Islamic Revolution, which published ideological materials that clearly reflected the influence of Khomeini concepts ^{[5, p. 200]}. For the Saudi authorities, these events have become irrefutable evidence of at least Iran's indirect involvement in supporting the Shiite movement within the kingdom, which has significantly strained bilateral relations between the countries.

At the same time, the harsh measures taken by the Saudi leadership against Shiite protests in the Eastern Province were caused by parallel events in the Hejaz, where an armed uprising involving about 3.5 thousand people unfolded ^{[6, p. 463]}. If the rebel attack on Medina was suppressed relatively quickly, then the situation in Mecca took a much more dramatic turn. The seizure of the holy mosque by a radical Salafist group turned into a serious crisis that threatened not only Saudi Arabia's international authority as the guardian of Islamic shrines, but could also provoke large-scale internal instability in the kingdom. This event became a powerful challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty and its ability to ensure the security of the main spiritual centers of the "Islamic world."

The incident of November 20 – December 4, 1979 was the largest terrorist attack in the history of Saudi Arabia. A group of about 500 radical Salafists led by Juhayman al-Utaibi, who declared himself a follower of the Mahdist movement, seized the al-Haram Mosque in Mecca, taking about 6,000 people hostage. At that time, King Khalid was in Riyadh, but the de facto leader of the country, Crown Prince Fahd, together with the head of the General Intelligence Service, Turki ibn Faisal, participated in the tenth Arab League summit in Tunis. They had to urgently interrupt the visit and return to manage the crisis situation.

The operation to liberate the mosque was complicated by the need to obtain two special religious rulings (fatwas) from the kingdom's leading ulama. This was due to the fact that the Islamic tradition categorically prohibits the use of violence and weapons in the immediate vicinity of the Kaaba. After a long siege and assault, 63 participants of the takeover, including their leader Juhayman al-Utaibi, were captured alive. On January 9, 1980, all of them were publicly executed by beheading in the squares of eight major cities of the country. This event was a turning point that profoundly influenced both the domestic and foreign policies of Saudi Arabia.

Special attention should be paid to the fact that the organization of the execution of terrorists was largely coordinated by the then governor of Riyadh, Emir Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, who later became King of Saudi Arabia. The British historian Robert Leisley, who lived in Jeddah in the late 1970s, emphasized in his work the symbolic significance of this public execution. She carried a clear message to the population: "the rebels are not heroes, but traitors to both the country and religion" ^{[7, p. 35]}. For the elites, this act was a reminder of the priority of loyalty to the Al Saud dynasty over kinship or tribal ties. To a large extent, these signals formed the basis for subsequent reforms, which, according to the observations of former American Ambassador John B. Smith, led to the transformation of Saudi Arabia into an ultraconservative state ^{[8, p. 145]}. These changes have affected various spheres of society, increasing the influence of religious norms on the political and social agenda of the country.

In March 1980, by order of King Khalid, under the leadership of Emir Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz, who served as Minister of Internal Affairs during 1975-2011, a committee was established to codify laws and develop a Basic Nizam of Government, which was to be formed on "Islamic values" ^{[7, p. 553]}. Despite the fact that the work on the document took twelve years and its final version was approved already under the next monarch, King Fahd ibn Abd al—Aziz (1982-2005), the very fact of the initiation of this project became a landmark event in the political transformation of the kingdom. This step marked the beginning of fundamental changes in both domestic and foreign policy.:

1. Internal policy: In response to the process of "Islamization from below," which manifested itself through the radicalization of Shiite movements and the increasing influence of extremist Salafist groups, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a strategy of "Islamization from above." The purpose of this policy was to strengthen state control over religious institutions in order to integrate them into the country's governance structure.

2. Foreign policy: The Kingdom gradually moved away from the concept of "positive neutrality", which combined moral principles with a realistic approach to international relations, and moved towards a more active regional course. This allowed Saudi Arabia to strengthen its leadership among Arab and Muslim states, while adapting to changing geopolitical realities.

Both of these trends were characterized by what was later called the "securitization of religion" in the scientific literature. Given the ethnoconfessional specifics of the country and its cultural and historical heritage, it was extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia to ensure internal stability and national security without a serious review of its religious policy both within the state and in the international arena.

A significant stage in the reform process was the renewal of the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, which, according to G.G. Kosach, "largely shaped its modern appearance" ^{[9, p. 39]}. In accordance with Decree No. 77/1 of 1980, a number of important transformations were carried out: the number of employees was increased, a branch of the ministry was established in Dammam, the key center of the country's oil industry, and small departments were transformed into seven full—fledged departments. The latter included the political, economic, diplomatic, consular, Protocol, Department of International Organizations and Strategic Planning, which continue to function to the present day.

Additional changes were introduced by Decree No. 77/2, which provided for the expansion of the Office of the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the creation of departments for wireless communications, information support and financial control. In addition, the Institute of Diplomatic Studies was placed under the direct supervision of the Minister. All these measures are aimed at improving the work of the kingdom's main foreign policy body, increasing its efficiency and professionalism in the face of the growing complexity of international relations.

GCC and the revision of the regional vector

As part of the review of its regional course, Saudi Arabia has identified the key task of maintaining stability and strengthening its leadership in the Persian Gulf. One of the most significant developments in this direction was the establishment of the Gulf Arab Cooperation Council (GCC), which brought together all the countries of this subregion, with the exception of Iran and Baathist Iraq.

On May 25, 1981, a summit of six states - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain — was held in Abu Dhabi, at which the GCC Charter was adopted. In the preamble of the document, special attention was paid to the "special ties" between the participating countries, their similar systems based on the principles of Islam, as well as the desire to coordinate cooperation for the well-being of the "Arab Ummah" ^[10].

In the official declarations of the Council on its goals and principles, it was noted that the decision to create the organization was not impulsive, but represented the institutionalization of historical, social and cultural realities characterizing the region ^[11]. The documents emphasized the deep religious ties and ethnic affinity of the populations of the member countries. At the same time, the creation of the GCC was seen as a pragmatic response to modern security and development challenges, as well as an attempt to realize the idea of regional Arab unity, which could not be achieved at the pan-Arab level. Thus, the organization has become an important step in ensuring strategic partnership and collective security in the Persian Gulf region.

On the one hand, such formulations demonstrated the transformation of the political and ideological space of the Arab East. By the early 1980s, after the "Islamist uprising" in Syria (1976-1982), the proclamation of the Libyan Jamahiriya in 1977, the signing by Egypt of a peace treaty with Israel in March 1979 and the final consolidation of Saddam Hussein's power in Iraq in July of the same year, the pan-Arab project, as V.V. Naumkin noted, began to lose momentum. its attractiveness and ability to mobilize the masses ^{[12, p. 56]}. The competition between several Arab republics — Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq — for leadership in the pan-Arab movement significantly influenced the course change of the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. This led them to abandon "classical" pan-Arabism in favor of a more specific concept of "regional Arab unity" based on common religious roots and ethnic proximity.

On the other hand, the establishment of the GCC had a clear practical basis, determined by a number of factors. First, Britain's complete withdrawal from the region in 1971 provided Saudi Arabia with a unique opportunity to strengthen ties with its neighbors. The economic and political support from Riyadh proved to be an important incentive for newly independent countries - Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain — and laid the foundation for a future integration project ^{[13, p. 78]}. Secondly, in addition to interrelated interests in the global oil market, the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf were united by common approaches to regional security issues ^{[13, p. 18]}. The main challenges for the Council members were the activation of Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood^[1], the growing influence of Shiite groups, and the escalation of tensions between Iraq and Iran in the early 1980s. The latter soon escalated into the protracted Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, which further emphasized the need for coordination of efforts to ensure the security of the region.

Thus, the existence of a common ideological platform, interrelated economic interests and similar approaches to regional security issues became key factors contributing to the creation of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). Nevertheless, as E.S. Melkumyan emphasized in her research, if the agreements on economic cooperation were reached relatively quickly — in a few months, then the process of preparing the treaty on a unified defense strategy, despite its high importance, took much longer and was completed only in November 1984 ^{[15, pp. 51-52]}.

The main reasons for the delay were disagreements between the participants regarding the role of foreign states, primarily the United States and Great Britain, in ensuring the security of Council members, as well as a certain position of Saudi Arabia. The latter, having the most developed military potential among the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, advocated speeding up the process of creating a unified defense system. At the same time, Riyadh sought to impose its own concept on its partners, which involved the formation of a unified command and the unification of weapons, effectively leading to the integration of the national armies of the participating countries. Such an approach could transform the GCC from an economic association into a full-fledged military-political bloc, which caused resistance from other states in the region.

Despite the existing differences, in 1981, at the initiative of the GCC Council of Ministers, a meeting of the chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the participating countries was held in Riyadh, where it was decided to hold the first joint military exercises in the UAE in October 1983.. At the same meeting, the key principles of security cooperation were approved, which included ^[16]:

1. The exercise of the right to self-defense in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and the Arab League through the mechanism of collective defense in the event of an armed attack or a similar threat against one of the Council members.

2. Strengthening the combined potential in ensuring regional security through the development of national armed forces both within the framework of bilateral cooperation between Member States and with the participation of external allies.

Based on these principles, a joint military contingent was established in 1982 under the auspices of the Joint Military Command of the GCC States. Subsequently, in 2005, at the initiative of King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, this contingent was renamed the Peninsula Shield, which symbolized its role in protecting regional stability and security.

This decision, which is largely a compromise, allowed the GCC to avoid transformation into a full-fledged military-political bloc. However, given the regional and international situation at that time, the creation of the Council can be considered as one of the first significant successes of Saudi Arabia in forming a "Sunni bloc" against the Iranian doctrine of exporting the Islamic Revolution. This interpretation is supported by the fact that throughout the entire period until the end of the 1980s, it was the Kingdom that acted as the main engine for the development of the joint military contingent. At the same time, other Council members showed a marked reluctance to transfer control over their defense policy, preferring to maintain national autonomy, especially in the face of Saudi Arabia's obvious military superiority.

OIC and the activation of the religious vector

At the same time, the direct military confrontation between Saudi Arabia's two key competitors for leadership in the Persian Gulf region, Iran and Iraq, against the background of the increasing role of the religious factor in state policy in the 1970s and 1980s, opened up new opportunities for the kingdom to expand its influence. During this period, Saudi Arabia was able to activate not only the regional, but also the religious aspect of its foreign policy. A striking example of this approach was the third conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (until 2011, the Organization of the Islamic Conference), which was held in Mecca and Al-Taif. The conference allowed the Kingdom to demonstrate its ability to coordinate the efforts of Islamic States in addressing key issues facing the Ummah of that time.

In total, the conference was attended by 39 member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as a PLO delegation. However, due to geopolitical and ideological reasons, several major Muslim countries were not represented at the event ^{[17, p. 80]}:

1. Egypt: Egypt's membership in the OIC was suspended after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel on March 26, 1979, which was the key reason for its absence from the conference.

2. Afghanistan: The country was deprived of the right to participate in the organization due to seeking military assistance from the Soviet Union after the suppression of the uprising in Herat (March 15-22, 1979). Instead of the official delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, representatives of the Afghan Mujahideen who opposed the pro-Russian regime participated in the conference.

3. Libya: Relations between Libya and Saudi Arabia deteriorated significantly on the eve of the event due to Muammar Gaddafi's harsh criticism of the Saudi leadership, which led to the severance of diplomatic relations between the two states.

4. Iran: Despite the official invitation, Tehran refused to participate in the conference. The reasons for the refusal lie in the acute contradictions with Saudi Arabia, the ongoing war with Iraq and the difficult internal situation in the country.

Thus, the absence of the main competitors for leadership in the Muslim world — Egypt, Libya and Iran — provided Saudi Arabia with a unique opportunity to advance its agenda and significantly strengthen its authority among the organization's members. This event marked an important stage in strengthening the kingdom's role as one of the main players in the Islamic community.

By the early 1980s, the religious aspect of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy had emerged as a strategy for positioning the country as a key "center of power" in the Muslim East, relying on its role as the guardian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, as was correctly noted in the works of G.G. Kosach and E.S. Melkumyan ^{[13, p. 81]}. At the same time, special attention was paid to creating a positive image of the kingdom through the contrast between the Saudi approach to progressive development while preserving traditional cultural values and the Iranian model of revolutionary transformation, claiming moral leadership in the Islamic world.

This strategic attitude allowed Riyadh not only to strengthen its authority among Muslim states, but also to set itself up against Tehran as an alternative in matters of spiritual and political leadership. Saudi Arabia has focused on stability and traditionalism, opposing Iran's revolutionary methods, which has become an important element of the kingdom's "soft power" on a global scale.

Regional and religious vectors

Consequently, the events of 1979 can be considered as a key moment in the transformation of Saudi Arabia's political development. The establishment of the Gulf Arab Cooperation Council (GCC) and the holding of the third Summit-level Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1981 were symbolic steps in shaping new priorities for Riyadh's foreign policy strategy based on two key areas:

1. Regional vector: Strengthening Saudi Arabia's position as a leader in the Arab East and ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf region.

2. Religious vector: Promoting the image of the kingdom as the main "center of power" of the Muslim East and defender of traditional Islamic values.

Since the mid-1980s, the GCC has become the main instrument for implementing Saudi Arabia's regional strategy. This multifunctional mechanism served not only for economic integration, but also for ensuring collective security through the development of a unified defense policy ^{[18, p. 117]}. A notable example of its effectiveness was the Second Gulf War (1990-1991), when the Peninsula Shield contingent, numbering about 3,000 people, was involved in the operation to liberate Kuwait. This event significantly strengthened the collective defense mechanisms of the Arab monarchies in the region, confirming the importance of the Council as an instrument of stabilization and security.

With regard to the religious direction of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, its intensification in the 1980s, which coincided with the final stage of the Cold War, created favorable conditions for the expansion of the kingdom's influence in the following decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s significantly transformed the geographical boundaries of the "Islamic world," adding new states with predominantly Muslim populations to the political map. During this period, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, Iran and Turkey began to develop relations with the former republics of the post-Soviet space, as well as with Muslim communities in the Balkans. This allowed them not only to strengthen their international image, but also to expand their influence beyond the traditional areas of interest ^{[19, pp. 75-76]}.

When analyzing Saudi Arabia's foreign policy strategy, it is important to note the dual nature of its interaction with newly formed states and Muslim communities. On the one hand, at the level of public diplomacy, the Saudi leadership has demonstrated considerable generosity by financing the construction of mosques, supporting spiritual centers and religious educational institutions. On the other hand, the financing mechanisms of these structures were sometimes used to support extremist and terrorist groups of radical Islamists operating in the Balkans, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. This practice has led to serious criticism of the Saudi leadership and has negatively affected the country's international image, raising concern among the international community.

To a large extent, the accusations leveled against Saudi Arabia in connection with its support of Islamist terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s were based on its role during the Afghan War of 1979-1989, when the kingdom became the second largest sponsor of the Afghan Mujahideen after the United States. It is documented that from 1984 to 1986, Riyadh provided about 525 million dollars to the rebels. In 1989. Saudi Arabia undertook financing in the amount of 61% ($436 million) of the total amount of assistance of $715 million announced by the United States ^{[20, p. 432]}. According to various estimates, over the course of the entire decade, Saudi Arabia has invested approximately $3 billion in support of the Afghan Mujahideen, while the United States has allocated about $3.3 billion.

However, analyzing Saudi Arabia's policy in the post-Soviet East in the 1990s, it should be noted that, according to A.I. Yakovlev's observations, Riyadh's activity was primarily aimed at strengthening its influence in the region ^{[21, p. 68]}. The religious aspect in this context played a rather symbolic role, whereas the key drivers of the kingdom's actions were economic and political interests. Thus, the religious component served as an additional tool for achieving broader strategic goals than just promoting Islamic values.

It is noteworthy that among the prominent representatives of the Al Saud dynasty, the current ruling monarch Salman ibn Abd al-Aziz played a special role in maintaining the royal family's connection with Wahhabism. For many years, he was considered a key figure in the field of religious charity, regularly donating personal funds for the construction of Muslim educational institutions around the world ^{[22, p. 49]}. At the same time, the results of a joint investigation by the CIA and the FBI showed that the top leadership of Saudi Arabia had no direct links to the activities of Islamist radicals and extremist organizations. Nevertheless, the possible involvement of lower-level officials or influential citizens of the kingdom cannot be completely ruled out, which remains the subject of discussion and speculation in the international community.

Nevertheless, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Saudi leadership was forced to exercise extreme caution in all matters related to the religious sphere. A new round of criticism from the Western media broke out after American intelligence agencies released information about terrorist hijackers: among them, 15 people had Saudi citizenship ^[23]. In these circumstances, the kingdom's public diplomacy and media resources have focused their efforts on protecting the reputation of the ruling dynasty and the country's religious institutions. Any attempts to draw a parallel between official Wahhabism and radical Salafist groups from al-Qaeda^[2] could not only seriously damage the image of Saudi Arabia, but also jeopardize its relations with Western partners. As a result, this period became an important milestone, after which the development of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy entered a new, more complex and multifaceted stage.

^[1] Traffic is prohibited in the Russian Federation.

^[2] The organization is banned in the Russian Federation.