Ontogenesis of the unfinished and free individual - the ontological project of Gilbert Simondon

Sayapin Vladislav Olegovich ORCID: 0000-0002-6588-9192 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of History and Philosophy; Tambov State University named after G.R. Derzhavin 392000, Russia, Tambov region, Tambov, Internatsionalnaya str., 33 vlad2015@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

At the beginning of our research, it is important for us to emphasize that the French philosopher J. Simondon devoted himself not only to creating an original philosophy of technology, but also to the theory of "individuation". His fundamental project is to think of the individual through individuation in all areas of reality: physical, biological, and psychosocial or transindividual, rather than the process of individuation through the individual. In this regard, we are talking about the formulation of an ontology of reality, which is the ontogenesis of individuals, which is equivalent to replacing the problem of the individual with a question of being. But there is nothing purely formal (in the sense of replacing a term with a term) or purely negative (rejecting any questions about being) in such a substitution. On the contrary, the intention that governs it is completely ontological. For Simondon, the point is to achieve a genuine abolition of the ontological privilege granted by classical metaphysics to being over becoming, to result over action, to the individual over individuation, and to make this a condition for any complete knowledge of reality. It is for this reason that his interpretation of individuation no longer needs one principle or another: the individual does not originate from the principle of individuation, but reveals himself to be the result of a certain systemic process during which he not only arises, but also develops. "To look for the principle of individuation in the reality preceding individuation itself," notes Simondon, "means to consider individuation only as ontogenesis" ^{[1, p.32]}. That is why the new Simondonian idea of the individual should shed light on one of the difficulties of Simondon's philosophy, namely the coexistence of a relativized ontology and a hierarchy of individuals. Moreover, it is as follows: "... relationality does not indicate the completeness or integrity of the individual, but the non-identity of the individual in relation to himself" ^{[2, p.300]}.

So, what Simondon essentially reproaches the history of European metaphysics with is that it did not consider the operation of individuation in its ontological meaning ^{[3, p.34]}. A number of fundamental mistakes were made in metaphysics from the beginning, which served to develop a very specific philosophy of the individual, and also became entrenched in thinking and tradition in the form of persistent illusions. One of the most striking examples of such an illusion is the hylomorphism paradigm, which is the imposition of an active form on passive matter. Another example is atomistic substantialism, which postulates the existence of eternal individuals (atoms). which are already given and just collide as a result of a chance encounter, and then dissipate. That is why, despite the fact that the substantial path, which considers existence as consisting in its unity, and the hylomorphic path, which considers the individual as generated by the meeting of matter and form, are for Simondon only a false alternative. Since, from Simondon's point of view, these two paths are united by the assumption of a single principle of individuation that precedes individuation itself. Therefore, to obey such an ontological postulate, according to which each individual, in order to "walk" along the path of becoming, needs the principle of individuation. Choosing one or the other of the two paths means actually carrying out the reverse genesis. That is, starting with the constituted and given individual, we try to return to the conditions of his existence. In other words, Simondon tries to explain: "In the very concept of principle there is a certain character that anticipates a constituted individuality with the properties that it will have when it is formed"^{[3, p.23]}. In fact, it is the very idea of the principle, according to Simondon, that underlies such a fundamental requirement. For, being the "primary term" both in the beginning and in the commandment, deriving its superiority and absolute separation from the perfection of its own essence, the principle is already an individual or something individualized. If such an appeal to the principle is possible, it is primarily because it is governed by an intention directly determined by ontological privilege: "... it is the individual as a constituted individual who is the reality of interest to us. A reality that needs to be explained"^{[3, p.23]}.

As a result, in order to avoid the impossibility of any knowledge about the individual, in fact, the operation of individuation itself must carry an ontological burden and guide epistemological research. And it is in this sense that Simondon is apparently authorized to formulate this paradox: "What is a postulate in the search for the principle of individuation is that individuation has a principle"^[3,p.23]. From this it follows that the true principle of individuation is not external and is not outside of individual reality: it is individuation itself. Therefore, thinking about the reality of an individual outside of any ontological privileges and, consequently, outside of any principles means that it is necessary to reject the entire substantial essence of philosophy at both the ontological and methodological levels. That is why the demand for the abolition of ontological privilege requires a second replacement: after replacing the problem of the individual with the question of being, it is necessary to replace the postulate of substantialism with an ontogenetic postulate. If the postulate of substantialism really required the search for the principle of individuation from a given individual in order to answer the question of their identity and unity, then the ontogenetic postulate will imply the knowledge of the individual through individuation, and not individuation from the individual. That is, the ontogenetic postulate helps to determine the conditions of individuation, existence and resolution of the individual's problem, which is greater than unity and greater than identity. Here in becoming, the non-identity of the individual to himself negates the transition from one identity to another by negating the previous one, because the individual has a certain potential, a certain reserve of this becoming. And since the non-identity of the individual is greater than the identity, the individual seems to transcend himself. Simply put, this second substitution means that instead of defining being from the idea of substance, we reduce the real individual to a natural being (the only being), namely to an ontogenetic postulate that defines being as becoming, and becoming as being, endowing the individual with reality regardless of the field of individuation under consideration. As a result, the individual associated with being complements the reality of being without any privileges granted to him by the ontogenetic postulate.

But how can a mental being outside of unity and identity, according to the ontogenetic postulate, be more unity and more identity and thus be a "complete" being? And what kind of incompleteness are we talking about? The point of the Simondonian project is not to complete the "oblivion" of ontology or to close the question of being by giving a definitive answer to it, thereby replacing an objectively determined lack with an overabundance of being. Its meaning is that the ontological question is a question that always remains the initial one, and that science asks it in accordance with the famous formula of the recognized connoisseur of the Aristotelian heritage, Pierre Aubinck (1929-2020), is always being investigated. Moreover, according to this researcher, the problem of the individual is primarily a problem of genetic ontology, namely, the explanation of being in its genesis, which means that the knowledge of the individual is always only approximate knowledge^[4]. But can we assume that only approximate knowledge can complement the ontology? Because this is the only real knowledge from a genetic point of view. Unlike substantialism, it is not based on any data, and no conceptual intentions govern it. Approximate knowledge based on the formation of both the object and the subject does not need the opposition of the subject and the object and the privilege of the subject over the object in order to be legitimate. In its "approach", approximate knowledge implements the genesis of thought simultaneously with the genesis of the object: the thinking subject and the thinking object individual are understood together within the framework of the same process, which is the process of individuation of knowledge. Strictly speaking, if substantialist ontology is incomplete, it is because it strives for a finite and complete knowledge of being that opposes subject and object, while Simondon's genetic ontology strives for an approximate but complete knowledge of being that constitutes subject and object. By placing subject and object on the same level, that is, outside of any fundamental opposition, Simondon thus gives genetic ontology the means to realize the ambitions of classical ontology: that is, to think of being universally, without turning it into totality, and to establish the science of being, without making its cognition impossible. It follows from this that the intention that governs ontogenetic research and is aimed at an approximate knowledge of the whole being, this intention requires always placing the individual in being. Moreover, this state of affairs coincides with the project of A. Bergson (1859-1941) to "place oneself in time" everywhere, that is, a philosophical effort that encourages the thinker to accept becoming and follow the creation of things ^[5,6].

Strictly speaking, for each area of reality where individuation manifests itself, it can be argued that for its cognition it must meet a double condition, that is, to abandon the separation of the individual from being, on the one hand, and to reintegrate the individual into his reality system, on the other. The first condition means that the problem of the individual does not relate to the question of being, that they belong to the same order of reality and that their cognition depends on the operation of individuation. The second condition means that the individual is a relative reality. If these two conditions are met, the individual is a certain phase of being, which presupposes a pre-individual reality preceding it and which does not exist by itself even after individuation, since individuation does not exhaust the potentials of this pre-individual reality in one fell swoop, and secondly, the fact that individuation highlights not only the individual, but also the individual-environment pair. In other words, the genesis of an individual occurs in a phase that is also an environment for him. As a result, the individual is relative in two senses: because he is not the whole of being, because he is the result of a state of being in which he did not exist either as an individual or as the principle of individuation^{[3, p.24-25]}.

That is why the individual is not "everything that exists," since, according to Simondon, he is only a certain phase of this being. And this meets the first condition. Indeed, the individual is just one of the phases of being. And this means that the individual belongs to the same order of reality as being, and therefore he is not separate from being. The idea of the phase is crucial here for understanding that the abolition of ontological privilege is not a change of issue, but a rethinking of the problem of being as such, starting with the individual, understood through individuation. As a result, it is the knowledge of individuation that requires the transformation of the individual into a simple phase, without detaching him from the reality of being. That is why the knowledge of individuation ensures the existence not of a phase, but of another reality, different from the reality of the individual, which meets the second condition. This is a pre-individual reality. For pre-individual reality, as a reserve of potentials of being, in which there is no division into an individual and an environment, is necessary for the emergence of an individual. It is an integral part of his reality system and is even a condition of individuation that exists before and after it. Without a pre-individual reality, a phase shift is impossible, and an individual-environment pair devoid of the potential for individuation cannot arise. And then existence is a failure.

In addition, Simondon insists that preindividual reality is always metastable, that is, it takes on some form focused on certain types of individuals. Moreover, this form generates temporary solutions that support the continuous genesis of permanently new and usually unrealized pre-individual realities. It follows from this that the pre-individual reality is always filled with such potential energy, which is never completed and cannot be exhausted, because, before reaching the formation of an exhausted or stable point, such reality is always capable of generating new formations. That is, pre-individual reality is a "real potential" that is not reduced to either an abstract possibility or an actual system. That is why pre-individual reality is always in a metastable state, and therefore any individuation can be understood as a system containing potential energy. Therefore, any pre-individual entities contain incompatible potentials, since they belong to different dimensions of these entities, their states or phases. Moreover, the spiritual in pre-individual reality manifests itself not only in the form of the individual's inadequacy to himself, but also is the very experience of the individual's incompleteness, which never ceases to double both in the past and in the future. Or in another way: both in memory and in imagination.

Thus, the individual always resolves metastability by acting on another level. But the individual is also marked and shaped by special forces or stresses that contribute to its emergence. An individual is a way of managing metastability or excess, not overcoming them. Therefore, individuality is not one of the types of being, but one of the phases of being, a period, a movement, neither the beginning nor the end. Therefore, the individual is, in Simondon's words, "relative in two senses," but no less real. It is even "more" real in that it is relative than substantial. Simondon's relativization of the individual is thus not a derealization of being. On the contrary, it supports a genuine ontological thesis: being is that from which phases exist. Here it becomes obvious that Simondon's theory of "individuation" is based primarily on the metaphysical postulate of "relational realism," which consists in desubstantializing an individual without derealizing him, since, according to this theory, an individual's individuality increases due to the multiplication of the relationships that make up this being. Moreover, the concept of "relational realism" was preceded by G. Bachelard (1884-1962), who along with J. Kangilem (1904-1995) and J. Hippolytus (1907-1968) had a significant influence on Simondon's work.

That is why such a definition of being as a multiphase becoming means that the individual is neither the totality of being, nor even the reality of being. It is a phase of being as such and presupposes a pre-individual reality. Does the co-existence of the phases of being and pre-individual reality present any difficulty? Does Simondon achieve an ontological bifurcation by replacing the problem of the individual with the problem of being? These questions are legitimate, but they still depend on the substantial concept of being in the sense that becoming is something that happens to being, not a dimension of being. From this it follows that the constant in being is not being as such, but becoming, at least in the form of the "real potential" of being. Individuation for the sake of being does not mean a transition from one stage to another or the acquisition of any new properties, since the process of individuation necessarily leads to a constituted individual or the truth of being, completed in itself. On the contrary, individuation is the appearance of phases of being that are in the process of becoming and at the same time are phases of being. This state of affairs means that becoming is neither a framework of being, nor an event that happens to it from the outside. This is how being becomes what it is, as being, that is, the possibility of a pre-individual being to leave the phase in an individual and related environment (or environment).^[3,p.25].

As a result, explaining the individual at its very beginning, based on the system of reality in which individuation takes place, means something other than the rejection of ontology or the bifurcation of searches on the part of being and on the part of the individual. On the contrary, it is an ontological addition that has the value of a true foundation. Therefore, this foundation is supported by relativism, but by relativism, which is actually non-reductionist realism (unlike Kant's subjectivist relativism), since the individual is understood as a pair formed by him and the environment associated with him, that is, to the extent that they together form a system of relations, the individual is an environment integrating the real conditions of his existence. This is how Simondon justifiably formulates his ontogenetic concept of the "non-identity of the individual in relation to himself," which is no longer the "total being" of metaphysics, but becomes a pre-individual being. And this will force him to consider the logic of the excluded third in the future. In order to think about individuation, one must consider being not as a substance, or matter, or form, but as a tense, oversaturated system, located as something above the level of unity and something above the level of identity. That is, a system consisting not only of itself, but also unthinkable with the help of an excluded third party. In this case, a concrete being is a pre–individual being, which is more than unity and more than identity ^{[3, p.63-64]}.

If the logic of the excluded third is unsuitable for a comprehensive study of the reality of being, it is because it still depends on an ontological privilege that gives priority to individuality. To relativize an individual means to relativize him in all areas where individuation takes place, and therefore necessarily in knowledge itself, which is also individuation. However, logic based on consistency and the idea that we resonate only with identity and with the purpose of identity makes it impossible to know individuation, since it does not consider itself as individuation, but arbitrarily separates the ontological plane from the individual logical plane. As a result, a third replacement is needed, correlated with the previous ones: the unity of the identity of being must be replaced by a transductive unity, which is the fundamental operation of the new epistemological attitude. According to Simondon, existence does not possess the unity of identity, that is, the unity of a stable state in which no transformation is possible. Being has a transductive unity, that is, it can shift in phase relative to itself, overflow itself on both sides of its center. In this regard, individuation should be perceived as the formation of being, and not as a model of being that would exhaust its significance. That is why: "... instead of comprehending individuation, starting with an individuated entity, it is necessary to grasp an individuated entity, starting with individuation, and individuation, starting with a pre–individual entity distributed according to several orders of magnitude"^{[3, p.35]}.

At the same time, although replacing the identity unit with a transductive operation is logical, as we have seen, it is nevertheless based on a physical argument based on a thermodynamic origin. So, if the unit of identity corresponds to the postulate that being is implicitly assumed to be in a state of stable equilibrium, then this excludes becoming, since it corresponds to the lowest possible level of potential energy. This is the equilibrium achieved by the system when all possible transformations are completed and no force exists anymore. The idea of transductive unity is an idea that adequately reflects metastability. In addition, this idea is based on an extensive knowledge of matter, which does not give any privileges to a stable state and thus makes possible a complete knowledge of reality from the process of becoming. Then the transductive operation corresponds to one method: transduction. Simondon gives the following definition of this method: "By transduction, we mean an operation – physical, biological, mental, social – through which activity spreads step by step within an area, and this spread is based on the structuring of the area, carried out [operee] from place to place: each constituent region of the structure serves as the principle of constitution for the following Therefore, the modification gradually spreads simultaneously with this structuring operation"^{[3, p.32]}. Therefore, transduction is also a mechanism of the "recursive contingent formation of existence" ^{[7, p.115]}, "... which proceeds from itself, shifting itself in phase relative to its center of reality"^{[1, p.404]}.

It can be noted that this definition of transduction arose as a result of studying the genesis of the crystal, which forms the physical paradigm of individuation for Simondon. But if in the physical domain transduction is carried out in the form of a sequential iteration, then on more complex levels, vital, mental, collective (social): "... it can move forward with an ever-changing step and spread into the area of heterogeneity ..."^{[1, p.49]}. That is why Simondon happens to make amendments to this paradigm, in particular, in order to think about the vital and psychic phases of individuation. As Jean-Yug Barthélemy, a modern philosopher, a theorist of multidimensional meaning and a specialist in Simondonian philosophy, has well noted, this partial universality of the crystal paradigm is problematic, especially from the point of view of giving it an analog reality^[8]. In addition, "It is transduction," according to the modern philosopher E.N. Ivakhnenko, "that generates numerous uncertainties at all levels, both at higher and lower levels: in the formation of dissipative structures from thermodynamic molecular chaos – on the physical, in evolution – on the vital, in mental processes and their manifestations – on the personal, in the explosions of collective and social activity – on the social, in the opening up of new opportunities, and with them risks and threats – on the technical and informational"^{[7, p.115]}.

Therefore, being an ontogenetic method, the transductive method appears here not so much as a method in the sense of a set of means of cognition of a given reality, as an operation, moreover, an operation understood in reality itself. Since transduction is primarily ontogenetic, it really is a process of cognition, as real as approximate reality, similar in its genesis and structure. Cognitive operation, therefore, is an integral part of the conditions of cognition of individuation. It is not only an operation of individuation itself, but also the knowledge of individuation, as well as the individuating itself as knowledge. As a result, transduction occurs when there is activity emanating from a certain structural and functional center of being and spreading in various directions from this center, as if numerous dimensions of being were emerging around this center. Transduction is the correlative appearance of dimensions and structures in existence in a state of pre-individual tension, that is, in a being that is greater than unity and greater than identity, and which has not yet shifted phase in relation to itself in multiple dimensions. In the field of knowledge, transduction defines the true approach to invention, which is neither inductive nor deductive, but transductive, that is, corresponds to the discovery of measurements according to which the problem can be determined. This is an analog operation to the extent that it is valid. In addition, this concept can be used to understand various areas of individuation.: it applies to all cases where individuation occurs. By manifesting the genesis of a network of relationships based on being, it expresses individuation and makes it possible to comprehend it. This is why transduction is both a metaphysical and a logical concept. It is applicable to ontogenesis and is ontogenesis itself. Objectively, it allows us to understand the systematic conditions of individuation, internal resonance, and mental issues. Logically, it can be used as the basis of a new kind of analog paradigmatics for the transition from physical individuation to organic individuation, from organic individuation to mental individuation and from mental individuation to transindividual, subjective and objective^{[3, p.33]}.

It is for this reason that Simondon's transduction explicates not only the reality of being in the process of individuation and the process of invention, but also forms the basis of a new "analog paradigm." Transduction is both a reality of being, a modality of knowledge, and the basis of the entire science of being. But how is this possible? In this case, it can be assumed that transduction, since it is "ontogenesis itself", will play a different role depending on the field under consideration and the type of discourse, without changing its nature. That is why Simondon believes: "If there were several types of individuation, then there would have to be several logics, each of which would correspond to a certain type of individuation. Classification of ontogenies would make it possible to differentiate logic with a valid basis of multiplicity"^{[3, p.36]}. All this means that transduction is not a "proof" that genesis took place in existence, but participates in this very genesis and is a demarche of the discovering mind. In this regard, only the individuation of thought, according to Simondon, can accompany the individuation of beings other than such a thought. Therefore, we may not have direct knowledge or indirect knowledge about individuation, but knowledge that is an operation parallel to a known operation. According to the famous French philosopher and anthropologist B. Stigler (1952-2020): "The relative conditions of the possibility of individuation are then conditions of impossibility, for it is impossible to know individuation without individuating it and without individuating oneself: without individuating oneself and without individuating in the same manner [meme coup] individuation, which is precisely so cognized and thereby becomes unidentified again, that is, inadequate. To know is to individualize, and to individualize is to transform a known object and make it unknown, to cognize and re–cognize; and this is so, because epistemological individuation is a case of mental and social individuation leading to transindividuation. This is even the case, par excellence, when the individuation of the cognizing subject as a mental individual is directly the individuation of knowledge, since the latter is inseparably a social reality and a mental reality"^{[9, p.16]}. In this case, it can be argued that Simondon tries not only to overcome the Kantian limits of reason, but also the Bergsonian "motif" is still felt here. Although it is not so easy to equate the "sympathy" that Bergson's intuition suggests with the "analogy" that transduction requires for Simondon.

Consequently, the comprehension of individuation occurs not only on the border of knowledge, which is an analogy between two operations, but also which reveals itself to be a certain way of communication. In other words, transduction, which is both an analog method of research and a real way of an individual's existence (for the cognizing subject and for the cognizable object), is thus the true meaning of complete being: decidedly non-dialectical. It allows us to experience individuation without any ontological privileges. Moreover, if transduction meets the conditions of an individual's full cognition precisely by what makes it positive to overthrow the ontological privilege of thinking about reality, which is no longer essential, but relative to both the thinking subject and the thinking object, how can one welcome the idea of a "perfect individual"?

So, Simondon believes that there is no concept of a perfect individual and there are no unchanging individuals, but only the processes of individuation. That is why the fundamental incompleteness of the individual suggests that the mechanisms of transduction constantly influence him and cause significant changes in him. In this regard, doesn't the idea of "incompleteness" bring back the idea of privilege? Does the "incompleteness" of an individual mean superiority? Is superiority determined by the fact that an individual belongs to a certain area of reality? Should we then assume that there is a gradation or even a hierarchy between the realms of reality? Or should "incompleteness" be understood as the idea of perfection of being, which increases with each level of individuation or increases with each phase? Does the idea of the "incompleteness of the individual" have teleological or even theological implications? And in general, isn't the idea of the "incompleteness of the individual" negating all of Simondon's efforts, allowing substantialism to re-establish itself at the very heart of ontogenetics? As we can see, the idea of the "incompleteness of the individual" is not without consequences for the clarity of individuation and the legitimacy of Simondon's project. If this is not going to be decisive, it will certainly be instructive.

It should be emphasized that individuals in Simondon's theory of "individuation" are always in a metastable state that is difficult to articulate. Nevertheless, they translate into something that can be intelligibly grasped. In this case, Simondon uses numerous examples from physics, biology, psychology, and sociology to show that an individual does not arise alone, but together with an environment associated with him, which provides him with a constant metastable equilibrium. He remains in a primary relationship with such an environment and at the same time, always being in an unfinished state, carries the potential of a pre-individual (metastable) being. Therefore, the further existence of an individual becomes for him not only what arises or erupts, but also what leaves a residue or excess in its context or in its environment, which is a condition for its future formation. That is, for example, a person's existence from birth to death is the result of a kind of solution to the problems of becoming. Simply put, becoming is one of the dimensions of being or a way to resolve the initial incompatibility, which is always replete with possibilities. It follows from this that the principle of an individual's being through becoming is nothing more than his existence, which becomes such through an exchange between structure and operation (operation turns into structure, structure into operation) where this exchange takes place in quantum leaps through successive metastable equilibria. Moreover, in such a context, life can exist without individuals being separated from each other anatomically and physiologically, or only physiologically. As a type of this kind of existence, Simondon cites the example of coelenterate marine multicellular animals ^{[3, p.167-168]}. In other words, Simondon adds a description of the mode of existence of these coelenterates to the existence of life in separateness and incompleteness, which confirms a similar approach in all his works^{[10,11,12,13,14]}.

In this approach, Simondon usually defines three aspects of research. Firstly, it performs the function of establishing the truth: it refutes or corrects substantive theses. Secondly, it has an epistemological function: it defines the specific modalities of the mode of individuation. Thirdly, it performs a methodological function: it verifies the criteria and conditions of knowledge of individuation. In addition, depending on the case, all three functions can be used simultaneously, and then the examples can be assigned a differentiated status: for example, understanding the truth of the paradigm. In other words, such an approach in the study corresponds to Simondon's epistemological postulate, which asserts something important for understanding the idea of the "incompleteness of the individual," namely: "... the criterion for recognizing real individuality here is not a material spatial connection or separation of entities in a society or colony, but the possibility of a separate life, migration beyond the primary biological unit" ^{[3, p.168]}.

Strictly speaking, Simondon argues that a criterion of individuality is necessary, and the criterion sought will be not only the modality of differentiation, but also the modality of the "incompleteness of the individual." If the search for the criterion of individuality is necessary, it is because it creates a problem for intestinal-cavity marine multicellular animals. What really characterizes these coelenterates is the difficulty of attributing individuality to one or another manifestation of their reality. We could attribute this individuality to the original entity, or the "oozoid" that is born from an egg, or to individuals that arose as a result of budding, or to "blastozoites" or even to individuals of certain types of polyps that constitute themselves by differentiation, or, finally, to the entire colony, which acts, defends and grows. as one individual. Along with this, for example, in his work "Creative Evolution" (1907), A. Bergson also emphasizes the difficulty of attributing individuality to any particular manifestation of life in its development. In his opinion, nowhere is confusion more clearly visible than in discussions about individuality. Moreover, individuality is never perfect, which is often difficult and sometimes impossible to determine what is individuality and what is not, but that life nevertheless shows a desire for individuality and tends to form isolated, naturally closed natural systems^[15].

It is for this reason that Simondon rejects the criterion of a material or spatial connection, since such a choice is abstract. It also implies a disregard for the vital in existence. However, in this case we are talking about a vital personality. That is why Simondon rightly argues that the true criterion of individuality can only be related and determined by life. Hence the idea in our text that the possibility of a separate life is migration from the original biological unit, which is another modality of the fundamental incompleteness of the individual. As a result, it is not immortality that creates individuality. Each individual can be interpreted as a quantum of living existence. On the contrary, the colony does not have such a quantum characteristic, it is somehow continuous in its development and its existence. It is the thanatological characteristic that Simondon borrows from the French philosopher V. Yankelevich (1903-1985) and defines individuality. In this regard, according to Simondon, if an individual possesses a "quantum of living existence" that the colony does not have, he is approaching death. That's why he is the bearer of a real personality. Since he is alive, he is not immortal, he has that thanatological character that marks his existence. As a result, the criterion of individuality is the living as the dying. This is not a spatial or material division. Only mortality is a real division. "Death displaces life, life compensates for death – that's what ensures continuity, moves formation forward and gives birth to an event"^{[16, p.374]}.

The complexity of the incompleteness of individuality is tied to viability as such, that is, to mortality as proof. This criterion necessarily refers to the process of continuing life through the death of individuals, in other words, to reproduction. To live for a mortal, especially at the level of simple organisms (such as coelenterates), means to maintain one's existence in that form through reproduction. It is here that the possibility of a separate life is actualized using the parallel drawn by Simondon to understand both the biological and tragic roles of the individual. At the same time, the idea of an "incomplete individual" is put forward under the formula of "freedom". "It is sexual reproduction, apparently, that is most directly related to the thanatological character of an individual at this level. In some cases, colonies of coelenterates lay eggs that become jellyfish, and it is through them that reproduction is ensured. In others, the individual completely separates from the colony and, leading a separate life, leaves in order to lay eggs far away, after which it dies. A new colony is established by budding on an individual strain that has emerged from this egg. Thus, between two colonies capable of unlimited development in time, there is a free individual capable of dying. Here, this individual plays the role of transductive propagation in relation to colonies: at its birth, it originates from the colony, and before its death, it gives rise to a new colony after a certain movement in time and space. The individual is not part of the colony. He is placed between two colonies without being integrated into either of them. Both his birth and death are balanced, because he comes from one community, but generates another. He is a relation"^{[3, p.169]}.

It is obvious that the sexual reproduction of coelenterate marine multicellular animals has an individual thanatological character: an individual separates from a colony, migrates and establishes a new colony before dying. In this case, Simondon focuses his attention on this method of reproduction, ignoring the other method in which the jellyfish appear. We may wonder about the "freedom" of this individual, who thus separates himself from the colony. Indeed, what meaning can freedom have that corresponds to the biological necessity of reproduction? Can determinism be the basis of freedom? Simondon doesn't seem to be facing this problem. Most likely, it's about something else. Let's assume that the freedom considered here refers to the actualization of the opportunity to live separately, unlike the rest of the colony, which remains motionless and has no reproductive potential. The colony is immortal, whereas the individual is mortal and, being mortal, is the carrier of the coming colony. That's why being mortal means being fertile. This is the meaning of individual freedom. Freedom is fertility. As a result, we have a paradox: the biological determination of reproduction is a condition for the freedom of the individual, who, being mortal, is the guide of the future immortal. This paradox is the definition of the individual as a transductive relationship. In this sense, a free individual (in this case, a living organism) capable of independent life is a conditionally existing temporary (and in time) metastable entity. In other words, if the criterion of individuality for coelenterate marine multicellular animals is a criterion of a thanatological nature in the sense that it has fertility, is this true at a higher and highly differentiated level? This is much more complicated: "... because the individual, in the individualized forms of life systems, is actually a mixture; he summarizes two things in himself: the characteristic of pure individuality, comparable to what we actually see in the relationship between two colonies, and the characteristic of continuous life, corresponding to the function of organized simultaneity, as in in fact, we see her in the colony..."^{[1, pp.286-287]}.

In other words, at a higher and extremely differentiated level, Simondon presents the idea of an "incomplete individual" in the form of a mixture of some kind of metastable assembly. Namely, in the form of an emergent assembly of pure individuality and continuous life, or, in other words, a mixture of matter and energy, based on the study of the metastable physical phase of individuation. Moreover, here we are again faced with the difficulty of justifying freedom by determinism, when the criterion of incompleteness of individuality seems to carry a form of higher risk. The risk of death for the sake of life, the sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the coming community. But our reasoning may be related to the fact that we focus our attention on the individual, hypostatizing him. This is why Simondon forces us to abandon his own method, instead of considering the individual as a transductive relationship, that is, as a vital dynamic, as life itself, which does not end and continues. This change of view is not a withdrawal, a way to detach oneself from the reality of the vital phase of individuation, but, on the contrary, it is a way to get in touch with the concrete, to think directly about the object, to follow it in its genesis. When an individual separates from a colony, he is, of course, determined by the process of reproduction, but he is this process himself, and he is different from an agent who achieves a higher goal, which would be to continue life. A migrating individual, by virtue of his thanatological nature, is a living individual and precisely to the extent that life passes through him. It is the passage of life as an act that generates the future. If an incomplete individual is something that conveys vital activity in time and space, our difficulty disappears. The incomplete individual is indeed life in its creative capacity, but this does not mean that he is unconditioned or devoid of any determinism. One could even say that life, since it is a universal determinism, is creative. Being necessary for itself, existing only relative to the physical phase of individuation, which precedes and prepares it, prolonging it, slowing down its stabilizing effects, life overcomes itself as mortality.

It should be noted that Sigmund Freud's theory of the "death instinct" (1856-1939) was reinterpreted by Simondon in his theory of "individuation" where he reintroduced the concept of time. Like any individuation, the death instinct is seen as the limit of progress. This is the structuring of potential, not the actualization of opportunities. In this context, Simondon's philosophy, like Bergson's, denies possibility and non-existence. Because he insists on the need to think in terms of "virtuality" or, more precisely, metastability, contrasting Kantian a prioriism. That is why Simondon often emphasizes the self-constitution of individuation: the pre-individual reality to which his theory refers is not possible, but remains a reality in a state of potentiality and not yet a structured state. In this case, as soon as the potential is exhausted, which is also a quantum of duration in the sense of Bergson, death occurs. But from the immediate temporal significance of the transductive role of the incomplete individual, it is well understood that the "life impulse" itself has its limit, since it is simultaneously life as a limit in progress and future death as a limited life potential. Death is not what happens to life, but what makes it happen. Again, if an incomplete individual is a continuation of the future, it is only because he is mortal in the present.

In addition, Simondon raises another objection to Freud's concept, which does not clearly distinguish between instincts and tendencies. According to Simondon, it is always necessary to distinguish the transductive character from belonging to a society, and for some reason Freud does not do this ^{[3, p.170]}. He relies on a concept that distinguishes in the individual: "... from a structural and dynamic point of view, a certain number of zones, it abandons the idea that an individual can achieve full integration by constituting a superego, as if existence could discover the condition of absolute unity in the transition to the action of its virtualities ..."^{[1, p.288]}. That is why, considering the complete integration of the individual impossible, Freud makes impossible any isolated life, any fruitful migration and, consequently, ultimately any freedom. What Simondon accuses Freud of is that he is still too committed to the "hylomorphic scheme." Therefore, he is unable to: "... take into account the whole meaning of the individual and leaves aside the instinctual aspect proper, due to which the individual is an operating transduction, and not an actualizing virtuality" ^{[1, p.288]}.

As a result, by focusing excessively on trends, Freud's concept falls into the same trap as metaphysics, and thus prevents the incomplete, free, and self-transcending individual from being understood as a "non-identical individual in relation to himself," that is, as a mixture of vital continuity and instinctive singularity. The heir to Aristotelian vitalism and the postulate of the entelechy of all things, Freud simply ignores this state of affairs, namely, neglects the theory, which consists primarily in the ontogenesis of the individual as a problem of potential fiction: "more than one."

Of course, along with the vital phase of individuation, the idea of a free and self-transcending individual found its meaning in the Simondonian concept of technical objects as entities possessing the soul of a real technician who understands the work of technical objects and invents new ways of functioning. Simply put, Simondon connects the idea of a free and self-transcending individual with the idea of a technician as an inventor. It follows that technical activity can be considered as an introduction to the true social cause and as a kind of creative initiative in the sense of individual freedom^{[3, p.511]}.

It should be noted that Simondon had similar views based on the French philosopher and historian of science J. Kangilema, who in the middle of the 20th century advocated the development of a new scientific discipline – the biological philosophy of technology (bionics). In his famous 1947 lecture entitled "The Machine and the Organism"^[17], he proposed to take as a starting point the historical fact of the continuously ongoing process of designing machines and tried to interpret this obvious phenomenon by referring to the structures and functions of biological individuals. Therefore, in the context of such an understanding, technology becomes, for Simondon, undoubtedly something more than a secondary result of scientific activity. It follows that technical activity plays an important intermediary role in the formation of an individual. It not only introduces us to true social intelligence, but also initiates us to a sense of individual freedom. As a result, technical activity is important both for the individual, because it introduces him to the meaning of freedom, being a passport to action and a school of behavior, and for the community, because it introduces society to its true mind.

So, if technique is an initiation into the meaning of freedom, then a technician is none other than a free individual. Does this mean that a free individual is a "darling of nature" and "more than one" like the Kantian genius, risking once again having his privilege? Therefore, Simondon asserts the "exclusivity" of the free individual in relation to the community. Initially, non–attachment (as we have seen, this is life in isolation from the community, and therefore the ability to exclude oneself, to cross a set limit) and the exclusivity of a free individual is his magical power or knowledge, unparalleled for ordinary individuals. For example, in Homeric poems, a doctor is considered equivalent to several warriors and enjoys special honor. This is because the doctor is a healing technician. He has magical powers. His strength is not purely social, like that of a leader or warrior, but rather his social function is the result of his individual strength, rather than his individual strength being the result of his social activity. That's why a doctor is an individual with magical powers. He has a gift that belongs only to him, but which he does not separate from the community.

In addition, according to Simondon, a doctor is a "healing technician", a sorcerer and a priest are "carriers of technology" capable of using natural forces and making divine forces favorable. The engineer is an agent of urban expansion, and his technique allows him to predict events in heaven. A scientist is someone who, with the help of technology, discovers the unknown from the ignorance in which he was. Through all these figures, the technician always appears as the source and condition of the power that society recognizes in him and which the historical narrative conveys. It follows from this that the main task of a technician is not only to learn how to live with machines, but also to be able to stubbornly overcome the factors of "infancy" and alienation in his being with them. A real technician understands the work of technical facilities and invents new ways of functioning. The car is not a "black" box for him: its entrance and exit are known, but its functioning remains mysterious^[18]. Therefore, the main goal of a technician (or a "free individual") is to understand machines. That is why the technician, on the one hand, interprets and invents machines, and on the other hand, does not seek to direct them from above. According to Simondon, technical activity does not consist in supervising a technical facility, but in living on the same level as the machine: it takes responsibility for the relationship between them. Moreover, the machine can be connected simultaneously or sequentially with other machines. It follows from this that instead of just controlling machines, a technician creates better conditions for technical ensembles of these technical objects and their surroundings – the geotechnical environment, which is a geographical and technological environment at the same time and which these ensembles of machines project as their state ^{[19, p.140]}.

Finally, a technician must not only interpret machines for those who are ignorant of them (social thinkers, artists, artists, etc.), but also, through his technical thinking, invent new ways of being machines with other individuals. The meanings of technology are present in all his technical activities. Therefore, technical thought also belongs to the category of inventions. This idea is not only transferable, but it also allows for participation. A technical object, to the extent that it was invented, thought out and expressed by a human subject, becomes a means (support) and a symbol of these relations, which are defined as transindividual ^{[19, p.252]}. Here, transindividuality is an attitude that simultaneously and mutually defines both the individual and the collective. This attitude attempts to capture the operational movement of technical activity in the process of its individuation. The starting point here is not only the relationship between the technician and the technical object, but also the relationship between their energy potentials.

It should be noted that an impeccable technician, in Simondon's understanding, always respects the technical object. In other words, a technical object is liberated and even saved from its enslavement by pure utility. In this case, the technical object is no longer a "black box" or a closed machine that refuses any modifications. This machine can already be transformed, repaired and used as a material for further new inventions. In other words, the technical object is free, open and authentic in its development. Moreover, this technical entity is a necessary intermediary between a person and his environment^{[20, p.85]}.

Therefore, in any case, to be able to live apart, to have the desire to comprehend the unknown, that is, to "know" what must be comprehended for the future, is undoubtedly what it would mean to be a free individual, that is, a person who has a desire for freedom. In this regard, the meaning of freedom in humans, unlike in coelenterates, is will, that is, both instinct and decision. It follows that the true technician shows this sense of freedom primarily as the one who invents an intermediary between the community and a hidden or inaccessible technical object ^{[3, p.512]}. As a result, being open to the unknown and because of his detachment, the technician becomes meaningful and useful to the community. He achieves this importance through "technical effort" and the creation of a technical facility. This technical object is not a tool that serves a purpose external to the essence of the individual. On the contrary, it is a certain crystallization of a creative human gesture that is perpetuated in existence. In other words, all this means that a technical object is not a means of mastering nature and enslaving a community, but a genuine mediation between human reality and the reality of nature, that is, support and a model of participation. And it is precisely because the technique reaches a certain accessibility and is open to any human gesture, and thus allows it to launch an impulse of universal communication, where nature, culture, technology, the individual and the community are no longer opposed, but complement each other in participation.

Thus, the mediation of a technical object, carried out within the framework of technical efforts, is the "germ of civilization" since it is originally an invention. That is, before it becomes normative, it is the beginning of the initiation of the future. At the same time, the feeling of freedom inherent in a technician imposes on him a great responsibility (but, in a sense, always secondary), which gives him a privilege in relation to the future, namely prestige in relation to the community, and gives his act a universal ethical value, free from any obligations. By taking on the risk of invention, the technician foresees the future of the community: he orients him to what is still within the realm of the known, and is structured in culture. That is, it becomes individual both in terms of norms and values. Starting with the mediation initiative, which is a technical facility. That's why abandoning the community to become a technician doesn't mean abandonment or betrayal. On the contrary, it is the full acceptance of society, respect for all its expectations and anticipation of the future. In one word: this creature is separated. In conclusion, technique has nothing to do with gender or being chosen. It is a recognition of life at the highest risk of death.