Behavior Patterns of Austrian Civil Population and it's Envolvment in Border Defence during the Ottoman Invasions of 1529 and 1532.

Luniashin Sergei Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0002-8484-1319 Assistant; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University Postgraduate student; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, city, Moscow, ave. Lomonosovsky, 27 slunyashin@narod.ru

At the turn of the XV–XVI centuries. In the military affairs of European states, the process of forming a regular army has begun, which has not least affected the attitude towards civilians. At this time, the troops of the Landsknechts appeared, which remained the most popular mercenary soldiers in Europe until the middle of the 17th century. Their service was regulated by special articles of association (both the charter and the contract), which already from 1513 contained articles prohibiting looting, robbery of merchants and unauthorized destruction of cities. These prohibitions (repeated in charters of 1527, 1570, etc.) were justified by belonging to the common Christian faith and the need to respect the honor of the sovereign who hired the Landsknechts ^{[5, pp. 55-59]}; ^{[14, pp. 159-161] [28, pp. 153-154]}. However, the real opportunity to stop the systematic looting depended on centralized government supply and increased disciplinary measures. Such an opportunity appeared only in the second half of the 17th century, after the Thirty Years' War, when the Landsknechts became associated almost exclusively with rampant violence and robbery.

In the same historical period, a new theater of military operations opened in Europe, where the struggle was particularly fierce. Since the second half of the XV century. The Ottoman Empire subjugated most of the Balkan Peninsula, and in the early 16th century resumed pressure on Hungary. In 1521, the Ottomans "hacked" the border line of fortresses, taking the fortress of Nandorfehervar (modern Belgrade), and on August 29, 1526, King Lajos II of Hungary was defeated and killed in the Battle of Mohac ^{[9, old. 8-11]}. After these events, the main opponent of Sultan Suleiman I in Europe was Ferdinand Habsburg, who led the Danube Monarchy, a state that united Austria, Bohemia and a number of territories of the Kingdom of Hungary on the principle of dynastic union. The new state faced Ottoman expansion as early as 1529, and then in 1532, when Suleiman I launched two campaigns against Vienna. These campaigns made a depressing impression on contemporaries, not only because of the very fact of the Turkish invasion of Central Europe, but also because of the proverbial cruelty of the Ottomans. Contemporaries wrote a lot about this, including Martin Luther, who interpreted the Ottoman invasion as God's punishment for sins ^[22]; ^[12]. Vivid evidence of the fear of the "Turkish danger" are illustrations to stories about the wars with the Ottomans, showing numerous scenes of the Ottomans' massacre of children and women ^[30].

It seems to me interesting to try to look at the first Ottoman campaigns not from the point of view of military confrontation, political significance, perception of these events or propaganda, but to consider the problem of the situation of the civilian population during the Ottoman invasions. The sources at my disposal allow me to make a similar study regarding the inhabitants of the Austrian border region and Vienna, which is quite reasonable, since the Ottomans carried out the main violence in 1529-1532 against the Austrian population. In addition, this view of the problem will allow us to study those aspects of the organization of border defense in Austria in which the local population participated.

The fate and behavior of the civilian population has so far been very poorly studied based on the Ottoman-Habsburg wars. The fact is that the fate and patterns of behavior of the civilian population during the war as a whole become the subject of historical research less often than military operations, and only in the last decades of the 20th century did interest in this side of military history begin to manifest itself. A. Schachlinger's article "The Turkish invasions of 1529 and 1532 and their impact on the topography of the Vienna Forest", published in 1929, refers more to historical geography than to military anthropology, since the author does not write about the behavior of the inhabitants of the settlements mentioned by him ^[26]. It is worth noting that A. Schachlinger has reworked a large amount of data from the archives of Lower Austria in this article. In Russian historiography, the last work affecting the population during the Ottoman-Habsburg wars is T. P. Gusarova's article "Audiatur et altera pars: the capture of Buda in 1686 by the troops of the European allies in the notes of a local resident Isaac Schulhof" ^[2]. The well-known monograph by K. Bracewell, devoted to the organization of life of military settlers (Uskoks) on the Croatian and Slavonian border, partly adjoins the problem considered in my article ^[8]. Biographical studies of noble families ^[31]; ^[32] and individual personalities ^[1] are indirectly related to the topic of peaceful life in military conditions. It is worth noting broader cultural and educational phenomena — for example, in 2024, the Museum of Lower Austria (St. Pelten) organized the exhibition "Auf der Flucht - 25 Objekte erzählen" ("On the run — 25 objects tell") ^[6], which also featured exhibits related to the second Siege of Vienna in 1683

The first clashes between the Austrians and Ottomans were pinpoint, but in 1529 and 1532 thousands of armies descended on the lands of Inner, Lower and Upper Austria, whose task was to capture Vienna. These events are described in a variety of documentary and narrative sources, some of which highlight the fate of the civilian population of the Austrian-Croatian-Hungarian border area. The starting point of this research was my acquaintance with the instructions of Ferdinand I, which are in the State Archives of Austria, issued on August 29, 1529 for the inhabitants of Lower Austria and wordyly exhorted them to leave for the western lands of the Archduchy ^{[17, f. 1-7]}. From the published sources studied at that time, I knew that not all ordinary people had time to follow these instructions, and this contradiction gave rise to the idea of this article. The fate of the civilian population is given attention by the authors of numerous stories about the defense of Vienna in 1529. Most of them are limited to general words about the atrocities of the Ottomans, but some describe the life of refugees and the actions of militias formed from townspeople and peasants. Several reports from the commander of the fortress of Köseg (German: Güns) Miklos Jurisic demonstrates how in 1532 civilians could be involved in border defense ^[11]. Finally, I have examined a number of individual documents in the Austrian State Archives that relate to the issues under study during the campaigns of 1529 and 1532. Based on this set of sources, I set the task of identifying and describing the main patterns of behavior of the civilian population during these invasions, as well as, if possible, explaining them in order to better understand not only the peculiarities of the behavior of civilians, but also the possibilities of ensuring the defense of border territories that existed in the first half of the XVI century in Austria.

The 1529 campaign was prepared by both sides in advance. The Ottomans' preparations began in the autumn of 1528 ^{[3, p. 255]}, and Ferdinand I's preparations were slower than planned. In the spring of 1529, Ferdinand I appealed to the estates of the Holy Roman Empire, Austria and Bohemia with a request for funds and (in the case of the latter countries) about the gathering of the militia. The Austrian Landtag and the Bohemian Diet approved the collection of taxes and contingents, and by early August the first detachments had already been assembled and were preparing to depart. Negotiations at the Imperial Reichstag began in May, but on every issue they were hampered by religious conflict: Protestant princes tried to bargain for privileges for themselves and prevented a positive decision on the troops ^{[27, p. 49]}. Perhaps they were also afraid that the gathered forces might actually be used against them. The advanced detachments of the imperial troops arrived at the theater of military operations only at the end of September and managed to take part in the defense of Vienna ^{[34, f. 6]}, while the rest, along with part of the detachments from Austria and Bohemia, concentrated in Krems and Linz until mid-October ^{[26, s. 511]}; ^{[27, s. 50-51]}.

The Ottomans entered the territory of Hungary on July 19 and did not encounter significant resistance until Buda (only on August 22-23, attacks were carried out on foragers of the main army, as a result of which more than 100 Ottomans died) ^{[29, p. 18]}. The Ottoman troops did not plunder these territories for two reasons: Suleiman I recognized magnate Janos Zapolyi as the king of Hungary and his vassal, who, in turn, supplied the Ottomans with food (however, not in full, since food prices in the camp began to rise from August 6 ^{[25, p. 25]}). The marching journal of the sultan's secretary, Mustafa Chelalzade, even mentions that one of the Sipahs was executed for destroying fields, probably for the edification of the entire army ^{[29, p. 13]}. The Ottomans' restraint towards the Hungarians was also evident after the siege of Buda: despite the fierce resistance of the garrison loyal to Ferdinand I, the city was not plundered. Moreover, almost all the Germans who surrendered were killed or enslaved, while the Hungarians were allowed to enter the service of the new king. When the Ottomans entered Austrian territory, systematic looting began.

It is worth noting that in the Ottoman wars up to the 18th century, the Christian population living in these lands for a long time became victims of violence. At the same time, the practice of foraging troops at the expense of local residents was common at that time, but in the Ottoman military of the XVI century. there were several organizational features that provided additional grounds for looting and violence.

Firstly, the vanguard of the Ottoman troops consisted of akinci — light cavalry, which carried out reconnaissance, occupied strategically important objects (crossings, passes), surrounded or destroyed small detachments and fortifications of the enemy. The Akinci had a partially privileged quasi-military background: joining their ranks was voluntary and provided tax exemption, but during the war the Akinci did not receive centralized supplies (unlike most of the Ottoman army). Usually, the number of Akinci detachments ranged from several dozen to several hundred people ^{[3, pp. 306-307]}. It is understandable that during the raids on enemy territory, the problem of providing fodder and food was acute, and therefore the Akinci supported themselves on enemy territory at the expense of the local population. In 1529, besides Akinci, the vanguard also included mercenary, vassal and allied cavalry. One of the authors gives the most complete list of those who participated in horse raids: "Turks, Tatars, Hussars, Stradiots, Pasha's horsemen" (Thuercken, Thattern, Husseren, Stradiothen, Weyssen Reussen) ^{[34, f. 6]}.

Secondly, an important source of enrichment for the soldiers and for the entire army was the capture of prisoners for sale into slavery. And if there was not always time for this during the march, then in the event of a siege, the entire district was cleared by the Ottomans (primarily by the same Akinci) not only from food and fodder, but also from the free population. So during major campaigns, the robbery or capture of peaceful inhabitants by the Ottoman troops was due not only to motives of cultural and religious discord, but also to military — maintaining combat capability, and economic — thirst for enrichment.

The inhabitants of Austria were warned, albeit belatedly, about the danger that the sultan's soldiers carried with them. On August 29, Ferdinand Habsburg issued a "Warning Mandate" (Warnungmandat) for "two quarters of Lower Austria," in which he informed residents of the possibility of Ottoman attacks, and advised (empfelen wir) "to transport crops, food, and other things from fields and from open, unprotected dwellings to fortified towns and fortresses." and run." The approach of the Ottomans was supposed to be reported by "signal shots, smoke and bonfires", and all those who were obliged to participate in the militia were required to "keep their weapons ready" ^{[17, f. 1]}.

The warning system was supposed to work when the Ottomans reached the border of Hungary and Austria (the mandate lists cities, castles and fortresses: Falkenstein, Krutt, Annger, Marheck, Heinburg, Bruck am Leith, Eisenstat, Scharfenagg, Guns, Forchtenstein, Kirchschlag, Pernstein), and three shots were supposed to signal the approach of enemies., as well as smoke (during the day) and a warning light (at night) ^{[17, f. 2]}. After receiving this signal, the inhabitants had to ring the bells, transmitting the news, and the land militias had to prepare for battles with the Ottoman "raiders and robbers" (streifzug und sakhman) ^{[17, f. 3]}.

The raid prevention system described in the mandate was developed in Austria at the turn of the XV–XVI centuries; probably, the long wars of the Habsburgs with Matyash Korvin contributed to this. In 1511 and 1518, the estates of all the lands of Austria, together with Maximilian I of Habsburg, approved the regulations for land self-defense (the so-called "Innsbruck Libell"), according to which the number of militia assembled, collection points and command positions were fixed, and a signal system common to all the lands of Austria was fixed ^[13]. The latter provided for the same means of notification listed in the 1529 mandate. Judging by the fact that this system was confirmed and refined in 1537, 1542, 1556, 1575 and 1594 ^{[23, pp. 34-35]}, it proved its effectiveness during the Ottoman invasions.

It is characteristic that Ferdinand Habsburg was concerned not only with the evacuation of the population, but also with the preservation of the harvest, i.e. he tried to make it difficult for the Ottomans to obtain food. At the same time, he could no longer ensure the protection of his territories, since most of the combat-ready troops were deployed to defend Vienna, and the detachments that formed and arrived late gathered in the camp near Linz. By the beginning of August, Ferdinand I had only 4-5 thousand soldiers, who were stationed in the garrisons of Buda, Altenburg (Veng. Ovar), Gran (Esztergom) and Brook-on-Leyte ^[16]; ^{[35, f. 6-7]}. When the Ottomans approached, only Buda offered prolonged resistance, while all other cities and fortresses resisted the Ottomans for no more than a day (and some even surrendered without a fight).

According to the sources at my disposal, Ferdinand's mandate had the necessary effect, despite the fact that it was published quite late. However, the very fact that this document appeared shows that Ferdinand did not expect the garrisons to detain the Ottomans, but the war zone approached very quickly. On the day of the publication of the instructions, the advanced detachments of the Ottomans had already reached Buda, and its siege lasted from 2 to 7 September. After the capture of the Hungarian capital, the Turkish troops took a long rest ^{[29, p. 19-20]}. The bulk of the army set off on September 11, and then several foraging detachments separated from it, marching south and north of the Danube, ravaging the countryside and small towns, collecting prisoners and supplying the main forces with food. The first clashes between the Vienna garrison and the Ottoman cavalry units took place on September 19, and from September 23 to September 25, the main forces led by Suleiman I arrived near the city ^{[34, f. 6]}. Therefore, it can be assumed that the advanced units of the Ottomans were ahead of the main army by about 4 days. In this case, if it is known that the Sultan's army overcame the line of border fortresses indicated by Ferdinand in the mandate on September 20 and 21 (20 — Hainburg, 21 — Broek), then the vanguard entered the lands of the Archduchy on September 16. Thus, about 18 days passed from the publication of the mandate (in Vienna) to the appearance of the Ottomans, which gave the civilian population less than two weeks to pack up. A. Schachlinger, referring to archival documents, claims that residents of a number of settlements (named Siefering and Penzing, but there were others) did not leave when the Ottomans approached. They did not leave the region of Lower Austria, but hid in the forests ^{[26, pp. 513-515]}. This did not help everyone: many people, up to 9,000 people, were captured and killed in the vicinity of Penzing ^{[26, p. 528]}. I cannot reliably judge why many thousands of people remained in the war zone. Possible reasons include underestimation of the danger, slowness in gathering, unwillingness to move far from their homes, or overcrowding of fortified settlements with other refugees.

It is impossible to speak unequivocally about the fate of the inhabitants of the fortresses and regions occupied by the Ottomans. On the one hand, M. Chelalzade's magazine contains information only that on September 8, "many captured in the fortress [Buda] were sold [into slavery] in the camp," and on September 10, "sons and daughters of infidels from the fortress were sold, who were promised mercy." On the other hand, the secretary reports only on the actions and movements of the two corps, which were led by Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and Suleiman I, and does not write about the actions of the vanguard and scouts even once.

The participants in the defense of Vienna left memories of the flight of many refugees from the eastern lands who passed by the city, starting on September 19 and ending on September 23-24 (it is obvious that the movement began earlier, but the sources I used cover the defense of the city only from the 19th). One of the authors summarizes the thousands of refugees from other parts of the country, "who came by themselves and brought their poverty with them," another writes about the residents of Vienna: on September 23 or 24, the last detachment of Landsknechts who broke into the city met "up to 5,000 people with women and children, many of whom are also people." Orders, priests, nuns...", previously expelled from the city ^{[4, f. 2]}; ^{[35, f. 10-11]}. By this time, the entire district was already filled with detachments of Ottoman horsemen, whose activity increased after the establishment of the blockade of Vienna, and therefore "most of them [the Turks] were treated so tyrannically and cruelly that it is impossible to fully tell or write, it is so hard for a Christian to experience it in his heart" ^{[34, f. 4]}. The number of refugees indicated in the memoirs cannot be considered completely accurate, but the general order seems reliable, since people who were the last to leave the threatened areas are taken into account. For comparison, it can be noted that by 1520, 30 thousand people lived in Vienna (along with the suburbs) ^{[10, p. 109]}, and the total number of dead and captured by historians of the first half of the 20th century was estimated at 100 thousand people ^{[26, p. 528-259]}.

According to the memoirs of participants in the defense of Vienna, most of the refugees who passed by the capital after September 19 were killed or captured by the Ottomans. Some of the prisoners were later used during the siege as parliamentarians and spies (the former were most likely captured by the military, but regarding the three spies it is known that they were not soldiers; one of them was from Presburg (Pojoni), another from Carinthia, and the third from Vienna)^{[7, f. 2]}; ^{[35, f. 20-21]}. Those who did not have time to leave the city became victims of violence: on September 23, the Ottomans ravaged St. Mark's Hospital on the outskirts of Vienna, after which the garrison made a sortie and recaptured some of the captured people, whom the Ottomans killed and "tortured with hooks and killed" in front of the defenders ^{[4, f. 3]}. A total of 20 to 70 civilians were killed ^{[35, F. 9]}. According to a number of defense participants, on the night of October 15-16, before retreating from Vienna, the Ottomans killed many prisoners. The reports of the defense participants about the fate of the fugitives are retellings of rumors or other people's words, but they seem quite realistic. The memories of the massacre at the end of the siege are supported by the statement that the sentries on the walls heard "such plaintive cries of people as they had never heard before" ^{[4, f. 14]}. These facts are indirectly confirmed by Mustafa Chelalzade. In the log of the campaign, he wrote that on October 17-19, because of muddy roads, it was necessary to burn the baggage carts and abandon a lot of military equipment, and only the guns were loaded onto the ships of the river flotilla ^{[29, p. 27-28]}. On the one hand, the prisoners had to travel without carts, so this measure hardly affected them. On the other hand, the maintenance of several thousand prisoners seems doubtful in conditions when the army, which had been experiencing food problems for some time (from August 6 to November 3, grain prices in the camp rose 27 times ^{[25, p. 25]}), tried in every way to speed up the pace of movement in order to escape from the early frosts. Anyway, with the Ottomans retreating from Vienna, the 1529 campaign came to an end, and the civilians of the region were no longer in danger (except for the almost rebellious garrison of Vienna, but this threat was eliminated with additional payments).

Thus, the fate of those who trusted their lives to escape primarily depended on when they left their homes. In 1530, only 12 thousand people lived in Vienna, in 1563 — 25 thousand, and only by the beginning of the 17th century. the number of inhabitants exceeded 30 thousand ^{[10, p. 110]}. Thus, about 10 thousand townspeople survived and returned after the siege, i.e. up to a third. Of the remaining 15-20 thousand, most likely did not die, but settled in safer areas of the Archduchy, since after 1529 the suburbs of Vienna (in terms of the number of houses approximately equal to the walled center) were not restored until the turn of the XVI–XVII centuries ^{[10, pp. 109-111]}. Resettlement was also a way out for some of the refugees from villages and small communes, since more than 70 settlements ^{[26, pp. 512-523]} suffered from devastation and deliberate fires set by foragers ^[34], troops retreating from Vienna ^{[4, f. 15]}, as well as the locals themselves ^{[9, f. 1-2]}.

Finally, a group of fragmentary reports suggests that some civilians remained in the "fortified towns and fortresses" mentioned in the mandate and defended their own homes, either organizing self-defense or joining the garrison forces. The vast majority of Vienna's residents fled their homes or were expelled by the garrison (this was a common practice that allowed them not to waste precious food on civilians during the siege), but some remained, most of them on duty. Thus, Burgomaster Wolfgang Troy and several members of the city council remained in Vienna during the siege to ensure the life of the garrison ^{[10, p. 34]}. For the same purpose, the courtiers of Ferdinand I also arrived in the city, for example, one of the secretaries of the chancellery, Peter Stern, and the Vice-house of Lower Austria (representative of the monarch) Markus Beck, who served as proviantmaster ^{[10, p. 245]}. A detachment of the city militia (about a thousand people) also remained with them, and the author of one of the memoirs about the siege specifically emphasizes that the militia was formed from citizens, and not from mercenaries at the expense of the city treasury. It is characteristic that this detachment proved itself in battle: during the assault on October 11, the Ottoman troops managed to break into the city between the Carinthian and Stuben gates, and the militia were the first to meet them ^{[4, f. 12-13]}. One of the authors, a professional mercenary, mocks them for the fact that "the townspeople tried themselves and missed 636 people, many of whom fled" ^{[34, pp. 11-12]}. But it is impossible to deny the fact that this detachment was able to hold out for some time and thus made it possible for the detachment that was alerted "from the apartments" to approach, which "after an hour of battle" threw the Ottomans over the wall ^{[4, f. 13]}.

In addition to officials and militias, construction workers and miners (Bergknappen) remained in the city ^{[34, f. 9]}. The latter came from Switzerland and Tyrol, and could also have fled from the mining towns in northwestern Hungary. The builders helped the Landsknechts to erect additional wooden and earthen fortifications, patched breaches in the walls and participated in the construction of a second wall behind a particularly large gap ^{[4, f. 10-11]}. The miners performed one of the most important tasks — they fought against digging under the walls: they listened to which areas the Ottomans were laying mines and digging counter tunnels through which they carried out the laid gunpowder, or ventilation pits (wendig luftlocher) through which the gunpowder was poured with water ^{[35, f. 16-19]}; ^{[29, s. 26]}.

However, civilians remained not only in Vienna and not only in the performance of official duties. In the fairground commune of Perchtolsdorf (Lower Austria), a garrison formed from local residents withstood an Ottoman siege in a fortified church. In one of the clashes, the self-proclaimed commander of the local militia, blacksmith Hans Magelach (Megele), was killed. This episode is known from a tiny note about a court dispute that went on until 1531 over the property of the deceased ^{[18, f. 1]}. The presence in small settlements of such fortifications as the church of St. Augustine in Perchtoldsdorf adjacent to the burg and donjon (preserved to this day) was not uncommon — fortified Churches (Wehrkirche) with towers, loopholes and walls were built throughout Europe, and are often found on the eastern borders of the German region, as well as in adjacent areas where German colonization took place (Silesia, mountainous regions of Hungary, Transylvania) ^[21].

Similar processes were observed during the Ottoman campaign in 1532. This time, the main forces of Suleiman I went to Vienna through Croatia and stayed for almost three weeks at the fortress of Keseg, which was defended by a small royal garrison ("10 heavy horsemen and 28 hussars"). Commandant Miklos Jurisic wrote to Ferdinand I that he had taken under protection "several thousand women, girls and boys" who were fleeing "death [at the hands of] a cruel enemy." To protect the city, he had to arm about 700 "poor poor peasants who fled here." The newly minted militias fought alongside the garrison ^{[11, f. 3-5]} and played a significant role in the fact that Keseg lasted 23 days. Moreover, once, women, old men and children allegedly took part in repelling a particularly fierce assault, who raised such a "loud cry" that the Ottomans retreated, thinking that help was coming from the fortress to defend the gap ^{[11, f. 9]}. Having exhausted the means to resist, Miklos Jurisic eventually surrendered the fortress to the sultan on the terms that no one entered the city except the "hauptman of the Janissaries" and no harm was done to any of the defenders ^{[11, f. 11-12]}. Most likely, this agreement also affected the refugees who had taken refuge in Kesega.

When the Sultan and the Grand Vizier took Keseg, they sent flying detachments under the command of Kasim Bey (numbering about 10,000 people) to devastate the Austrian lands. On September 11 and 12, they attacked Graz, the capital of Styria, having previously ravaged the district, Lower Austria also suffered, in particular, the city of St. Pelten, ravaged by one of the Ottoman detachments ^{[33, f. 22-23]}. Near Graz, they were repulsed by the local militia, but the vice-chancellor of Styria, Michael Mayener, wrote in his letter to the vice-chancellor of Carinthia, not doubting that the city would have been captured if Count Hans Katzianer had not arrived with a detachment of about 3 thousand infantry and 1.6 thousand horsemen ^{[19, F. 1-2]}; ^{[33, F. 19-20]}. G. Katzianer acted in conjunction with the detachments of Count Palatine Philip and Bishop Christopher Rauber, and on September 18-19, the main forces of Kasim Bey were surrounded and defeated in a series of clashes. This ended the campaign of 1532, and in February 1533 Suleiman I and Charles V concluded a truce.

Since the mid-1530s, Ferdinand Habsburg spent large amounts of money on strengthening Vienna and creating several lines of border fortresses: around Vienna, on the borders of Austria and Hungary, along the borders with the Ottomans ^{[15, pp. 71-84]}. During the truce, Uskok military settlers were settled in the lands of Croatia and Slavonia, patrolling the area and repelling small raids. To a large extent, they were able to protect the Austrian border area from new threats, unless it was a question of major attacks in which thousands of Ottoman soldiers took part ^{[20, f. 2]}. Only the system of more than 50 fortresses with 15,000 soldiers in garrisons, created by the mid-1550s, provided reliable protection for the region ^{[24, p. 25-27]}, so the next time the Austrian civilians faced the Ottomans only during the march on Vienna in 1683.

So, an analysis of various sources shows that all models of behavior of the civilian population during the Ottoman invasions of 1529 and 1532 were not only based on an established tradition (largely common to civilians in any region), but were also regulated by Austrian law. Ferdinand I's "Preventive Mandate" recommended avoiding contact with the enemy by fleeing or retreating to the protection of the fortress walls, and a long tradition encouraged this; this is exactly what most residents of the Austrian borderlands did. However, several tens of thousands of people could not or did not have time to comply with the recommendations of the ruler and became victims of the Ottoman invasion. Armed resistance was also provided for in special documents of 1511 and 1518; and such episodes were highlighted in significant numbers – however, a small number of peaceful inhabitants participated in them. Thus, the measures taken before and on the eve of the invasion to save the civilian population proved effective, but only partially: a significant number of peasants and townspeople, for various reasons, did not follow the provisions of the decrees, regulations and recommendations of the ruling elites.

It can be argued that the choice — to fight or to flee — primarily depended on the time that remained for escape, even if there was an opportunity (the presence of fortifications in a peaceful settlement or a stock of weapons in a fortress) and the tactical need to resist. In the latter case, the civilian population actually ceased to be such and came under the command of military administrators as a militia, or created its own military hierarchy. People of peaceful professions made a significant contribution to the defense of Vienna and Kesseg in 1529 and 1532: without valuable specialists in the first case and without a sufficient number of militia in the second, the garrisons of both cities would have been much weaker.

A characteristic feature is the fact that resistance to the enemy was not accidental, but systemic. It was provided for by special instructions of 1511 and 1518, as in most European countries of the early sixteenth century. However, these instructions are unlikely to have had a serious impact if peaceful coexistence with the Ottomans was possible. Probably, the desire to resist reinforced the knowledge of the fate of those who found themselves defenseless before the Ottomans — and Ferdinand I, by his decrees, tried to convey to the inhabitants of the border region that the arrival of the Ottomans meant death, ruin or slavery. And the fate of the people who faced the invading forces confirmed this (the only exception was the population of those cities that were surrendered to the Ottomans without a fight or on honorable terms). Therefore, it is not surprising that in many cases civilians joined the fight against the Ottomans and did not give up until they had the strength to resist; moreover, during the campaign in 1532, unlike in 1529, there were no cases when residents of fortified settlements surrendered to the mercy of the conqueror. Until the organization of the Military Frontier in the 1550s, the participation of the militia remained an important, although far from the main, element of the military defense of the Austrian lands.