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Razgovorov, S.V. (2025). Governor-General M.N. Muravyov and the Confessional Policy of the Russian Empire in the Western Provinces. History magazine - researches, 2, 309–320. . https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2025.2.74121
Governor-General M.N. Muravyov and the Confessional Policy of the Russian Empire in the Western Provinces
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2025.2.74121EDN: JFKJPFReceived: 16-04-2025Published: 04-05-2025Abstract: The subject of this research is the figure of Governor-General M.N. Muravyov-Vilensky in the context of the confessional policy he implemented in the western provinces of the Russian Empire. The aim of the study is to characterize M.N. Muravyov's personality and his policies as one of the most prominent representatives of Russification politics within the broader trends of the religious policy of the Russian Empire in the 1860s. The research tasks are: 1) to describe the social landscape in the western provinces before M.N. Muravyov was appointed Governor-General; 2) to define the psychological and historical portrait of the aforementioned statesman; 3) to analyze M.N. Muravyov's role in developing religious innovations during the era of great reforms; 4) to examine the peculiarities of M.N. Muravyov's policy as the Vilensky Governor-General concerning the Orthodox population and non-Orthodox individuals. The study employed a systematic research method to consider M.N. Muravyov's figure from different perspectives in the context of political and religious transformations in the western provinces and the country. Additionally, the principle of historicism was applied in analyzing the life path and the development of crisis situations within the religious institutions of the Russian Empire. As a result of the research conducted, the conclusion was drawn regarding the characteristic nature of Governor-General M.N. Muravyov's figure in the context of the confessional policy pursued by the Russian Empire at that time. Unlike other government members who sought compromise with non-Orthodox individuals, Muravyov acted quickly and resolutely. He considered it impossible to achieve reconciliation with Catholics and refused to acknowledge that the Orthodox Church needed any internal changes. This led to a temporary resolution of the social crisis in the western provinces, but subsequently, it only worsened, something that neither Muravyov's successors nor the government of the Russian Empire fully understood. The novelty of the study lies in examining M.N. Muravyov's figure in the context of the overall confessional policy of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century as one of its most characteristic representatives. The materials of the research can be applied in educational materials and further studies on the confessional policy of the Russian Empire. Keywords: Muravyov-Vilensky, Priests, Gentry, Holy Synod, Orthodoxy, Catolicism, Clergy, Religious tolerance, Polish Uprising, Western RegionThis article is automatically translated. Introduction The figure of Governor-General Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravyov-Vilensky attracted considerable attention from researchers and publicists during his lifetime. His resolute and harsh policies, as well as his success in suppressing unrest, contributed to his fame as a defender of Orthodoxy and the Russian population in the western provinces of the Russian Empire. This assessment is most vividly presented in the journalistic work of D.A. Kropotov: "The life of Count M.N. Muravyov, in connection with the events of his time and before his appointment as governor in Grodno." Since the political activity of Governor-General Muravyov was closely intertwined with the western provinces of the Russian Empire, his personality was actively studied in Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian historiography. Opinions about this historical figure varied depending on the era and the country. In pre-revolutionary historiography, as well as among the monarchists of the 20th century, his role in the history of the region was viewed in a complementary way. In the works of historian M.V. Dovnar-Zapolsky and publicist I.L. Solonevich, he is seen as a figure who ended the humiliation of Catholics over the Orthodox Belarusian population. On the other hand, Polish historiography views his figure from extremely negative sides. He was nicknamed "Muravyov the hangman." He appears as a proponent of the policy of polonophobia, as a suppressor of the Polish struggle for independence, as well as an instiller of an alien culture. In Lithuanian historiography, the assessment of the figure of M.N. Muravyov was ambiguous. On the one hand, his unscrupulousness in repressive measures against Gentiles was emphasized. Historian I. Ilgunas pointed out that in the opinion of the population of that time, any Catholic was equated with Poles, which also caused the Lithuanian population to suffer. However, it seems that in Lithuanian historiography the figure of M.N. Muravyov is considered more carefully, although interest in it is limited exclusively to the Polish uprising of the 1860s and its consequences. The exception is the work of D. Stalyunas, where considerable attention is paid to the confessional policy of the Russian Empire in the western region, including under M.N. Muravyov. In Soviet historiography, the figure of Mikhail Muravyov was viewed exclusively from a negative perspective as a reactionary and guardian of the monarchy. In many ways, such an attitude towards him was formed during the Governor-General's lifetime in social-democratic circles. In particular, the publicist and politician A.I. Herzen had an extremely negative opinion about him. It is also worth noting that the study of the activities of this historical figure was also closely linked to the Polish Uprising of the 1860s. Among the researchers of this event, one can single out N.M. Druzhinin, A.V. Polansky and A.F. Smirnov. As the Belarusian historian A.Y. Bendin points out, the figure of M.N. Muravyov and his contribution to the development of the country and the region was greatly simplified by both monarchical circles and their opponents. Bendin examines Muravyov from different angles, avoiding unambiguous assessments, emphasizing the lively mind of the politician, as well as his energy. Modern historians are trying to adhere to a similar approach. M.N. Muravyov is considered as the most prominent representative of conservative circles of that time. In the work of historian A.A. Komzolova, considerable attention is paid to his political activities in the context of confrontation with moderate and liberal circles of the Russian government, in particular, with the Minister of Internal Affairs, P.A. Valuev. It is noteworthy that despite the fact that in complementary historical works about M.N. Muravyov, he appears as a defender of Orthodoxy, researchers often focus more attention on his economic and social transformations in the Vilna general government than religious ones. Among such events, one can list the repression against the Polish gentry, the deprivation of their land plots, as well as the implementation of a policy of Russification, where confessional politics is considered only as an integral element. The confessional aspect of his work is considered by the historian S.V. Rimsky. His work "The Russian Church in the Era of Great Reforms" is devoted not so much to a specific historical person as to the confessional policy of the tsarist government as a whole. At the same time, the figure of M.N. Muravyov is not subjected to significant analysis, unlike his political opponent, P.A. Valuev. However, the research conducted by the historian provides comprehensive information about the contribution of the Governor-General of Vilna to the course of the confessional policy of the Russian Empire. Also noteworthy is an article by S.V. Ananyev, specifically devoted to Muravyov's confessional policy. It lists both his main activities as Governor-General in this area, as well as other projects to regulate the situation in the western region. However, the religious problem in the article is considered somewhat in isolation from other factors., In this paper, an attempt is made to consider the confessional policy of Governor-General Muravyov in the context of the general transformations in the confessional policy of the Russian Empire at that time. The article uses a civilizational approach as a methodology. Since Muravyov's political activity was inseparable from the clash of different cultures, this approach allows us to identify their specific features, what influence they had in the western region of the Russian Empire, and how they influenced Muravyov's decisions and activities. The following types of sources were used in the work: personal (for example, the diaries of P.A. Valuev and D.I. Milyutin), journalistic ("The Life of Count M.N. Muravyov, in connection with the events of his time and before his appointment as governor in Grodno"), clerical and others. Archival sources are also of great interest, in particular, M.N. Muravyov's report to Alexander II, where he justifies the set of reforms he conceived in the western region after the Polish Uprising. Study In any state, there is a binding rod that frames not only its cultural field, but also its course of development. For the Russian Empire, the Orthodox Church served as such an element. She not only proclaimed the primacy of the emperor, but also built relationships and the structure of society itself on the basis of her values and morals. This was especially noticeable with the example of the Gentiles. Despite the fact that the government of the Russian Empire adhered to the principle of religious tolerance, there were certain restrictions for them. Among other things, they included promotion in military and civil service, as well as marriage with Orthodox Christians. For a long time, this did not cause strong conflicts in society. However, by the middle of the 19th century, with the emergence of nationalist movements, conflicts in some regions could not be avoided. One of the most problematic territories of the empire was the western provinces, where adherents of other Christian movements, in particular, Catholics, Uniates and Protestants, were traditionally represented. Conflicts between these faiths were overlaid by a long history of hostility, and given the importance of religion in the social life of the Russian Empire, interethnic conflicts often became inter-religious, just as uprisings acquired the character of a struggle for faith. This was especially evident during the Polish Uprising of the early 1860s, in which the Catholic clergy actively intervened. The priests agitated Catholics to join the rebels, and the monasteries provided both material support and shelter for the rebels [1, p. 8]. Provocations by the Catholic clergy were known in the government, and special attention was paid to them during the investigation of the failed uprising. Many representatives of the non-orthodox clergy were convicted, but this could not fix the situation, only clog it up. Therefore, the government began actively discussing measures to ensure peace in the region, including in the religious sphere. During the discussion conducted by the Western Committee, two approaches prevailed. The first was promoted by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Peter Alexandrovich Valuev, who stood on the positions of religious tolerance. In his diaries, he repeatedly stated that peace can be achieved only through mutual respect, but not through physical coercion [5, 126]. He expressed the same thoughts in his memorandum to Alexander II, which even had the emperor's resolution [9]. This indirectly confirms that at first the government was determined to limit itself to only partial repression. However, there was another trend that prevailed later. Its most prominent representative was the Governor-General of Vilna, Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravyov. He repeatedly stated the need to nip any free-thinking of Gentiles in the bud, and saw the cause of conflicts in society in the irreconcilable hostility between Orthodox and Western branches of Christianity, which could not be changed. M.N. Muravyov's position was formed on the basis of his long life and career. Coming from an ancient family, in his youth he became involved in the activities of the Decembrist movement. As the brother of the future governor-General later pointed out, they did not know anything about the final plans of the secret societies [14, p. 6]. During the investigation, he was acquitted, but his military career was hampered. To clear his name, Muravyov became active in military service, particularly in the western region, participating in the suppression of the Polish uprising under Nicholas I. Even then, according to his own memoirs, he was discouraged by the dominance of the Polish nobility in the administration of the region. The Orthodox population was in a humiliated position. Catholic aristocrats actively agitated peasants to convert to another faith, as well as provoked pogroms of Orthodox churches [11, p. 149]. The clergy also provided all possible assistance in agitating for the riots. In the future, the situation only worsened, which led to a new uprising, already in the 1860s, where Muravyov also took an active part. Having excelled in suppressing the uprising and having long-term service experience in the region, Muravyov was involved in drafting projects on the future fate of the western provinces. He set himself the goal of strengthening the position of the Orthodox Church in the region, believing that all its problems stem from prolonged attacks from non-Believers and the West in particular. However, the crisis was much deeper, and more internal. It manifested itself most clearly by the middle of the 19th century, when publicists, both from among the clergy and secular people, began to actively discuss this problem. Among other things, the dilapidated state of the church buildings and the unsatisfactory moral character of the priests themselves were pointed out. In the 1850s, special attention was drawn to the work of the priest John Bellustin, who criticized the situation of the rural clergy. Considerable attention is also paid to the unsatisfactory level of spiritual education, focused more on cramming unnecessary subjects than on studying the Holy Scriptures [2, p. 21]. M.N. Muravyov himself called the book a provocation and a lie, but it made a strong impression on Emperor Alexander II. In developing future church reforms, he ordered to focus on this work [17, p. 18]. The opinion was expressed that Orthodoxy would not be able to respond to the challenges of the time without achieving the cohesion characteristic of Catholicism [3, p. 421]. If P.A. Valuev saw the solution to the problem in increasing the authority of the Orthodox Church, in coexistence and qualitative changes within the spiritual institutions themselves, then N.M. Muravyov considered it sufficient only to increase the financing of churches, not considering that the crisis of the clergy stems from within. In his memorandum to Alexander II, he points out that measures to increase funding should be taken as soon as possible, given their exceptional importance not only politically, but also morally [10, p. 53]. Standing on conservative positions as a statesman, he believed that the Orthodox Church should not be changed, because it was the cementing element that ensured stability in society. Muravyov's confrontation with the liberal wing of the Russian government took place in several stages, and his victory was largely due to the inertia of moderate ministers. Firstly, there was no consensus among them on ways to achieve peaceful coexistence between Orthodox Christians and non-Believers. As D.A. Milyutin pointed out, there was useless chatter at meetings of the Western Committee. In his opinion, one of the most prominent representatives of moderate reformers, P.A. Valuev, used to think at length, without offering any real measures to solve the issues raised [16, p. 407]. At first, there was no obvious opposition between reformers and conservatives. Even during the active phase of the Polish Uprising of the early 1860s, liberal-minded ministers supported many of Muravyov's repressive proposals designed to stabilize the economic situation in the region. However, as time passed, the mutual discontent of the members of the government only grew. Taking advantage of the disunity of his opponents, as well as their indecision, Muravyov stopped taking them into account, deciding to take drastic measures by submitting a note to the emperor. Based on the information provided in the Governor-General's autobiography, it can be concluded that he actually gave Alexander II an ultimatum [15, p. 136]. Since the ministers from the Western Committee interfered with his work, he asked that he be allowed to pursue such a policy as he considers appropriate, otherwise asking for his resignation. Since the emperor himself probably understood how fruitless the work of the other ministers of the Western Committee was, he gave his consent. Alexander II, in principle, tended to swing between liberal and conservative policies, depending on emerging crises. Initially agreeing with P.A. Valuev's point of view on the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the western provinces, he also easily agreed to carry out harsh punitive measures against the rebels. Looking ahead, we can recall the fact that the emperor planned to slow down the repression towards the gentry, but the assassination of D.I. Karakozov put an end to this [13, p. 199]. Questions of confessional politics, apparently, worried the emperor in a utilitarian way. While agreeing with the crisis within the Orthodox Church, he saw the institute itself as just an instrument of pressure, whose problems and work needed to be fixed. This was manifested, again, in the inconsistency of the emperor's policy, as well as his weak involvement in the development of church reforms. While the moderate wing, led by Valuev, offered extensive ideas, Muravyov took concrete and rapid actions that were more profitable from a utilitarian point of view. Thus, Count Muravyov-Vilensky could bring his ideas to life without looking back at the opinions of those who disagree. Paradoxically, the Western Committee that was formed was conceived by the Minister of the Interior to reduce the power of the governors-General and implement his own plans. However, Muravyov's assertiveness and Valuev's own lack of allies largely determined the future path of confessional politics in the region. First of all, the government decided to take measures to effectively control non-Orthodox clergy, with special attention being paid to Catholics. Investigations of their activities were conducted, after which a conclusion was drawn about the trustworthiness of a particular clergyman. Moreover, the order of services was now also controlled. If earlier the Russian Empire did not interfere in any way with the ritual component of other faiths, now the situation has changed dramatically. At first, the measures were cosmetic, but later during the services it was prescribed first of all to praise the emperor, while any communication with the Vatican was interrupted. This was also due to the severance of diplomatic contacts with the Roman See. The relationship itself was strained, given the frequent proclamations of Pope Pius IX calling for the unification of all Christians under his rule. Subsequently, when the Vatican strongly condemned the measures to suppress the Polish uprising, the government and M.N. Muravyov in particular feared provocations from foreigners. For the same purpose, a special committee was formed in St. Petersburg, designed to monitor the affairs of the Catholic Church within the country according to a similar principle of work as in the Holy Synod. The fears of provocations were not unfounded. Subsequently, according to reports, the Catholics were preparing an "iron bank" designed to raise funds to prepare for new unrest and uprisings. According to the notes passed to the emperor, the priests were still actively expressing hatred towards the Russian and Orthodox population [17, p. 175]. It is noteworthy that the first man executed by Muravyov was a Catholic priest who openly read the revolutionary manifesto in the temple. Given that the execution took place on market day with a large gathering of people, Muravyov clearly sought to give this event as much publicity as possible for demonstration intimidation [13, p. 70]. Polonophobia was growing in the region, which was not so much ethnic as religious. Under him, officials of the Catholic faith resigned from the government of the region, they were deliberately classified as Poles, regardless of their real ethnicity [13, p. 50]. N.M. Muravyov himself stated that the territories that the Gentiles considered their ancestral ones had never actually belonged to them, and therefore the imperial government had every right to establish its own rules here, exalting the role of the Orthodox Church. Repressive measures were also carried out against those who were directly involved in the uprising. Thus, many monasteries that provided facilities for the rebels and later sheltered them from persecution were closed. The remaining ones were transferred under direct control from St. Petersburg, thus also coming under secular control, as in the case of the Orthodox Church [4, p. 30]. The confessional policy of Alexander II, in principle, resembled an attempt to unify the churches. If the affairs of Orthodoxy were managed by a secular institution, accordingly, the Gentiles also had to be accountable to the same structures. This greatly simplified their management, as well as prevented the possibility of a repeat uprising. Moreover, in the mid-1860s, a project was being developed to unite both churches, but it remained unfinished. Its creators were not sure of the sincerity of Catholics in their desire to accept Orthodox values [12, p. 12]. Catholic religious processions were gradually banned, and subsequently the government also began to control the sphere of spiritual education [7, p. 415]. Obstacles were being built for the admission of Catholics to the relevant seminaries and academies. Due to this, the influx of new Catholic priests decreased markedly, which again was to the advantage of M.N. Muravyov, who tried to reduce the presence of Catholic influence to a minimum. An example of this was the reconstruction of Catholic churches for Orthodox churches. Muravyov strove for the gradual Russification of the region entrusted to him, but preferred not to act abruptly, gradually suppressing propaganda from Catholics. Muravyov was guided by far from narrow-minded ideas about order through violence. As already mentioned, the Governor-General's career was fraught with repeated suppression of popular unrest, including Polish ones. He, like no one else, could convince himself of the idea that it was impossible to ensure peaceful coexistence between two opposing cultures and religions. And being by nature a statesman and an ardent patriot, he, of course, stood up for the position of ensuring security in the state at any cost. Muravyov's government did not persecute other faiths if they did not threaten stability and order in the Vilna General Government. He focused mainly on removing the Polish element in the administration of the region, including the religious one. Jews and Protestants were not so active in promoting their ideas and values. In addition, the religious conflicts that followed Muravyov's resignation were largely caused not by religious intolerance, but by domestic issues. At the same time, the confrontation with Catholics bore the marks of religious hostility and even war. He was genuinely confident in the effectiveness of his decisions, as they brought tangible results. Even his ardent opponent Valuev acknowledged the "heinousness" of the Poles' behavior, as well as the effectiveness of the Governor-General's forceful methods. However, at the same time, he spoke about the unresolved issues of confessional stability in the region. As Valuev pointed out, there were ideas on the Catholic side, but there were none on the Orthodox side [5, p. 258]. Despite the fact that Muravyov's radical decisions drew criticism from supporters of dialogue with Gentiles and Poles in particular, it seemed that the Governor-General's position was only strengthening against this background. There were several publications in which he presented himself as a defender of the faith. Moreover, after his resignation, the trend towards Russification of the region, including in the religious sphere, has only continued and intensified. Conclusion Thanks to his decisive and tough actions, M.N. Muravyov earned a controversial reputation. Some sources paint him as a defender of the Orthodox faith, others as a straightforward soldier accustomed to solving complex problems by force. Nevertheless, he did manage to stabilize the situation in the region entrusted to him for a while, carrying out punitive measures against the rebels and actively contributing to increasing the authority of the Orthodox faith in the region. However, after his death, new problems emerged. Decisive and tough actions can bear fruit in a short time, but the government had no intention of developing the situation or correcting the root problems. The authority of the Orthodox Church could not increase with the construction of new churches and the belittling of the position of Catholics, with an unsatisfactory level of spiritual education and the general closeness of the Orthodox clergy, its inertia and the inability to get out of the control of secular authorities. Unlike his opponents, Muravyov, although he saw some problems related to the state of the Orthodox Church, he did not consider them to be root problems, that they could be solved solely by the infusion of new funds or demonstration events. For example, he ordered the free distribution of about 300,000 Orthodox crosses in local parishes, which was met with delight among the local flock. However, this move, although it was met positively and had a certain public response, still did not have any lasting consequences. Muravyov was prone to harsh but superficial measures that could affect the situation in the short term, but he missed the root details of the problem. His political opponents also did not understand the depth of the crisis of the Russian Orthodox Church, and therefore could not influence the situation either. His personality is an excellent demonstration of the indecision and inconsistency of Alexander II's general confessional policy. Supporters of peaceful coexistence with non-believers could not develop specific tools for the implementation of their projects, and as a result, their measures turned out to be half-hearted. Supporters of repressive measures could overcome the peak of the crisis, but could not build on their success. At the same time, Emperor Alexander II tried to stay in the middle, maneuvering between two points of view. Of course, this was at odds with the line of religious tolerance in the Russian Empire, and there was a feeling that Muravyov was trying to extinguish the crisis of the Orthodox Church solely by humiliating another faith, but he was not a religious figure, but primarily a government and military man who preferred harsh but effective measures. Moreover, his policy was motivated by a response to the same humiliations that Catholics had previously resorted to against the Orthodox population. He saw the stabilization of the situation in the strengthening of the government here, as well as the expansion of the cultural presence of Russians, in particular, through the Orthodox Church. The only question was that ensuring momentary order in the region and a visible solution to religious conflicts did not help stabilize the situation after Muravyov's death. His successors tried to use similar methods, but they lacked flexibility. Where their predecessor sincerely admired the position of the church and wanted to expand the presence of the Russian element in the western provinces, they saw in the church only a repressive tool directed against the Polish nobility. Against this background, the crisis within the Orthodox Church only deepened. Many disappointed people simply renounced their faith and tried to find peace and justice in something else. This led some to join revolutionary circles. For example, this happened with the populist A.K. Solovyov, who carried out an attempt on the life of the tsar. The rest of the subjects either continued to cling to the church or fell into mysticism. Already after the death of Muravyov and Alexander II, sects and charismatic spiritual figures like the elders gained significant popularity. Mystical movements have also gained some popularity. At the same time, the church could not respond to the demands of the time, as it remained deeply limited in its activities. And the half-hearted measures of politicians like Muravyov, although they helped calm the situation for a short period of time, could not fix the situation fundamentally, just as the projects of his political opponents could not. M.N. Muravyov was a man of his time and his kind of activity. He managed to solve the tasks assigned to him, but these solutions were based on a shaky foundation. His decisions were often harsh and illegible. Thus, by Catholics and Poles, he understood all Gentiles in principle, which only turned against himself a part of the population that had previously adhered to a neutral position. Muravyov's decisions did not worsen the crisis of the Orthodox Church. This historical figure was quite a characteristic phenomenon of his era, albeit extremely vivid. The blame lay largely with the ministers, who let the situation take its course and did not try to overcome the crisis after the death of this undoubtedly outstanding statesman. Despite the fact that Muravyov himself sincerely wanted to change the situation and took a very active part in this. The figure of M.N. Muravyov was much more multifaceted and complex than the epithets he received during his life: "hangman", "reactionary", "defender of the faith". However, the era that followed his death was already devoid of that versatility and continued trends that were effective only in times of crisis. Indirectly, a quote from the diary of his political opponent, P.A. Valuev, speaks about the arrival of new times.: "Today is the laying of the chapel, tomorrow is Muravyov's funeral, the day after tomorrow is the execution of Karakozov... there is something broken in the current system of Russia and in everything that is daily before my eyes" [6, p. 147]. References
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